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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is occasioned by my role as one of several responders to
Dr. Larry Laudan’s paper at the Seton Hall Law School symposium honoring
D. Michael Risinger.1 Although a brief comment could suffice, thanks to the
flexibility of law reviews and their relative indifference to article length, I’ve
taken the opportunity to offer an extended comment on Laudan and other
authors whose positions on criminal procedure and criminal justice I label
anti-Blackstonian. The authors reviewed herein are (i) Daniel Epps,2 (ii)
*

Professor, Criminal Justice Department, Wayne State University. Thanks to Shawn
Bushway, Paul Cassell, Steven Drizin, Gipsy Escobar, Brian Forst, Saul Kassin, Richard Leo,
Will Ortman, Bill Thompson and Greta Zalman for helpful comments.
1
For other coments, see Keith Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System,
48 SETON HALL L. REV 1265 (2018); and Roger Koppl, Comment on Laudan, 48 SETON HALL
L. REV 1255 (2018).
2
Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(2015). Prof. Epps declined to respond to my critique, pointing out that he had responded to
other critiques; see Daniel Epps, Essay: One Last Word on the Blackstone Principle, 102 VA.
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Larry Laudan,3 along with Ronald Allen,4 and (iii) Paul Cassell.5 These
authors do not agree on all points and their approaches differ in some
respects. Nevertheless, their core positions share the view that reducing
defendants’ procedural protections would make criminal trials more accurate
and would reduce crime—positions that can reasonably be labeled antiBlackstonian.6
At the outset it is useful to borrow from Epps who distinguishes the
famous Blackstone ratio from the Blackstone principle. The Blackstone
ratio—”it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer”7 was the subject of an amusing and informative article that rang
changes on all its variations.8 The ratio seems to attract the attention of
quantitatively oriented scholars who enjoy manipulating its parameters.9
Among the anti-Blackstonians, Allen and Laudan are most drawn to taking
the Blackstone ratio seriously. Epps does not think much of the ratio;
instead, he defines a Blackstone principle:
Of course, no one maintains that our system produces exactly ten
false acquittals for every false conviction — nor do many hold that
out as a serious goal. But the constant recitation of Blackstone’s
L. REV. ONLINE 34; responding to Joel S. Johnson, Note: Benefits of Error in Criminal Justice,
102 VA. L. REV. 237 (2016); John Bronsteen & Jonathan S. Masur, The Overlooked Benefits
of the Blackstone Principle, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 289 (2015), and Laura I. Appleman, A
Tragedy of Errors: Blackstone, Procedural Asymmetry, and Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 91 (2015)
3
LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIAL AND ERRORS? (2016); Larry
Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Patterns in Criminal
Prosecutions by ‘Empiricizing’ the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False Acquittals
Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243 (2018).
4
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 65
(2008). At times I will evaluate Dr. Laudan’s work alone and at other times refer to their joint
work.
5
Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some Skeptical
Observations on Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1063
(2011-12) [hereinafter, Cassell, Freeing]; Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent
without Freeing the Guilty? Thoughts on Innocence Reforms That Avoid Harmful Trade-Offs,
in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING
THE INNOCENT 264-290 (Daniel S. Medwed ed. 2017). [hereinafter, Cassell, Protect].
6
As a result of my critique of Paul Cassell’s work and his reply, Prof. Risinger expanded
the Symposium to include Prof. Cassell’s response and my reply. Rather than incorporating
all of Prof. Cassell’s points in a revision of this Article, my complete position should include
“A Reply to Professor Cassell,” 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1493 (2018).
7
Robert J. Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer:” Evaluating State Safeguards
Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 1301, 1301 (2010-11) (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 358 (1760)).
8
Alexander Volokh, Aside: n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).
9
“The continuing interest in trying to fix the Blackstone ratio is scarcely surprising.”
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 48. Epps and others are indifferent to or even
dismissive about this fascination.
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ratio matters, even if the numbers themselves do not. The maxim
is “a slogan meant to convey a message quickly and memorably,”
standing for a more general rule, which I’ll call the “Blackstone
principle”: in distributing criminal punishment, we must strongly
err in favor of false negatives (failures to convict the guilty) in
order to minimize false positives (convictions of the innocent),
even if doing so significantly decreases overall accuracy.10
Whether or not no one maintains a 10-to-1 or some other ratio as a
description or goal of verdict error, Epps’s clear statement of the principle is
a helpful starting point.
To summarize each author, Epps presents a major exposition of the
Blackstone principle with an elaborate jurisprudential argument for
replacing procedural asymmetry favoring defendants (i.e., the Blackstone
principle) with a principle of neutral adjudication.11 His concern is with the
principle itself and not with procedural rules with which it is consistent.
Epps dismisses the Blackstone ratio as one that “can’t be taken literally.”12
Laudan and Allen, contrary to Epps, are concerned with the ratio of false
acquittals to false convictions; in The Law’s Flaws, Laudan calculates a
different ratio. Although Laudan, unlike Epps, agrees with the Blackstone
principle that false convictions are more harmful than false acquittals, his
numerical calculations with crime and criminal justice data show that
defendants’ advantages in procedural adjudication rules result in excessive
false acquittals. Consequently, he argues for changing the standard of proof
for recidivist defendants from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and
convincing evidence, and advocates eliminating a host of pro-defendant
criminal procedure rules.13 Cassell’s article and chapter do not explicitly
address the Blackstone ratio, although he adopts some of Allen and Laudan’s
10

Epps, supra note 2, at 1068. Michael Risinger agrees: “As for the ‘Blackstone
ratio,’ . . . I believe that all we can say about the intendment of this expression was that it was
meant as a general declaration that, for any given crime, an error that convicts an innocent
person is much worse morally than an error that acquits a guilty person.” D. Michael Risinger,
Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL
L. REV. 991, 1002 (2010) [hereinafter Risinger, Tragic]. Taking the Blackstone ratio
seriously can produce weird results. LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 47. For
example, Laudan asserts, “Blackstone opined that a false positive was ten times more harmful
than a false negative.” This statement is specious. There is nothing in Blackstone other than
the quote to suggest that he engaged in this come of comparative harm analysis. Laudan,
however, seems not to be concerned with a qualitative measure of harm but rather with the
number of people victimized by two kinds of error. See infra III.B.1. See also Keith A.
Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 133, 136 (2008).
11
See Part III. A. 1 infra.
12
Epps, supra note 2, at 1072.
13
See Part III. B. 1 & 2 infra.
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reasoning. Unlike Epps and like Laudan, Cassell accepts the Blackstone
principle.14 Unlike both Epps and Laudan and Allen, Cassell is concerned
with sources of error throughout the criminal justice system, not just the
adjudication process. As a self-defined innocence skeptic, Cassell offers a
mix of proposals that would benefit and harm defendants’ interests; some
would purportedly improve system accuracy and others might generate
greater error.15 The overall direction of Cassell’s proposals would reduce
defendants’ procedural protections. I have no doubt that Epps, Laudan and
Allen, and Cassell genuinely grieve over false convictions. However,
although Laudan claims adherence to a variation of the Blackstone ratio and
Cassell agrees with the Blackstone principle, I still count them as antiBlackstonians because, despite their claims, in my view their programs
would (1) seriously weaken defendants’ rights, (2) not reduce wrongful
convictions, and (3) not enhance public safety.16
These authors advance theories and propose rules that seek to make the
adjudication process more accurate and that would reduce overall harm to
society by reducing the number of false acquittals relative to false
convictions. To Epps, rejecting the Blackstone principle “would mean better
committing ourselves to accuracy in criminal adjudication.”17 Allen and
Laudan conclude that “the objective should be the pursuit of overall factual
accuracy, and we think much could be done that would, in general, facilitate
truth finding rather than just one aspect of it.”18 Cassell, also concerned with
the one-sided skew of the innocence movement and innocence scholars,
asserts, “it is possible to craft reforms that help to protect the innocent
without allowing the escape of the guilty.”19 Because all these authors would
14
“Proceeding from the perspective of “innocentrism” (that is, the idea that exoneration
of the “innocent” ought to be privileged over other values in the criminal justice system), I
suggest eight proposals for reformFalse” Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1065.
15
See Part III. C. 1 infra.
16
See Part III. A. 2, B. 3 & 4, C. 2 infra.
17
Epps, supra note 2, at 1143.
18
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 89. This conclusion follows a somewhat polemical
article that takes innocence scholars to task for fastening on wrongful convictions and not
considering wrongful acquittals. They propose, by way of examples, six procedural reforms
that would make the criminal justice process more accurate: robust discovery, videotaping
police interviews of witnesses and suspects, explaining the meaning of privileges to juries,
eliminating the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, allowing retrial after acquittal on the basis
of substantial evidence, and admitting corroborated, voluntary, non-Mirandized confessions,
ibid., at 89-90.
19
Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 264. His list of prescriptions overlaps with those of
Allen and Laudan: implementing the Brady requirement, increasing defense and prosecutorial
resources to focus on innocence issues, abolishing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
replacing Miranda with videotaped interrogation, barring state habeas petitions without a
colorable claim of factual innocence, and requiring defense attorneys to ask clients if they
committed the crime charged. Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1084-95. While some of
these proposals are balanced, for the most part they read like a prosecutor’s wish list.
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purportedly achieve these laudable goals by neutralizing the theory of prodefendant procedural asymmetry (Epps), by reducing the standard of proof
(Laudan and Allen), and by eliminating some procedural protections
(Cassell), is no stretch to label these authors anti-Blackstonians.
The innocence movement has influenced these authors.20 Along with
most criminal justice professionals, the anti-Blackstonians now accept that
false convictions are not vanishingly rare. Cassell, who challenged early
innocence scholarship in the 1980s before DNA exonerations sparked the
movement,21 now seems to believe that the number of false convictions is
nontrivial.22 His article and chapter respond most directly to innocence
issues among the four authors. As an innocence skeptic, he raises the
reasonable concern (along with Laudan and Allen) that innocence reforms
not increase false acquittals. Allen and Laudan’s article reacts to a
perception of excessive innocence movement concern for exonerees and
little concern for crime victims.23 In their article, they reason their way to a
wrongful conviction rate of between one-half of one percent and one percent,
but by 2016 Laudan accepted a wrongful conviction rate of about three
percent.24 Epps’s major arguments are largely orthogonal to innocence
movement concerns. He develops a concept that the Blackstone principle
has dynamic effects that generate error and, contrary to common thinking,
works to the detriment of criminal defendants. The Blackstone principle
should therefore be dismissed as an organizing principle of criminal
procedure. Epps’s dynamic thesis obliquely comments on innocence
movement positions.

20

See infra Part II. A for a description of the innocence movement.
Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Comment: Protecting the Innocent: A
Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121(1988).
22
See Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 266.
23
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 66 (“The significance of the externalities that
wrongful executions impose may be seen in the emergent national concern that has reached a
crescendo in the last decade over the accuracy of capital convictions specifically and the
criminal justice system generally.”). The authors loosely link the concern for wrongful
convictions, which implies dissatisfaction with government, with what they perceive as a
widespread attack on the legitimacy of the American state since the 1960s, slyly linking liberal
American critiques of governance to Mao Zedong’s initiation of the Cultural Revolution, ibid.
at 66-67. Curiously, the current authoritarian (and increasingly repressive) regime in China
attempts to remediate many of its citizens’ concerns, like air pollution. The Chinese
party/state reacted to widespread demonstrations set off by the wrongful conviction of
homicide defendants with what I interpret as a Chinese innocence movement that operates
within the party/state. See Marvin Zalman, Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Analysis
in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 449-72 (A. J. Treviño ed., 2018).
24
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 71; LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, at xi, passim. Laudan
states that he borrows this figure from assessments by innocence projects. Id. at 50-55.
21
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As a self-defined innocence scholar, I analyze the works of Epps,
Laudan and Allen, and Cassell from an “innocentric” perspective.25 This is
a bit odd because innocence movement advocacy and scholarship differs
from the standard criminal defense orientation. The usual juxtaposition of
Blackstonian and anti-Blackstonian is defense vs. prosecution, or in
reformist terms that Risinger popularized, between Romillist or Payleyite
positions.26 These Enlightenment Era thinkers staked out their positions
when English criminal justice predated the bureaucratic system that arose in
the nineteenth century.27 In eighteenth century England no organized police
force existed and prisons were not yet invented. Order depended on the in
terrorem use of the death penalty and the criminal law as applied by judges
who mixed harshness and mercy, and whose punishment options were
limited to the noose, flogging, fines and transportation to the colonies.28
Contemporary innocence reforms address an array of justice system
processes that did not then exist, including police investigation and forensic
science, which are believed to generate errors that lead not only to wrongful
convictions, but also to wrongful acquittals. In this light, the trial-related
focus of the anti-Blackstonians, especially of Laudan and Allen and of Epps,
seems archaic and overly abstract.29
My critique might be a case of scholars talking past each another. I
argue that Epps and Cassell lack empirical support for their positions, while
Laudan and Allen’s reductionist empiricism misses relevant evidence. A
25
Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549 (2008). See Marvin
Zalman, Criminal Justice System Reform and Wrongful Conviction: A Research Agenda, 17
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 468 (2006); Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful
Convictions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1465 (2011) [hereinafter, Zalman, Integrated]; Marvin Zalman
& Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 955 (2014). I am not
affiliated with any Innocence Network (http://innocencenetwork.org/) organization, but do
serve as a “senior advisor” to Proving Innocence (http://www.provinginnocence.org/aboutpi/senior-advisors.html), a local innocence organization that provides some investigation
assistance to the Michigan Innocence Clinic (http://www.law.umich.edu/clinical/innocencecli
nic/Pages/default.aspx).
26
D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 763-764 (2007) [hereinafter Risinger,
Innocents Convicted]. Risinger introduced readers to two late eighteenth century English
leaders. Paley believed that convicting the innocent is inevitable and a necessary price paid
to maintain security while Romilly abhorred wrongful convictions and argued for many
reforms to avoid them. They wrote in the context of an Enlightenment sensibility, see J. M.
KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 294-98 (1992).
27
SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2nd
ed. 1997) [hereinafter WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE].
28
LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
FROM 1750 (1948); Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in DOUGLAS
HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
17-63 (1975).
29
Epps, supra note 2, at 1081-87 uses this historical view to support his antiBlackstonian argument.
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criminal law theorist like Epps might shrug off my criticism as not relevant
to his vocation. But where empirical evidence contradicts a theoretical
position the theory must be reconsidered. Law is ultimately a profession that
shapes the way in which individuals and institutions behave, which means
that legal theory must at some point be concerned with empirical effects.30
The latter point is amplified by my position as a law/criminal justice scholar,
and my understanding of the difference in how criminologists and legal
scholars address the same issues.
Part II includes three sections that establish contexts for thinking about
the Blackstone ratio and Blackstone principle and that draw admittedly
tendentious conclusions. Part II.A briefly describes the innocence
movement and suggests that the classic Blackstonian and anti-Blackstonian
debate has been changed by the innocence movement’s research and reform
project. Part II.B describes Brian Forst’s labor-economics vision of balanced
justice, which is more comprehensive and less polemical than that of Epps
and Laudan and Allen. The latter describe only glimpses of balanced justice,
mixed with teleological arguments. Although Forst’s policy orientation
seems more Blackstonian than not, the book-length scope of his work and
his data-driven and criminological perspective provides a less argumentative
basis for analysis. Part II.C describes two Blackstone ratio analyses by
criminologists Shawn Bushway and Brian Forst. Bushway describes an
empirical imbalance between potential suspects not convicted and
defendants convicted for homicides. I argue that this real imbalance is wellknown and results mainly from features of society, law enforcement, and
prosecution rather from the operations of trial courts. Forst’s mathematical
manipulation of the ratio shows that the population of false negatives
(wrongful acquittals) must be hugely expanded in order to reduce the number
of false positives (wrongful convictions).31 I argue that the exercise is
hypothetical and does not describe the actual court or justice system. These
arguments form the core of my position that Laudan and Allen and to a
degree Epps, are fundamentally mistaken.
Part III describes the positions of Epps, Laudan and Allen, and Cassell,
followed by “internal” critiques that are peculiar to each author, although
some overlap occurs.
Part IV is an “external” critique of antiBlackstonianism that provides empirical examples of a justice system
30

This, of course, does not mean that particular legal philosophers must work out all or
any of the practical implications of their positions. However, Laudan and Allen and Cassell
either make strong empirical predictions or operate on the level of standard legal scholarship,
which implies conclusions that have real-world effects; Epps writes on a theoretical plane but
does make empirical/theoretical predictions that I take empirical aim at.
31
False negatives/false positives can be narrowly defined as false acquittals/convictions,
which implicate only the trial process, or more broadly viewed as errors of impunity/due
process, which implicate the entire criminal justice system.
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stacked against defendants and filled with error-generating processes that are
orthogonal to anti-Blackstonian concerns. In such a system antiBlackstonian reforms could generate greater error.32 Part V, the Conclusion,
provides positive reasons for the Blackstone principle that rest not only on
the anti-Blackstonian critique in Part III and the depiction of a flawed,
prosecution-friendly justice system in Part IV, but also on the ground of
constraining government power, which is orthogonal to concerns of verdict
accuracy.
Although I am critical of the works reviewed herein, it must be said that
at the most general level their base idea—that trade-offs exist in all social
processes including criminal justice—is not wrong, which is surely why the
“Paleyite-Romillist” debate has continued for more than two centuries.33
The innocence movement’s growth period (which has probably not ended),
seeks to potentially reduce the incidence of errors by emphasizing the
benefits of innocence reforms based on logic and scientific research. It is
noteworthy that many innocence reforms seek to improve system accuracy
in ways that increase the potential of both convicting the guilty and notselecting or quickly exonerating innocent suspects. Still, the point that most
pro-innocence scholarship does not focus on trade-offs is fair criticism.
When Allen and Laudan, however, seek to explore “a highly complicated
matrix of relationships” where serious crime impunity (“other equally
32
The anti-Blackstonians critiqued in my article discuss issues, which have been the
basis of research by criminologists and criminal justice social scientists. As a side comment,
I suggest that some of what I see as serious deficiencies in their work could have been avoided
by collaboration with crime scientists or by paying greater attention to criminological
literature. This point hit home when Epps, supra note 2, at 1117, referred to “criminal justice
scholars” who abhor hyper- incarceration, and mentioned to two superb law-school based
scholars. In my world “criminal justice scholars” hang out in departments of criminal justice,
criminology, and sociology. Very few are employed in law schools; indeed the only one who
comes to mind is Jeffrey Fagan at Columbia Law School. Ideally, crime scholarship should
see greater cooperation of empirical and doctrinal scholars, but I don’t expect a rush of greater
collaboration because professional rewards are generally not enhanced by crossing
disciplinary boundaries.
Neither legal scholars nor social scientists make the practical agency decisions or the
policy innovations made by a range of administrators, supervisors, legislators, and judges.
But their ideas can stimulate, impede or influence reforms. Scholars and researchers, of
course, have an obligation to extend the imagination of system personnel and policy makers
and in doing so might go pretty far out on some weak limbs. It helps for academics who study
criminal justice (whether in law, social science or both), a field of inquiry which is bounded
by the realities of practice, to strive to appreciate the system’s complexity into which our ideas
may fall. An effort to know the system as best as possible might improve our scholarship by
channeling efforts into usable forms and to avoid injecting ideas that could generate
unintended and possibly deleterious consequences. The ideas that animate justice scholarship
will inevitably reflect the ideological variations in the larger polity. However, before law
professors or philosophers make claims about the effects of their ideas on crime or on justice
system operations, it would be helpful for them to consult relevant empirical research.
33
See Risinger, supra note 26.
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horrifying mistakes”) “go unnoticed in the conventional discourse,” their
quantitative reasoning is wrapped up in a polemic that seems aimed less at
sorting out real costs and benefits but more at drowning the innocence
movement like a kitten in a bathtub.34 As will be seen, a more balanced and
far from obscure cost-benefit analysis exists which has not been referenced
by the anti-Blackstonians.35 Also, anti-Blackstonians are not wrong to keep
the suffering of serious crime victims in mind, but my observations of
innocence lawyers and policy people is that in practice and in policy they are
sensitive to the pains of crime victimization.36
These thoughts about costs and benefits lead me to characterize the
approaches of Epps, Laudan and Allen, and, in a different register, Cassell,
as kinds of “global” anti-Blackstonianism, in that they analyze the entire
justice process through the Blackstone principle, or the Blackstone ratio, or
a conservative criminal procedure filter. In doing so, their analyses try to
cover too much ground in too little space and result in arguments with
weaknesses that I seek to expose in this Article. Other scholars honing in on
specific processes can offer more convincing anti-Blackstonian arguments,
which is where the innocence movement’s intellectual battle lines will surely
be drawn. One prominent example is the work of Steven Clark, a
psychological scientist who has empirically challenged the benefits of
eyewitness reforms.37 I would finally note that this Article cannot address
every argument made by anti-Blackstonians.38

34

Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 68.
I refer to Brian Forst, Errors of Justice, see infra note 80.
36
Although this is a worthy point in Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 85 they seem
almost to libel innocence advocates with a lack of concern for crime victims by being
concerned with only one kind of error, an attitude that I’ve never sensed in the presence of
innocence lawyers or exonerees. I doubt if an attempt to weigh relative harms is useful or
reasonably possible (e.g., is a murder always worse than a wrongful conviction resulting in a
life spent in/dying in prison). While some violent crime victimizations do not always leave
much if any trauma (e.g., some armed robberies), I assert that a wrongful conviction always
leaves a defendant with, at the least, a profound distrust in the legitimacy of the justice system
and at most severe psychological incapacitation. See Adrian Grounds, Psychological
Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY &
CRIM. JUST., 165 (2004).
37
See e.g., Steven E. Clark, Cost and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform:
Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSPECTIVES PSYCH. SCI. 238 (2012); see also
Cassell, Protect supra note 5, at 267, which alludes to this issue; see discussion at infra, Part
III.C.2.f.
38
At several points in this article I point out specific points not addressed. Epps, supra
note 2, at 1089-92, briefly reviews the works of other thinkers, including Laudan, who have
been critical of a Blackstonian approach.
35
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II. CONTEXTS FOR THINKING ABOUT THE BLACKSTONE
PRINCIPLE
The innocence movement provides the impetus and the setting for the
contemporary anti-Blackstonians, especially Laudan and Allen and Cassell.
The partial sketch of the movement herein helps place the anti-Blackstonian
writings in context. Additional context is provided by reviewing analyses of
two criminologists with quantitative and labor-economic skill sets. Forst
provides a vision of a balanced criminal justice system; Bushway and Forst
analyze the Blackstone ratio in ways that provide useful comparisons those
of the anti-Blackstonians.39
A. The Innocence Movement and Its Critics
The innocence movement has existed for about 25 years; its
organizational core lies in more than 50 innocence projects or
organizations.40 I have described it as “a related set of activities by lawyers,
cognitive and social psychologists, other social scientists, legal scholars,
government personnel, journalists, documentarians, freelance writers, and
citizen-activists who, since the mid-1990s, have worked to free innocent
prisoners and rectify perceived causes of miscarriages of justice in the United
States.”41 Most innocence reform efforts target practices thought to generate
(or not screen out at trial) erroneous convictions, especially in police
investigation (lineups, interrogation, informants), forensic science (faulty
methods like bite mark analysis; deficient crime laboratories), prosecution
(failure to turn over exculpatory evidence to defendants, prejudicial remarks
in closing statements), ineffective defense counsel, and limited postconviction review.42 As a result, justice system professionals now accept the
regular occurrence of a non-trivial number of wrongful convictions.43 Until
recently innocence scholars gave little attention to adjudication as a source
of error.44
39
Note that Epps, supra note 2, is more concerned with establishing a theoretical basis
for his anti-Blackstonian stance rather than advocating procedural changes; nevertheless, it
seems that his argument could be employed to weaken procedural rules that favor defendants.
40
See INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://innocencenetwork.org/.
41
Zalman, Integrated, supra note 25, at 1468.
42
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE
INNOCENT 40-56 (Daniel S. Medwed ed. 2017).
43
See ROBERT J. NORRIS, EXONERATED: A HISTORY OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT
(2017) [hereinafter Norris, Exonerated]; Richard A. Leo, The Criminology of Wrongful
Conviction: A Decade Later, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82 (2017).
44
Marvin Zalman, Notes on the ‘Adversary System’ and Wrongful Convictions, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 71-91
(C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias, eds., 2008) [hereinafter, Zalman, Notes].
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The innocence movement is, ostensibly, politically and ideologically
neutral. It is often said, “[n]obody wants to convict an innocent person.”
Some prominent conservatives have championed the innocence movement.45
In this spirit Jon Gould described the Innocence Commission for Virginia as
nonprofit, nongovernmental, and nonpartisan.46 Robert Norris interviewed
innocence movement founders who raised the intriguing speculation that
penal harshness may have played a role in the movement’s rise. The
innocence movement, paradoxically, arose just as America’s “tough on
crime” and pro-death penalty policies reached their apogee in the 1990s and
well before political conservatives became skittish about the costs of mass
incarceration and began to advocate milder punishments.47 As penalties
became increasingly draconian, “tough on crime” states passed strong
innocence laws; an example is Texas, whose exoneree compensation law
offers the highest awards in the country.48 According to Steve Saloom,
former Innocence Project policy director, “[t]hose who want to be tough on
crime also want to seem like they’re being fair at the same time.”49
Yet, partisan divides often occur in valence issues, usually over
implementation methods.50 Soon after the innocence movement came into
public consciousness criticisms arose from defense-oriented scholars on the
“left” and a few critics on the “right.” The defense critics were concerned
that juries would absorb the lessons of “actual innocence” and would
disregard judges’ instructions regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
they would return not guilty verdicts only when convinced of a defendant’s
actual innocence, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.51 These fears
45
See e.g., Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission:
Catching Cases that Fall Through the Cracks, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 249-65 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano, eds., 2014) (discussing
North Carolina Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake); see JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE
COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 58 (2008) (discussing William Sessions, former federal judge and FBI director under
President Reagan); Jon B. Gould, Introduction, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 5 (2014) (explaining former Attorney General Edwin
Meese told Jon Gould that he supported the study of and rectification of wrongful
convictions).
46
Gould, Commission, supra note 45.
47
HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION ERA POLITICS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015); DAVID DAGAN AND STEVEN M. TELES,
PRISON BREAK: WHY CONSERVATIVES TURNED AGAINST MASS INCARCERATION (2016).
48
Robert J. Norris, Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted, 23
CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 352 (2012).
49
Norris, Exonerated, supra note 43, at 135.
50
Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith & Angie Kiger, Officials’ Estimates of the Incidence of
‘Actual Innocence’ Convictions, 25 JUST. Q. 72, 74 (2008); see also W. M. OLIVER, THE LAW
& ORDER PRESIDENCY 125 (2003).
51
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM.
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have not materialized. Another defense criticism, trenchantly stated by Abbe
Smith, was that growing concern about actual innocence devalues legitimate
concerns about factually guilty defendants, most of whom are society’s
losers, who are more in need of support than the stereotypical predator who
the public imagines when the label “criminal” is brandished.52
On the right, a noted scholar-judge erroneously claimed that innocence
movement activists believe that one-half of all convicted defendants are
innocent; his own wrongful conviction estimate was in fact close to the low
estimate made by innocence scholars.53 A prosecutor’s casual and misguided
effort to dismiss the number of wrongful convictions,54 although taken to
heart by a Supreme Court Justice,55 was simply wrong.56 Another more
potent criticism is found in the work of philosopher of science Larry Laudan,
who along with evidence professor Ronald Allen, has staked out a critique
of the innocence movement based on cost/benefit reasoning57 and an analysis
of the Blackstone ratio, which is reviewed herein.
Two innocence movement defenses against such critiques appeared in
2008; they positioned the innocence movement in a middle ground,
threatening neither traditional defense nor crime control orientations. Daniel
Medwed, replying in part to a death penalty cost/benefit analysis,58
challenged a “mechanical” view of the Blackstone ratio, stating that
“wrongful convictions do not seem to be incidental effects of a system
designed to maximize social benefit [i.e., of a Blackstone ratio]; on the
contrary they are direct, unabashed examples of the system’s flaws.”59
Medwed also argued that defining a conviction as one of actual innocence

L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587 (2005); Raymond, infra note 165.
52
Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing
Anxiety about Innocence Projects, 13 UNIV. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315 (2010); DAVID
FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER’S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
(2006); Steve Saloom also links Smith’s point to pro-innocence activism among
conservatives. See, Norris supra note 43, at 128 (“the harsher the punishments, the more you
want to keep the innocent out because really you’re trying to scapegoat [offenders].”) (quoting
Steve Saloom).
53
Morris Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 663
(2007).
54
Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 26, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/26/opinion/the-innocent-and-the-shammed.html
(last
visited May 12, 2018).
55
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185-99 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
56
Samuel R. Gross, Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat in the Marsh, 105 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67-72 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/
vol105/gross.pdf
57
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4.
58
Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 625 (2005).
59
Medwed, Innocentrism, supra note 25, at 1564.
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“should aim as close to certainty as possible” but not be based on absolute
proof. The latter standard, advocated by some innocence movement critics,
would severely undercount wrongful convictions.60
Keith Findley identified the innocence movement as a new justice
paradigm—a “Reliability Model” aiming for investigation and prosecution
accuracy. His model is situated between Herbert Packer’s adversary
conceptualization of criminal justice as marked by the “Due Process” and
“Crime Control” models.61 Both Findley and Medwed agreed that in the
“real world” there are and must be some limits to which the justice system
will go to prevent convicting the innocent. Accordingly, their essays were
mindful of the time and resource constraints that attend any proposed justice
system change to reduce the number of false convictions.62
In all fairness, the innocence movement has a strong defense flavor.63
Most innocence lawyers came from the world of criminal defense, and the
Innocence Network64 appears to have informal ties with the National
60

Medwed, Innocentrism, supra note 25, at 1563. The definition-of-wrongfulconviction issue is not entirely settled and is a potential area of contest. See Richard A. Leo,
Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement? The Risks and Rewards of
Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTYFIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 57-83 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017).
61
Findley, New Paradigm, supra note 10; see HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-246 (1968) (hereinafter PACKER, LIMITS).
62
The gist of their essays, especially Findley’s, was to sketch out a defense of innocence
movement reforms in broad terms, but their attentiveness to a working system indicates that
they would not seek impossible or unfeasible changes. In Findley’s case, he and the
Wisconsin Innocence Project worked with a bipartisan commission established by the
Wisconsin legislature to develop accuracy-enhancing reforms in relation to police lineup and
interrogation procedures, see Keith Findley & Larry Golden, The Innocence Movement, the
Innocence Network, and Policy Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 93-110 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano, eds., 2014). The cost/benefit
and other practical constraints on reforms occur in the give-and-take of the practical politics
that underlie virtually all policymaking. For two innocence reform examples, see Rebecca
Brown & Stephen Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identification Reform and the Role
of Police Leadership, 42 U. BALTIMORE L. REV. 535 (2013) and Mumma, North Carolina,
supra note 45.
63
“[W]hile the Innocence Movement is largely perceived as a defense–oriented
movement, its rhetoric includes respect for fundamental crime control values.” Findley, New
Paradigm, supra note 10, at 141.
64
The Innocence Network:
“is an affiliation of 69 organizations from all over the world dedicated
to providing pro bono legal and investigative services to individuals
seeking to prove innocence of crimes for which they have been
convicted, and working to redress the causes of wrongful convictions.
Currently, the Innocence Network consists of 56 U.S. based and 13
non-U.S. based organizations.”
http://innocencenetwork.org/ (last visited May 12, 2018).
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Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).65 Barry Scheck, the
co-founder of the Innocence Project and in many ways the face of the
innocence movement, was a past president of the NACDL.66 Some
prosecutorial conviction integrity units have hired defense attorneys to better
guarantee their effectiveness.67 Nevertheless, as Risinger and Risinger have
noted, the role of the “innocence lawyer” differs from the traditional defense
lawyer in significant ways. The innocence lawyer—a lawyer representing
clients at various innocence organizations or innocence projects—does not
represent any convicted prisoner and is not indifferent to the client’s factual
guilt or innocence. The innocence lawyer is committed to carefully
investigating cases for factual innocence and in so doing violates the “antisignaling” ethic of standard defense lawyers. Innocence advocacy involves
intense scrutiny and winnowing (triage) of cases before taking on clients and
the investment of extraordinary investigation and litigation resources once a
case is accepted. A client will be dropped if evidence convinces the
innocence lawyers that the person is factually guilty. The Risingers opine
that most criminal defense lawyers will not be comfortable with the
innocence lawyer’s role because innocence advocacy in one or a few cases
tends to undermine the anti-signaling posture related to their other clients.68
Putting aside the differences between innocence lawyering and
standard defense advocacy, Keith Findley suggested that innocence
movement policy reforms would benefit prosecutors as well as innocent
defendants and prisoners, through the greater accuracy in police
investigation and forensic science methods. On balance, such diagnosticityimproving procedures will help police convict a larger number of “bad guys”
while snaring a smaller number of innocent suspects. To put a familiar face
on this point, the same Barry Scheck who was a president of the NACDL
was also a commissioner on New York State’s Forensic Science Review
Board from 1994 to 2016, “a body that regulates all crime and forensic DNA
laboratories in the state.”69

65

NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW., NADCL, https://www.nacdl.org/ (last visited Apr. 15,

2018).
66

The popularity of the innocence movement is displayed in a Time Magazine special
edition devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Innocence Project. See Innocent: The Fight
Against Wrongful Convictions—25 Years of the Innocence Project, TIME MAG. (Larry Sutton
ed., 2017).
67
Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of Getting It
Right the First Time, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1033(2012).
68
D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, The Emerging Role of Innocence Lawyer
and the Need for Role-Differentiated Standards of Professional Conduct, in CONTROVERSIES
IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 123, 135 (Sarah L. Cooper, ed., 2014).
69
Univ. of Hawai’i at Manoa William. S. Richardson Sch. of L., Barry Scheck: Visiting
Professor (2018) https://www.law.hawaii.edu/person/barry-scheck.
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To reiterate, until recently wrongful conviction scholarship had little to
say about the adjudication process.70 The enormous bulk of innocence
scholarship focused on what Sam Gross has famously called the canonical
causes of false convictions:
There is a canonical list of factors that lead to false convictions:
eyewitness misidentification; false confession; misleading, false,
or fraudulent forensic evidence; testimony by highly motivated
police informants such as “jailhouse snitches”; perjury in general;
prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective legal defense. All these
factors are common among cases of known exonerations.71
Despite the considerable literature on these subjects, other possible sources
of wrongful convictions require more research.72 More recently, however,
legal scholars have turned their attention to attributes of the adjudicative
process that might either be a source of wrongful convictions or, more likely,
fail to screen out errors made by police investigators, forensic scientists, or
in the pre-trial and prosecutorial charging process. A German legal scholar
and I reviewed five studies by prominent legal scholars, including our
symposium host, D. Michael Risinger, Tim Bakken, Keith Findley, Samuel
Gross, and Christopher Slobogin.73 These authors proposed novel trial
procedure modifications aimed at preventing wrongful convictions and
producing more accurate verdicts. Among the anti-Blackstonians, Cassell,
who is more concerned with adversarially testing innocence movement
claims than with developing a theoretical model, offered a spirited and in
some ways convincing rebuttal to Bakken’s approach.74 These five more or
less inquisitorial proposals, sparked by judicial process diagnostic weakness
disclosed by the innocence movement, on the whole provide better
approaches to resolving adversary system inadequacies than the antiBlackstonians’ proposals. While not reviewing them in detail, they offer
other ways to think about system improvement.
70

Zalman, Notes, supra note 44.
Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 186 (2008)
(citations omitted).
72
A recent law review symposium explored “non-canonical” sources of wrongful
convictions. See James R. Acker, Allison D. Redlich, Catherine L. Bonventre & Robert J.
Norris, Elephants in the Courtroom: Examining Overlooked Issues In Wrongful Convictions,
79 ALB. L. REV. 705 (2016).
73
Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence Revolution
and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial, 3 TEXAS A&M L. REV. 189 (2015). In
this article, we also addressed the plausibility of any of the reforms coming into being. Id. at
238-41. Laudan does not address the feasibility of adoption.
74
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1064-80. Cassell has not proposed alternate errorreducing trial procedures.
71
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It seems to me that Epps and Laudan and Allen are unconcerned with
this kind of innocentric modeling (which Cassell critiqued). Adjudication
errors flow from many structural and psychological factors that skew errors
against the state as well as the defendant.75 Many possible levers of change
could produce more accurate trials in addition to the few analyzed by the
anti-Blackstonians. Grunewald and I identified fourteen proposed accuracyenhancing changes (not simply wrongful-conviction reducing proposals)
raised by the five studies. Of these, several focused on the trial process as
such: (1) drop the jury or constrain the evidence it receives, (2) enhance
judicial control over the entire process, (3) increase judicial control over
expert witnesses, (4) modify the lawyer’s role, (5) allow a plea of “innocent,”
and (6) expand discovery. Among the concerns discussed, four of the five
authors recommended some change to the rules of trial procedure or
evidence, with only Keith Findley leaving the trial process “as it lays,” but
modifying the institutional setting for defense attorneys and prosecutors.76
The innocence movement is more concerned with decision-accuracy
throughout the criminal justice process than the anti-Blackstonians credit.77
The defense lawyer’s classic position, tasked with putting the state to its
proof and owing full concern to ethically defending the client, is not
concerned with overall system accuracy. The defense background of most
innocence organization lawyers and their use of defense strategies in postconviction litigation makes innocence work seem like standard defense
work. But innocence lawyers encourage and work with prosecutors’
conviction integrity units78 and interact with police officials and forensic
scientists to promote accuracy-enhancing investigations, supporting the
innocence movement’s “Reliability Model.” In short, many diagnosticimproving innocence reforms will make police, forensic scientists, and
prosecutors more proficient in convicting serious offenders. Nevertheless, it
seems that innocence movement advocates wish to preserve the rules of trial
evidence, whether embedded in constitutional principle or not, which favor
the defendant and are targets of anti-Blackstonian critiques.79

75
A critical source for understanding the human sources of error in the trial process is
Dan Simon’s magisterial review of the psychological literature. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 144-222, 324-74 (2012).
76
Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 73, at 212. None of the five authors whose work
was analyzed were concerned with the standard of proof.
77
This criticism applies more to Epps and Laudan and Allen than to Cassell. See
generally Allen & Laudan, supra note 4; Epps, supra note 2; Cassell, supra note 5.
78
John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Comparison, (Univ. Penn.,
Working Paper No. 1614 2016), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?fy
article=2615&context=faculty_scholarship.
79
I elaborate on this point in the Conclusion, infra Part V.
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B. The Ideal of Balanced Justice
The anti-Blackstonians desire a level adversary process playing field,
but their balanced system descriptions, grounded in the tradition of legal
scholarship, tend to tilt toward the prosecution. I believe the clearest and
least partisan theoretical description of a balanced criminal justice system is
Brian Forst’s Errors of Justice.80 It examines procedural and substantive
errors of justice across a range of criminal justice processes.81 Forst
conceives of “justice” as “an optimal outcome of justice for a criminal case.
An optimal outcome is one that minimizes the total social cost of crime and
crime control.”82 The anti-Blackstonians, especially Allen and Laudan, and
Cassell, emphasize the costs of crime without sufficiently weighing the
effects and costs of crime control.83
Errors of justice impose social costs of both crimes and sanctions, and
are defined as “the net reduction in aggregate wealth associated with the
act.”84 From the point of optimal justice, errors of justice —”errors in the
interpretation, procedure, or execution of the law”—can run in opposite
directions. The two directions are labeled “errors of due process” and “errors
of impunity.” The social costs of due process errors fall not only on innocent
defendants but “include as well excessive intrusions against those who
violate the law.”85 In the opposite direction, errors of impunity involve
insufficient criminal law sanctions or “none at all where one is warranted.”86
Errors of due process or impunity can be systematic (the product of justice
policies that bias outcomes toward errors) or random (actions of individual
justice practitioners or private individuals or unforeseeable events that
80

BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES (2004); Laudan
covers some of the ground specified by Forst in Law’s Flaws, supra note 3, at xix-xx but in a
casual and discursive, rather than in a systematic, way.
81
FORST, supra note 80, at 3.
82
FORST, supra note 80, at 4 (partial emphasis in original deleted and emphasis added).
83
Thus, although it seems counterintuitive, it is likely that mass incarceration may have
increased crime in some areas by weakening community social control. See TODD CLEAR,
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007).
84
FORST, supra note 80, at 46. Forst divides social costs into costs associated with
crimes and costs of prevention and response to crime. He observes that costs are incurred
privately (e.g., Costs of crime: property lost, medical costs, pain and suffering; Costs of
prevention: locks, dependents deprived of income) and publicly (e.g., Costs of crime:
insurance costs for theft, lost productivity of victims; Costs of prevention: criminal justice
system). Forst discusses the difficulties of measuring intangible costs and the difficulty of
measuring costs related to offenses with hard-to-identify victims. Costs include the costs of
intervention. Id. at 52. A critical unanswered “piece of information” in these theoretical
calculations is “the social cost of the detention, conviction and incarceration of an innocent
person.” Id. at 55.
85
FORST, supra note 80, at 4.
86
FORST, supra note 80, at 4.
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inhibit or facilitate detection and conviction or that generate false
convictions).87
The anti-Blackstonians focus attention on the criminal trial/
adjudication process rather than the entire criminal justice process (referring
to false positives/negatives rather than errors of due process/impunity),88
although some inconsistency may be present.89 Laudan and Allen also
expand the adjudication category by mislabeling prosecutorial dismissals as
acquittals. Forst’s book differs from that narrow approach in that his dataanalytic analyses apply to a variety of justice system areas across the criminal
justice system, including police-induced errors, prosecution policy and
justice errors, sentencing, and homicide, as well as to the issue that fascinates
anti-Blackstonians—standards of evidence at trials. His analyses use data
relevant to those procedures in separate chapters and provide alternative
analytic approaches to better understand these pressing issues.90 He counts
the failure of the justice system to adhere to rules of constitutional criminal
procedure as due process errors of justice (in analytic rather than legal
terms). To him, such errors have more than symbolic consequences. If
constitutional protections are reduced, “protections falter, innocent people
are more likely to be harassed, detained, and convicted, and actions taken
against offenders, from interrogation to the terms of incarceration, may
become needlessly harsh, with avoidable external costs imposed on
taxpayers, the punished, and their dependents.”91 If the justice system comes
to be seen as “increasingly corrupt,” consequences of due process errors may
include increased crime and civil unrest.92 The sources of due process errors
87

FORST, supra note 80, at 4.
Epps, supra note 2, at 1128 (“The Blackstone principle can prevent only those harms
that are caused by the adjudicative system itself. A false conviction may represent a greater
tragedy than a false acquittal, but that tells us little about how the justice system should
distribute errors.”). This terminology diverts attention from a larger array of processes that
allow potentially dangerous people who have committed acts that could lead to prosecution
to escape detection.
89
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, seems to have it both ways by asserting the
decisions in the adjudication stage can have substantial effects on crime. This is discussed
infra Part III.B.1&3. Laudan also raises the loophole that police action can also reduce crime,
but he strongly emphasizes that changes in the standard of proof will reduce crime.
90
FORST, supra note 80.
91
FORST, supra note 80, at 16. This is in stark contrast to Laudan, who asserts that
adherence to rules of constitutional criminal procedure will increase wrongful acquittals and
increase crime, LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110-37 (Chapter 6).
92
Epps advances this idea. Epps, supra note 2; see also infra Part III.A.2.a. This point
is not abstract from the perspective of linking riots or rebellions of African Americans since
the 1960s to the effects of deeply embedded racialized policies borne of frustration with
justice system wrongs, and at a more mundane level viewing the friction between police and
minority communities that impedes the effectiveness of law enforcement as a factor in causing
crime. See infra, Part IV; Alice George, The 1968 Kerner Commission Got It Right, But
Nobody Listened, Smithsonian.com (March 1, 2018) https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smit
88
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may be innocent or inadvertent (e.g., mistaken eyewitness identification),
due to systemic resource deficiencies, the result of unprofessionalism, or to
more sinister motives involved in unjustified police killings. In Forst’s
scheme, legal but unduly harsh punishment is an error of due process. This
Blackstonian position is made in a principled manner (the obverse of Epps’s
anti-Blackstonianism), and is not influenced by his Blackstone ratio
calculations, discussed below.93
C. Criminologists on Blackstone
Criminologists Shawn Bushway and Brian Forst estimated criminal
justice system errors. Bushway’s estimate relied on a data set of homicide
investigations and convictions in Chicago, while Forst applied the
Blackstone ratio to hypothetical trial data. Bushway asserted that Blackstone
took it seriously: “Blackstone hypothesizes that it would be ideal to have a
justice system that generates ten false negatives for every false positive.”94
1. Bushway on the Blackstone Ratio.
Sean Bushway conducted what he called a Blackstone ratio of murder
convictions based on a detailed study of a sample of sixty-three Chicago
murders reported to police in 1979.95 Investigators reported the suspects per
case they believed to be involved in the murders, which totaled to ninety.96
Of these ninety suspects, sixty-one were not convicted and twenty-nine were
convicted. Bushway assumed all sixty-one suspects who were not convicted
were false negatives (falsely acquitted) due to the “strong assumption that
the police estimate the number of suspects based on witness testimony, and
evidence is a good estimate of the number of people who were actually guilty
of murder.”97 He extrapolated a 3.4 percent wrongful conviction rate from
hsonian-institution/1968-kerner-commission-got-it-right-nobody-listened-180968318/ (last
visited, May 19, 2018); CHRIS HAYES, A COLONY IN A NATION (2017).
93
Infra at Part III.A.
94
Shawn D. Bushway, Estimating Empirical Blackstone Ratios in Two Settings: Murder
Cases and Hiring, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2011). Volokh, supra, note 8, (citing that the
idea that it is better for guilty men to go free than an innocent man be imprisoned was a deeply
rooted cultural tradition). In light of Epps’s note that the ratio was propounded somewhat
casually, it is likely that Blackstone himself used the number as a way of emphasizing the
principle’s importance. Epps, supra note 2.
95
Actually, seventy-two were reported to police, but nine were dropped. No data about
the number of suspects was reported. Bushway, supra note 94, at 1092.
96
Bushway, supra note 94, at 1092. This was a unique feature of the data set. See also
Joseph L. Peterson et al., Forensic Evidence and the Police, 1976-1980 (2006)
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/8186/detail.
97
Bushway, supra note 94, at 1093 (comma added to original). For a less sanguine view
of evidence-based murder investigations by Chicago police, see Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the
Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 1 (1993). To his credit, Bushway notes that his estimate “rests crucially on
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Risinger’s estimate of error in rape/murder cases and assigned one of the
twenty-nine convicted to the factually falsely convicted category.98
Thus, when estimating the suspects who were assumed to commit/not
commit the crime by people convicted/not convicted, sixty-one were
assumed guilty/not convicted, twenty-eight were assumed guilty/convicted,
and one was assumed not guilty/convicted. None were assumed to be not
guilty/not convicted.99 The original data set included detailed descriptions
of the adjudications and final conviction charges. Of the twenty-nine found
guilty of murder, attempted murder, or voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter, Bushway reports that fourteen pleaded guilty and three were
convicted by jury. He does not report, but we might assume, that the
remaining twelve were convicted in bench trials. Unfortunately Bushway
does not report whether any of the sixty-one who were not convicted were
acquitted at trial or were dismissed. It may not matter to some utilitarians,
but given what we know about trial acquittals, most of the sixty-one probably
were not charged by prosecutors. 100
With the lopsided assumption of police accuracy that equates a suspect
with a guilty defendant, Bushway estimated a Blackstone ratio of sixty-one
to one. He then pulled back from the assumption that all ninety suspects
identified by the police were guilty perpetrators, and as an alternative
reduced the number of murderers in the 1979 data set from ninety to sixtythree, “the smallest number of murderers possible.”101 Recalculating the
table with sixty-three instead of eighty-nine “guilty” murderers “provides an
estimate of thirty-five false negatives, which provides a false negative rate
of 55.5 percent, and an empirical Blackstone ratio of thirty five-to-one. As
a result, I feel confident that the lower bound or floor of the Blackstone ratio
in this data is thirty-five-to-one.”102 Either estimate is far above the
Blackstone ratio “ideal” of ten guilty to one innocent.

the assumption that the police estimate of the number of perpetrators is a good estimate of the
number of guilty parties. If this assumption is incorrect, the exercise is flawed.” Bushway,
supra note 94, at 1094.
98
Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 26. Risinger warns against such
extrapolation.
99
See Bushway, supra, note 94, at 1092. (“[T]he total number of people who did not
commit the crime, is a difficult conceptual number. Clearly, any number of people in Chicago
did not commit the crime, so this number could be arbitrarily large.”).
100
It is important to understand the underlying criminal process that generates these
statistics. Laudan, for example, calls dismissals “acquittals.” Laudan, Different Strokes, supra
note 3; LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 60 (“We know that of those arrested by the
police and charged with volent crimes in 2008, some 37% never made it to a trial or plea
bargain; the prosecutor or the pre-trial judge, in effect, acquits them.”). I will return to
Bushway’s data when I offer a critique of Laudan’s approach, infra Part III.B.3.
101
Bushway, supra note 94, at 1093–94.
102
Bushway, supra, note 94, at 1094.
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Bushway’s analysis, although based on “strong assumptions,” is surely
correct in broad strokes: there are many more people who commit criminal
acts and are not sanctioned by the criminal justice system than are convicted.
This point is worth lingering over because Laudan and Allen’s argument
rests in good part on the finding that the risk of being a crime victim is much
higher than the risk of being wrongfully convicted. This point, however,
comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with the criminal justice and trial
systems. Defense attorneys know that most of their clients are factually
guilty to some degree. Laudan recites criminal justice data to that effect and
Risinger makes the point in his response to Allen and Laudan: “the numbers
given by Allen and Laudan are almost certainly artificially high and seem to
have been selected to make their readership . . . more threatened.”103 But in
Risinger’s view the ratio of false acquittals to false convictions does not
matter or is to be expected “because some such substantially higher risk must
always attach to the risk of being a victim over the risk of being a convicted
innocent simply as an inevitability of any likely set of social arrangements
in the real world. Any other result is virtually unimaginable.”104
Risinger’s observation makes sense if we ask, what is the source of
Bushway’s 35-to-1 ratio of false negatives (false “acquittals”) to false
positives (false convictions)? To the anti-Blackstonians the sources of error
lie mainly in rules of criminal procedure that make it harder to convict the
guilty at trial. I assume, however, that most if not all of the sixty-one
suspects in Bushway’s sample who were “not convicted” were dismissed by
the prosecutor (perhaps a few were acquitted at trial). Some of the sixty-one
(probably dismissed) non-convicted may have been guilty.105 But it is risky
to make assumptions about what goes on in prosecutorial charging and
dismissal, a process which is not that well documented.106 In any event, the
source of the disproportion of convicted guilty to unconvicted guilty is
important because Laudan argued that increasing the proportion of trial
convictions, lowering the proportion of dismissals, and longer prison
sentences will reduce crime. If, however, the primary sources of unconvicted
guilty people lie outside the adjudication process, then the focus of crime
reduction should be on those areas, not the trial.

103

Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 1016.
Id. I would add that it is unimaginable in any “normal” state; one could imagine that
in a repressive, totalitarian dictatorship going through a phase of “eliminating enemies” a
different ratio might exist.
105
Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3, at 1-2 argues that prosecutorial dismissals
should be treated as acquittals, a point that will be discussed, discussed infra.
106
See discussion infra, at notes 147–154.
104
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For Laudan and Allen, crime will be reduced and verdict accuracy
increased by lowering the standard of proof, eliminate defendants’
procedural protections, dismissing fewer cases and convicting more of the
guilty at trial (which will result from a relaxed standard of proof and fewer
procedural protections). But empirical knowledge about the criminal justice
system demonstrates that the fault probably lies in the failure to report and
apprehend, and the (poor) quality of evidence in cases that came to the
attention of prosecutors. If evidence in the Chicago homicide cases was
stronger, the prosecutor would likely have obtained more guilty pleas and
brought more cases to trial. The innocence/empirical perspective is that
deficiencies in processing cases at all pretrial stages, not only at trial,
generates false prosecutions and false convictions, and that these pretrial
deficiencies also reduce the state’s ability to successfully prosecute serious
crimes.
So, Bushway’s Blackstone ratio rests not so much on the difficulty of
proving their guilt at trial because the burden of proof is too high, but more
on upstream problems allowing serious criminals to go uncaught and
handing prosecutors weak cases that lead juries to acquit.107 The reasons for
this are well known. Aside from murder, which usually comes to the
attention of police, many violent crimes are not reported. Non-reporting
might indicate distrust of the police based on mistreatment of minority
populations; deportation of undocumented immigrants; fear that police
might negligently injure or kill a witness;108 mental disability; or a sense of
hopelessness generated by conditions of poverty and systemic deprivation of
standard government services by law, custom, or the greater political
influence of the affluent.109 Flaws in police and forensic investigation and
the lack of defense investigation services compound the problem by not
screening out innocent suspects. It is likely that lowering the burden of proof
without correcting current weaknesses in the upstream criminal justice
process will deepen the sense of impunity or negligence among police and
forensic investigators.110

107
To be clear, Bushway does not assert an anti-Blackstonian reason for his speculation.
See generally Bushway, supra note 94.
108
See John Eligon, Vivian Yee & Matt Furber, In Minneapolis, Unusual Police Killing
Raises an Old Outcry: Why?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/
22/us/minneapolis-police-shooting.html?ref=todayspaper
109
See Part IV.B.5, Murder, Race, and the State, infra.
110
This point is made by Forst, supra note 80, at 64. I discuss this moral hazard in the
critique of Laudan and Allen regarding the Blackstone ratio, infra Part III.B.3.
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2. Forst on Reasonable Doubt.
Brian Forst, in Chapter 6 of his book, examines standards of evidence
in cases that go to trial, asking, “[w]hat precisely is meant by ‘poof beyond
a reasonable doubt’?”111 Forst takes readers through hypothetical scenarios
by “establishing relationships among three variables: the percentage of cases
with true offenders, the conviction rate, and the percentage of defendants
convicted who actually committed the crime.”112 In scenarios in which he
holds the actually guilty and actually innocent rates constant while varying
the conviction rate, Forst demonstrates that if a “super-judge” (my term)
were to try to reduce the number of false convictions by decreasing the
conviction rate, the number of falsely acquitted would increase sharply,
producing “Blackstone ratios” of up to 101-to-1 (where the conviction rate
is decreased to forty percent). If, in his scenarios, the conviction rate were
increased to eighty percent, the ratio would be one to one, or eight factually
guilty acquitted and eight factually innocent convicted, a scenario that
“violates” the Blackstone ratio but convicts far more guilty persons. This
exercise shows if one were to strictly apply the Blackstone ratio as if it were
a law of nature, a very large number of guilty people must be freed in order
to reduce the number of wrongfully convicted. Forst’s abstract analysis of
standards of proof is only one chapter in a larger and more empirically
informed project to speculate about possible challenges to optimal justice.
Given the mathematically reciprocal ratios in Frost’s scenarios, the
presentation almost suggests an automatic or “hydraulic” effect of modifying
the standard of proof. Laudan and Allen engage in a similar exercise and
seem almost to invest the quantitative relationships with agency.113 But
Forst’s mathematical exercise in Chapter 6 must be read in the context of
comments in Chapter 5, which comprehensively and normatively assess
justice error costs. He asks, for example, whether the ratio should apply
equally in serious and trivial crime, implying that the ratio masks ethical
questions.114 So for all of the numeric manipulation of the trial standard of
evidence in Chapter 6, Forst makes it clear that the trial is only one venue
for thinking about tradeoffs in the justice system, and that a system of
optimal interventions against crime must consider the social costs of both
crime (including pain and suffering) and the application of the justice system
(monetary costs to society, deprivations to prisoners’ families, etc.), special
evaluations for victimless crimes, and the like. A rational frame for making
111

FORST, supra note 80, at 58.
FORST, supra note 80, at 58.
113
Infra Part III.B.1&3.
114
FORST, supra note 80, at 45 (“Blackstone’s dictum places an arbitrary lower bound on
the tradeoff, leaving open the question, ‘How much better,?’ thus side-stepping an assessment
of the respective social costs of each type of error.”) (emphasis in original).
112
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cost/benefit estimates of justice might exist, but the data to make firm
conclusions are not available, and the frame itself does “not eliminate the
prospects for ideology to trump objectivity in the development of an errorsensitive justice policy.”115
Forst pulls back from going this far and, along with cordoning off his
Blackstonian analysis in a separate chapter, applies data-analytic approaches
to a variety of justice system issues.116 Each issue is analyzed in the context
of contemporary criminological research and where possible uses available
or hypothetical data relevant to that issue (rather than a global Blackstone
ratio). This is quite different from Laudan and Allen who seem to claim that
every aspect of criminal investigation, prosecution and crime control can be
manipulated by adjusting the conviction ratio. Forst warns readers: “such
information provides just a single piece of the large and complex puzzle of
criminal justice policy.”117 So Forst’s Blackstonian study, like a musician’s
finger exercises, provides a sense of how the Blackstone ratio would operate
if it were like a natural law of hydraulics. But his more wide-ranging book
offers different and more specific analytic strategies that provide food for
thought and potential guides for action. He clearly knows too much about
justice institutions to propose radical changes based on hypothetical analysis:
“[t]he obvious problem with the numbers used in these scenarios is that we
don’t know which set is nearest to the truth in any jurisdiction.”118 Also, like
most criminologists, he identifies the source of error with system actors and
not on the automatic operation of legal standards of proof.119

115

FORST, supra note 80, at 55.
The chapters in his book assess the sources of error of due process and impunity in
regard to police investigation, prosecution policy, the jury, sentencing and corrections, and
homicide. He concludes with a chapter on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. See
generally FORST, supra note 80.
117
FORST, supra note 80, at 65.
118
FORST, supra note 80, at 63.
119
FORST, supra note 80, at 62-63. (“The percentage of those convicted who did not
commit the crime will be based largely on police and prosecution practices, as well as the
inclination of judges to protect the rights of the defendant and the willingness of juries to
decide on verdicts of guilt. . . . The number of offenders freed per innocent defendant
convicted and corresponding total error rate are likely to be affected also by the quality of
defense counsel in the jurisdiction and the willingness of each side to engage in plea
negotiations”).
116
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III. OVERVIEW AND INTERNAL CRITIQUES OF EPPS, LAUDAN
AND ALLEN, AND CASSELL
A. Epps on Blackstone
1. Overview
Epps’s encyclopedic review of the Blackstone principle situates the
principle as a regnant idea shaping the legal world’s views of procedural
rules asymmetrically favoring the defendant. Given his uphill battle against
its entrenched position, he is justified in covering as many bases as
possible.120 He ties the principle’s development to the amelioration of the
death penalty and harsh trial procedures of eighteenth-century English
criminal law, suggesting that the current justification for the principle is
attenuated or no longer necessary.121 He then traces the traditional account,
which prefers the cost of a wrongful acquittal to that of a wrongful
conviction, and the utilitarian reaction against it going back to Bentham.122
Epps follows this review with his original idea that the principle’s effects are
not static but dynamic, and supports this claim with six analyses that suggest
that the Blackstone principle might make a defendant worse off.123 This
argument is grounded in a mix of theoretical and empirical observations; my
critique, in Part III.A.2, will address only this part of Epps’s Article. The
gist of my criticism does not deny the dynamic effects of legal rules, but
argues that Epps’s logical and theoretically supported points are, based on
an empirical understanding of criminal justice, too small to significantly
affect the justice system.124
Epps follows his analysis of the dynamic Blackstone principle with
“alternative justifications,” that raise, meet, challenge, and (in his estimation)
vanquish a number of jurisprudential defenses of Blackstonianism, both

120

Epps, supra note 2, at 1072-77. His overview includes a few glimmers of social
reality: (i) Blackstone-Principle analysis may be limited where vast majority of convictions
are obtained by guilty plea; (ii) he raises the “real-world” effect with a concern that terrorists
may escape conviction (although he makes no reference either to the costs of crime victims
or the wrongfully convicted); and (iii) he refers to two opinion polls. These stabs at social
reality do not topple his largely theoretic exercise. Id.
121
Epps, supra note 2, at 1077-87. Above, I suggested a different approach to this
historical understanding, namely that analyzing criminal justice only thorough adjudication
procedures fails to account for the ways in which the contemporary criminal justice system is
a product of the world since the 1820s. See WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 27.
122
Epps, supra note 2, at 1087-92. Laudan and Allen continue the Benthamite/utilitarian
critique of the Blackstone principle. Allen & Laudan, supra note 4.
123
Epps, supra note 2, at 1092-1124.
124
The temperature of a lit match is higher than the water temperature of the Atlantic
Ocean, but tossing a lit match into the surf at Jones Beach has a minuscule effect on the
Ocean’s mean temperature.
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consequentialist and deontological.125 About these arguments I have nothing
to say, aside from some incidental comment. My critique is based on what I
can bring to the table as a criminal justice scholar and not as a legal
philosopher. Whether my critique might cause an anti-Blackstonian to pause
depends perhaps on whether one is convinced more by legal-theoretical
analysis or by less elegant empirical considerations.126
An engaging element of Epps’s article is his caution and openness to
possible error. He allows, despite his intellectual tour de force (which he
assumes has undermined “complete and persuasive justification for the
Blackstone principle”), that “[a] compelling argument for the Blackstone
principle could well emerge.”127 He also addresses a number of reasons why
his analysis might fall short, including plea-bargaining, unintended
consequences, and limited knowledge of how the system produces error.128
He refreshingly notes, “we can’t reach conclusions about how our system
produces errors by looking solely to formal rules.”129
Epps’s anti-Blackstonianism differs from Laudan and Allen’s in at least
two ways. First, he avoids the numerical Blackstone ratio and focuses on the
Blackstone principle, while Laudan and Allen make assumption-based
numerical calculations with crime statistics. In keeping with his quantitative
approach, Laudan approximately equates the harm of a wrongful conviction
with the harm of a violent victimization and replaces the Blackstone ten to
one ratio with his “metric [that] a false conviction (2.2 victims) is roughly
twice as harmful as a false negative (1.2 victims). That justifies that the state
should make it harder to convict an innocent person than it is to acquit a
guilty one.”130
Second, Epps rejects the Blackstone principle entirely while Laudan
“does not dispute the traditional and familiar claim that a typical false
positive [i.e., wrongful conviction] is more harmful to society than a false
negative.”131 The Blackstone principle is reflected in a number of procedural
rules like proof beyond a reasonable doubt that create formal asymmetries in
favor of the defendant. Epps emphasizes that his Article is not aimed at
attacking these rules; rather he “is critiquing an idea about how criminal
punishment should be distributed, one that may not actually be consistent
125

Epps, supra note 2, at 1124-43.
FORST, supra note 80, at 159 takes a certain brand of theoreticians to task: “Many
criminologists are justifiably skeptical of the economist’s rather narrow approach to analyzing
crime, regarding it not so much incorrect as reductionist and incomplete.”
127
Epps, supra note 2, at 1142-43.
128
Epps, supra note 2, at 1143-48. This section reads much like the obligatory section in
social science journal articles, which specify the limits of the research.
129
Epps, supra note 2, at 1145.
130
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 80.
131
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 80.
126
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with the way our system operates.”132 Epps rejects the Blackstone principle
“as a theory of the proper distribution of punishment” for two reasons: (1)
its benefits are “smaller than usually assumed” (and might make defendants
worse off) and (2) it causes voters to be inclined toward harsh punishment
and to feel less sympathy for defendants—labeled a “political-process
failure,” that hurts defendants and society as a whole.133 My critique of Epps
(which overlaps with those of Laudan and Allen and Cassell) is aimed at the
six arguments he raises to support his dynamic interpretation. To the degree
that my analysis is based on empirical evidence and conjecture, it could be
seen as orthogonal to Epps’s rational/theoretical approach.
2. Internal Critique of Epps
Epps’s rests his assertion that the Blackstone principle (BP) does not
deliver benefits to defendants on his speculative thesis134 that the Blackstone
principle is “dynamic” and that a system that includes the Blackstone
principle will lessen benefits to defendants. This thesis is not based on
quantitative reasoning but upon six “imaginative comparison[s]” between
two systems (a BP system and a non-BP system).135 On the whole I found
Epps six “imaginative comparison[s]” less than compelling, and often
tentatively phrased.
i. Crime, Punishment, and Policing136
The base argument in this section is that the BP, by making convictions
harder to obtain, makes crime more prevalent than in a non-BP society.137
This theory makes little sense from a criminological perspective, which links
the prevalence of crime to a number of social, economic, political, cultural,
situational, and psychological factors. For example, one of the most debated
topics in contemporary criminal justice policy is why serious crime dropped
precipitously after 1990.138 Crime increased from 1965 to the 1980s,
132

Epps, supra note 2, at 1074 (emphasis in original). Some asymmetries listed by Epps
include, for example, reasonable doubt, jury unanimity, and no prosecution appeal of not
guilty verdicts. Id. at 1073. Laudan takes on many of these asymmetries. See LAUDAN,
LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110-37. Epps claims that the Blackstone principle is given lip
service but “surprisingly little rigorous analysis.” Epps, supra note 2, at 1069.
133
Epps, supra note 2, at 1070, 1102-04.
134
Epps, supra note 2, at 1094 (admitting that his thesis involves a generous dose of
speculation but claims that “is preferable to implicitly assuming that the Blackstone principle
has no systemic consequences at all”).
135
Epps, supra note 2, at 1094.
136
Epps, supra note 2, at 1095-99.
137
Epps, supra note 2, at 1095-99. The argument is also asserted, in different ways, by
Laudan and Allen and Cassell, so my critique in this section applies generally to the other
anti-Blackstonians. See Cassell, supra note 5; Allen & Laudan, supra note 4.
138
Candidates include harsh sentences, improved policing, economic upturn,
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fluctuated for a decade, and then dropped continuously throughout the 1990s
and into the 2000s absent changes in the fundamental rules guiding
adjudication practices. Epps’s analysis includes a passel of arguments that
mostly rest on abstract utilitarian or economic thinking and wanders off in a
number of directions. He discusses: the counter-argument that the BP
decreases crime through increasing respect for and obedience to law;139 one
public opinion poll showing that a majority of citizens disagree with the
BP;140 public outrage at verdicts like the Casey Anthony acquittal;141 an
assumption that increased crime caused by the Blackstone principle reduces
accuracy in the criminal justice process;142 economic reasoning that the
fewer people punished, the harsher the punishment;143 speculation about
demographic changes, changes in illicit drug markets, legal abortion, and more. See THE
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, eds., 2000); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007); JOHN E. CONKLIN, WHY CRIME
RATES FELL (2003); Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Markets and Crime, in CRIME AND PUBLIC
POLICY 183-209 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011). A recently published study
provides data and analysis to support the role played by local, community-based, nonprofit
organizations in reducing serious crime since 1990. See Patrick Sharkey et al., Community
and the Crime Decline: The Causal Effect of Local Nonprofits on Violent Crime, AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. (2017).
139
Epps, supra note 2 at 1095-96; in discussing errors of impunity, Forst, supra note 80
at 23, observes that “the credibility of deterrent effectiveness is lost, and citizens become
increasingly inclined to perceive injustices to victims and alienation from the police and the
courts, if not from government generally.”
140
Epps, supra note 2 (citing one opinion poll showing that 56% of respondent disagreed
with the BP could simply be a makeweight argument). Contrast Baumgartner et al.’s review
of all the public opinion polls related to the death penalty in America from 1953 to 2005,
showing that while public opinion on a topic as deeply rooted as capital punishment is inertial,
it does respond to environmental factors the number of homicides and to the innocence frame.
These factors led to a historic decline in support for the death penalty. See FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DEBOEF, & AMBER E. BOYDSTUN, THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH
PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE 166-99 (2008).
141
False acquittals at trial do occur and notorious false negatives raise public ire, but
along with other, perhaps less justified social ills, are absorbed by society. The 1990s seems
to have been a big false negative decade, or perhaps that perception is shaped by a number of
notorious cases. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS’
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1996); POSTMORTEM: THE O. J. SIMPSON CASE—JUSTICE
CONFRONTS RACE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LAWYERS, MONEY AND THE MEDIA (Jeffrey
Abramson ed., 1996).
142
There may have been a link between the increase of serious crime from the 1960 to
the 1980s, the metastatic expansion of punitiveness known as the war on drugs and mass
incarceration that flooded the courts, and an increase of wrongful convictions. See Hannah
Laqueur et al., Wrongful Conviction, Policing, and the “Wars on Crime and Drugs,” in
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 93-107 (Allison
D. Redlich, et al., eds. 2014). Laqueur et al. did not include the BP as a cause of the problem.
Id.
143
This theory seems refuted by the lower imprisonment rates and shorter average
sentences before 1970 and the increase in the prison rate and longer average sentences in the
mass incarceration era. I would think that any empirical examination of the issue would
include surplus wealth available to the state, crime rate, and ideology to an equation.
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whether police spending would increase in a BP world to compensate for the
“heightened difficulty” of obtaining convictions; and doubts about whether
increased policing would compensate for the alleged increase in crime cause
by Blackstonianism. Epps concludes the section with this: “The key point,
however, is that unless the legitimacy thesis is right and the Blackstone
principle is essential for deterrence, then letting more guilty people go free
must result in some combination of increased crime, heightened punishment,
and greater investment in policing.”144
Even if proven, the asserted Blackstonian effect, while logical, would
have a minuscule effect on crime, one that is, perhaps, too small to measure.
Epps’s speculation rests on a premise that what occurs in the conviction of
criminal cases already in the adjudication stage will directly impact crime
rates. This must be the case because Epps insists that his reasoning applies
only to errors “that are endogenous to the rules governing criminal
adjudicationFalse Expanding the lens to include all of the justice system’s
failures to correctly identify wrongdoers would implicate a much broader set
of normative tradeoffs — such as how much society should invest in policing
as opposed to other social goals — that needlessly complicate the inquiry.”145
However, Epps does not limit effects to those caused by the false positives
and false negatives among the five percent of cases that go to trial, but, like
Laudan, includes cases dismissed by prosecutors based on limits of proof,
thus expanding the impact of the BP on crime rates.146
By bringing prosecutorial dismissals into his qualitative analysis, Epps
must be assuming that he can precisely measure the reasons for why
prosecutors dismiss cases. But the truth is that data on prosecutorial
dismissals are severely limited. John Pfaff, perhaps exaggeratedly claims
“we have almost no information whatsoever on what prosecutors do or how
(or why) they do it.”147 Some data, gathered by legal scholars and
criminologists do exist, but it reveals general patterns not sufficiently refined
to answer the kinds of questions relevant to the anti-Blackstonians’ concerns
of separating the guilty from the innocent. Miller and Wright, for example,
mined a decade’s worth of data on reasons for prosecutorial dismissals in

144

Epps, supra note 2, at 1099.
Epps, supra note 2, at 1076, at n. 39. Of course, looking at upstream causes of error
is a major concern of the innocence movement.
146
Epps, supra note 2, at 1076, n. 39 (“[I]t also includes dispositions short of actual trial,
such as a prosecutor’s decision to drop charges upon determining that she could not prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; such an outcome is the product of the rules that govern trials
even if no trial occurs.”).
147
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 17 (2017). Pfaff uncovered data about gross charging statistics.
Id. at 71-72. However, data is unavailable “about how prosecutors . . . determine who they
will charge and how they will charge them.” Id. at 42.
145
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New Orleans (before that data collection was terminated), and concluded that
the regularity of those decisions demonstrates that discretion is exercised in
ways that “reveal[s] an internal legal order at work.”148 While it is reassuring
that prosecutors do not exercise discretion in lawless or entirely arbitrary
ways, the gross categories of reasons given do not answer whether cases
were dismissed because of actual innocence. Criminological studies of
prosecutorial discretion have been criticized as “dated, restricted to small
samples, and focused on limited offense types in specific jurisdictions.”149
Nevertheless, those studies, like the Miller and Wright data, show reasonable
general patterns and professionalism in decision-making. A large-sample
federal charge reduction study under mandatory guidelines, for example,
found no evidence of racially biased decisions.150 The bulk of criminological
research shows that prosecutorial discretion is motivated primarily by
evidence strength and crime seriousness.151 Yet, according to Forst, the data
are not sufficiently refined to dispel the hypothesis that many decisions are
subjective.152 Reflecting on the termination of a systemic data gathering
program, Forst comments that “it is really remarkable that we have less
useful information now about the routine prosecution of felony cases than
we did 30 years ago.”153
Not knowing, with specificity, what goes on in the opaque world of
prosecutorial charging and dismissals weakens Epps’s speculation. Even
with available studies we might speculate that thoughtful prosecutors in the
charging process, alert to an array of justice concerns, may be conducting a
kind of Khadi justice and dismissing cases based on complex, perhaps
somewhat personalistic, notions of right and wrong but guided by more or
less reasonable factors. Or, in the alternative, policies may vary from one
county to another without much rationale except for the elected prosecutor’s
predilections.154 In any event, it is hard to know how a sudden drop in the
148

Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 130 (2008).
The reasons for recording dismissals by assistant prosecutors was for internal review;
although the practice was discontinued when a new prosecutor came into office there is no
reason to believe that the general pattern of dismissal reasons would be dramatically different
under a different prosecutor.
149
Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q.
394, 396 (2010).
150
Shermer & Johnson, supra note 149.
151
Brian Forst, Prosecution, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 437-66, 446 (James Q. Wilson
& Joan Petersilia, eds., 2011).
152
Forst, Prosecution, supra note 151, at 447.
153
Forst, Prosecution, supra note 151, at 439 (emphasis in original); see Shermer &
Johnson, supra note 149, at 396 n. 1 (Prosecutor’s Management Information System
[PROMIS] terminated in 1992).
154
Recent data from the new web-based county-level justice information system,
Measures for Justice (MFJ), allows us to peer into justice processes as never before. On
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standard of proof would affect prosecutors’ decisions related to their
assessment of the factual guilt of defendants. Perhaps most prosecutors
would seek to increase the number of convictions but others might not.
Epps’s “imaginative comparisons” operate under a presumably
unchanged or contemporary criminal justice system and Laudan and Allen
seem to think that a lowered burden of proof would simply be passed by
rational legislators convinced by rationalistic argument. But consider a
political scenario that might have to exist to cause state legislatures to enact
evidence statutes that replace beyond a reasonable doubt with clear and
convincing evidence. Such a radical departure would most likely be part of
an extreme right-wing or alt-right political advance that would make the Tea
Party appear middle of the road and, like the attempt of the Polish
government in 2017, would make courts subservient to the government.155
One could then imagine intense polarization over the issue, with staunch
ACLU opposition, a possible red-state-blue-state divide, and some
prosecutors in clear and convincing jurisdictions, having an attachment to
older ideals, holding to beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prosecutorial charging
standards. Although passage of such a law might strike some as bizarre,
adherence to the traditional rule of law ideas, at least in criminal cases,
should not be assumed.156
August 28, 2017, data for “Cases Not Prosecuted” in Florida indicate very different dismissal
rates for two adjacent counties in the Florida panhandle: Liberty County (8.45%) and Calhoun
County (26.39%), and two large adjacent counties on the Atlantic coast: Broward County
(15.2%) and Palm Beach County (31.35%). Why these differences exist in adjacent counties
in anybody’s guess, but Measures for Justice should be thought of as the equivalent of van
Leeuenhoek’s microscope for America’s justice system – we are beginning to see things about
the justice system never before clearly seen, even if their existence was sensed.
The need for expert knowledge and caution when assessing the sources of criminal
justice data is provided by an exchange with MFJ. State Attorney Offices in Florida are
organized by Judicial Circuit, some of which have jurisdiction over multiple counties. Thus,
although Liberty and Calhoun Counties belong to different judicial circuits, there are high
variations of declination rates between some counties within the same Judicial Circuit/State
Attorney Office (email communication with Gipsy Escobar, MFJ, Feb. 2, 2018, on file with
author). The wide variations in rates of prosecutorial declination that may exist within a
prosecutor’s office, suggest that scholars apply extreme caution when making statements
about prosecutorial decision-making.
155
Any government that wants its trials to come out in a preordained way is better off
handpicking safe judges. See Rick Lyman, In Poland, an Assault on the Courts Provokes
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/europ
e/poland-courts-law-and-justice-party.html?ref=todayspaper. The attempt to control the
courts led to massive opposition, with the government backing off. Rick Lyman & Joanna
Berendt, Poland’s Court Crisis Cools Off, but It’s Far From Over, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/europe/poland-court-protests-andrzej-du
da.html; Marc Santora and Joanna Berendt, Poland Overhauls Courts, and Critics See Retreat
From Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world
/europe/eu-poland-law.html
156
Tom Delay, who rose to the position of House Majority Leader, holds the radically
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In today’s America, a historically and comparatively unprecedented
number of people are under penal control not because of the BP or a rational
response to serious crime but because of two generations of irrational fear of
drugs and a politicized and racialized justice policy.157 Contra the purely
rational idea of more policing reducing serious crime, the historic pattern
shows police treating black-on-black crime and homicide with impunity,
thus not deterring or incapacitating serious criminals, while a neoliberal
polity simultaneously avoids addressing criminogenic and correctible social,
economic, and health needs of minority and poor communities.158 In any
event, the number and deployment of police is determined by a range of
practical, political, and budgetary influences and the impact of police alone
on crime levels is subject to debate.159 Penalization may increase crime
under some conditions.160 The length of prison terms might, for example,
result from an increase in the number of full time rural prosecutors and low
visibility prosecutorial decisions driven by organizational incentives.161
These multiple factors are orthogonal to the BP.

populist view that court decisions should be subservient to legislation, although he applies
that view only to right-wing issues. Bill Hoffman, Tom DeLay: Trump Should Buck Courts
on Immigration, NEWSMAX (June 29, 2017), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/TomDeLay-immigration-SCOTUS-courts/2017/06/29/id/799026/ (“‘People need to re-read
Article III of the Constitution. The opinions by the courts are only opinions, the rulings by the
court are only opinions, but they’re not enforced by the executive branch or the legislative
branch,’ DeLay said.”). It is also the case, however, that some conservative benefactors, most
notably the Koch brothers, have supported traditional defense protections in the law in part to
better defend against criminal prosecutions for environmental law violations. See Molly Ball,
Do the Koch Brothers Really Care About Criminal-Justice Reform?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar 3,
2015) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/do-the-koch-brothers-really-car
e-about-criminal-justice-reform/386615/.
157
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed., 2012); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME:
HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE
OF FEAR (2007); David A. Boyum, Jonathan P. Caulkins & Mark A. R. Kleiman, Drugs,
Crime, and Public Policy, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 368-410 (James Q. Wilson & Joan
Petersilia, eds., 2011). On the range of theoretical orientations that can explain variations in
crime control policies, see Peter B. Kraska, Criminal Justice Theory: Toward Legitimacy and
an Infrastructure, 23 JUST. Q. 167 (2006).
158
See JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015); LISA L.
MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL
(2008); NICK REDING, METHLAND: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN SMALL TOWN
(2010). See infra Part IV.
159
See, e.g., Gary Kleck & J. C. Barnes, Do More Police Lead to More Crime
Deterrence? 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 716 (2014) (finding no relationship found between officers
per capita and perceptions of risk of arrest).
160
TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007).
161
PFAFF, supra note 147.

ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

1352

8/10/2018 10:03 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1319

Empirical analysis of crime and criminal justice grounded in
observation and data analysis does not have the elegance of economic
modeling, so my listing of a few recent, prominent works on criminal justice
policy may not carry weight with law and economics adepts, even as
conservative politicians and interests selectively step away from their earlier
harsh crime policies.162 I place these sources on the table to support my
position that Epps’s crime analysis seems thin and unconvincing.163
ii. Social Meaning164
Epps’s next point is that the stigma of criminal convictions is not as
great as it should be in a BP society because people harbor doubts about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts. Evidence for this includes the chance of holding
an acquitted person liable for intentional torts and the difficulty of clearing
the name of acquitted defendants. The evidence is weak and indirect. Epps
asserts that in a non-BP world, acquittals will be more closely aligned with
actual innocence. This reasoning parallels Margaret Raymond’s concern
that growing knowledge of actual innocence will lead juries to demand proof
greater than reasonable doubt to acquit; except for the special case of the
decline of death sentences, this fear has not materialized.165 Epps’s social
meaning argument is based on abstract reasoning and indirect evidence at
best. It seems a recklessly thin ground as a basis for dumping procedural
rights.
iii. Voter Attitudes166
Most voters are not very likely to become defendants; they identify with
victims, not criminal defendants. In the abstract logic employed by Epps the
BP should make average voters more inclined toward harsh punishment and
feel less sympathetic toward defendants. Criminologists, sociologists,
political scientists and legal scholars have given the fear of crime a good deal
of thought and the influence of the burden of proof or the BP has never
entered into their calculations.167 James Q. Whitman’s comparative social
history of punishment explored the deep cultural roots of penal harshness in
162
HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION ERA POLITICS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015); DAVID DAGAN & STEVEN M. TELES,
PRISON BREAK: WHY CONSERVATIVES TURNED AGAINST MASS INCARCERATION (2016).
163
This approach is expanded in Part IV, infra.
164
Epps, supra note 2, at 1099-1102
165
Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 449-64
(2001); see BAUMGARTNER et al., supra note 140; Medwed, Innocentrism, supra note 25.
166
Epps, supra note 2, at 1102-06.
167
See, e.g., Brian R. Wyant, Multilevel Impacts of Perceived Incivilities and Perceptions
of Crime Risk on Fear of Crime: Isolating Endogenous Impacts, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
39 (2008) (finding perceived incivility positively correlated with fear of crime).
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the United States, and his comparison of the United States (a harsh “BP
nation”) with France and Germany (mild inquisitorial systems) might offer
some facile support for Epps, although his historical evidence does not rest
on different modes of proof in the different systems.168 Other socio-legal
scholarship offers macro-economic and political explanations for the rise in
punitiveness after the 1970s.169 An empirical/statistical study demonstrated
President Clinton’s use of the levers of presidential discourse to run up the
fear of crime in opinion polls, at a time when crime was dropping, in order
to mitigate the political defeat of his failed attempt to revamp the American
health care system, thus paving the way for the 1994 Violent Crime Control
Act.170 None of these shifts in public opinion or crime rates had anything to
do with the BP, which presumably remained constant. Whatever the
underlying attitudes to crime, with the decline in crime rates, the substantial
monetary and social costs of crime control have led to a significant
conservative turn-around on justice issues, with contemporary conservative
crime rhetoric expressing sympathy for stereotypical first-time, low-level
drug offenders, although not for stereotypical predators.171 In light of this
and much more empirical research on the politics of crime and crime control,
the abstract reasoning employed by Epps, unsupported by empirical
research, is weak at best.
iv. Law Enforcement Behavior.172
“The Blackstone principle could also influence the behavior of law
enforcement actors.”173 So could many other factors, but this idea is missing
in contemporary studies of police behavior. His following argument is
specious: “the Blackstone principle could lead actors within the system to
feel less responsibility for preventing false convictions because those actors
will know that the procedural system is already designed to guard against
such outcomes.”174 Even if police dwelled on the Blackstone principle —
which I doubt, given the staggering fragmentation of American law
enforcement into about 17,000 agencies, the wide discretion allowed to line

168
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003). His argument provides evidence that
challenges a popular criminological theory that attributes increasing punitiveness to penal
modernism. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
169
SIMON, supra note 157.
170
OLIVER, supra note 50.
171
AVIRAM, supra note 162; DAGAN & TELES, supra note 162. See also RIGHT ON CRIME,
http://rightoncrime.com/ (last visited May 14, 2018).
172
Epps, supra note 2, at 1106-08.
173
Epps, supra note 2, at 1106 (emphasis added).
174
Epps, supra note 2, at 1106.
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officers, the limited professional training required, and substantial
differences in role orientations and even ideologies of policing among
officers in the same agencies—such a broad statement cannot hold up
without some empirical research support. The same is true for prosecutors’
offices and individual prosecutors.175 The innocence literature is replete with
stories of misconduct by callous cops and indifferent prosecutors leading to
wrongful convictions. There are also many instances of conscience-stricken
and conscientious law enforcement officers who go on missions to exonerate
the innocent. Facile abstract assumptions based on assertions rather than
empirical evidence, and a principle that in many ways may have very little
grip in actual justice system practice outside the courtroom,176 are
makeweight arguments at best.
v. Legislative Behavior.177
Epps argues that legislators will broaden criminal statutes to help
obviate the benefits of procedural safeguards in a BP world, based on a
hypothetical put forward by William J. Stuntz.178 Is the obverse true? Does
lowering the standard of proof and eliminating procedural protections mean
that legislatures will pass mild criminal laws? I speculated that any political
movement powerful enough to reverse the Blackstone principle would likely
be a right-wing authoritarian movement, favoring severe crime legislation.179
The shift among conservative politicians toward milder punishment since
about 2012 has been a rational response to the costs of mass incarceration,
but the pushback by Attorney General Sessions appears to be driven by
ideology and political calculation. None of this has anything to do with the
BP. Strong opinion exists among a large number of Americans to once again
criminalize medical abortions, use criminal law to stigmatize LGBT folks,
and the like. I cannot believe that this opinion would be deterred by lowering
the burden of proof. In addition, if American states were to begin to emulate
the penal mildness of western European democracies, my speculation is that
175

I recently attended a meeting of the Criminal Law Section of the Michigan State Bar
on the topic of conviction integrity and heard a number of young assistant prosecutors making
statements that would be hard to differentiate from opinions of defense lawyers. My biases
are probably influencing my perception, but for a study of justice system actors related to
wrongful conviction that produced more stereotypical results, see Brad Smith, Marvin
Zalman, and Angie Kiger, How Justice System Officials View Wrongful Convictions, 57
CRIME & DELINQ. 663 (2009) (finding defense lawyers significantly more favorable to
innocence reforms than police or prosecutors in Michigan). The prosecutorial respondents
were presumably the county chief prosecutors.
176
I address this in Part III, infra.
177
Epps, supra note 2, at 1108.
178
Epps, supra note 2, at 1108 (quoting William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519 (2001)).
179
See text and note at footnote 155 supra.
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such changes would have nothing to do with changes in burdens of proof.
As for legislatures’ willingness to trash constitutional rights to support
reelection, Justice O’Connor had enough political experience to dissent from
extending the Fourth Amendment good faith reliance doctrine from search
warrants to legislation.180 As a high-ranking legislator, she knew that many
state legislators, faced with re-election where a “weak-on-crime” stance
would expose them to defeat, would vote for blatantly unconstitutional laws
in a heartbeat, expecting the courts to fix the problem later. This depended
on a political context in which being “tough-on-crime” was essential for reelection. In light of this political and social reality, Epps’s argument that
legislatures pass harsher criminal legislation because of the BP is thin and
abstract.
vi. Procedural Subversion.181
“A final potential effect flowing from a system’s formal commitment
to the Blackstone principle is outright subversion by judges, prosecutors, and
the other actors who run the system.”182 Epps draws on John Langbein’s
exemplary scholarship linking the use of judicial torture in medieval
continental courts to their burden of proof to argue that contemporary
standards of proof generate unfair plea bargaining.183 Epps is correct but
understates medieval Europe’s law of proof as “overly demanding”; it was
more—it was an absolute requirement of perfect proof even for covert
crimes: two eye-witnesses (which has Biblical roots)184 or a confession that
made convictions in serious cases nearly impossible without resorting to
torture.185 Langbein compared the rigidity of the continental system to the
common law’s “torture-free” law of proof, with verdicts rendered not by
professional judges but by lay juries. “The jury standard of proof gave
England no cause to torture.”186 Thus, Langbein’s research is justification
180

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 361-69 (1987).
Epps, supra note 2, at 1108-09. Epps drops his tentative approach and asserts “[l]ike
police and prosecutors, legislators will also behave differently in a world with the Blackstone
principle” Epps, supra note 2, at 1108 (emphasis added).
182
Epps supra note 2, at 1108.
183
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE
ANCIEN RÉGIME (1977).
184
DEUT. 19:15, ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 1100 (2001).
185
In addition, the theological roots of continental procedure, and the fears of professional
judges, who may have taken holy orders, of eternal damnation, is a further reason for why
torture was used on the continent and was not a feature of English common law trials where
decisions were made by a group of laymen who gave no reasons for their verdict. See JAMES
Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL
TRIAL (2008) [hereinafter WHITMAN, ORIGINS].
186
LANGBEIN, supra note 183, at 78. When judicial torture was applied under Henry VIII
and under Elizabeth, it was applied in a warrant procedure occasioned by state trials of alleged
enemies of the crown by the Privy Council, and not in ordinary criminal trials. Id. at 81-128.
181
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for proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a workable standard.
Langbein is not the only scholar to link the contemporary pressures on
defendants in plea-bargaining to the torture regime.187 Epps admits that
“[w]hile rules justified by the Blackstone principle are not the only force
making trials costly, they certainly contribute to those costs and thus could
contribute to this phenomenon.” Whatever pressure to plead guilty may be
exerted by reasonable doubt, far greater weight is accorded to the rise of
caseloads and a bureaucratic justice system and the ratcheting up of harsh
penalties.188 Epps does not draw on plea-bargaining scholarship to
substantiate his abstract, theoretical point. Again, the evidence for a dynamic
effect of the plea-bargaining is thin to the point of vanishing.
In short, all of Epps’s reasons for claiming a “dynamic” effect of the
BP are based on thin evidence and theoretical reasoning that is abstracted
from empirical analyses that describe the way that police, prosecutors, courts
and other justice personnel and institutions operate. I find his rationale for a
dynamic effect unconvincing.189 Anti-Blackstonians may take heart from
Epps’s lengthy assessment of the positives and negatives of the Blackstone
principle,190and alternative justifications,191 but I think that his
jurisprudential analyses must make better sense in social practice.
B. Laudan and Allen on Blackstone
I address two major related themes and arguments in Laudan and
Allen’s works: (i) that the Blackstone ratio works injustice by allowing too
many false acquittals, and (ii) that the effects of the Blackstone ratio
increases violent crime, suggesting that violent crime can be reduced by
convicting a larger number of defendants and sentencing them to longer
terms. I have already responded in part to their anti-Blackstonian thesis in
my review of Forst’s “Blackstonian” analysis192 and in my argument against
Epps.193 I do not address the empirical and numeric calculations in Laudan’s
“[T]he systematic use of torture to investigate crime never established itself in English
criminal procedure” Id. at 73.
187
See Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting
Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1009 (2011).
188
See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 205-30 (2003) (discussing the balance of power between
prosecutors and judges mediated by sentencing structures accounts for much of the
prosecutor’s power in plea bargaining); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014) http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/whyinnocent-people-plead-guilty/. (commenting on draconian penalties).
189
Epps, supra note 2, at 1121-24.
190
Epps, supra note 2, at 1110-21.
191
Epps, supra note 2, at 1124-43.
192
Infra Part II.C.
193
Infra Part III.A.
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symposium paper and book that leads him to assert that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt should be replaced by clear and convincing evidence for
repeat offenders or any legal issues arising from that conclusion, except
insofar as it relates Laudan and Allen’s crime reduction theory.194 I also do
not directly address his challenge to many procedural protections including
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.195 Nor will I
comment on Laudan’s proposals regarding bail, sentences, probation, and
parole.196
1. Laudan and Allen’s Blackstonian Analysis
Their first argument—that the Blackstone ratio (or a ratio variation or
at least the Blackstone principle) causes too many false acquittals—is traced
in Allen and Laudan and The Law’s Flaws.197 They begin by stating the
Blackstonian view that only by “strict adherence to this principle” “keep[ing]
the error-ratio of false acquittals to false convictions. . .very high. . . can we
protect the principle that false convictions are much more egregious than
false acquittals.”198 Mathematical manipulation of various Blackstone ratios
show that driving down false conviction levels drives up false acquittal
levels, and, based on a formula and attendant proof, a possible false
conviction rate and overall conviction rate produces rates of false acquittals
far above the ten to one Blackstone ratio.199 Next, Blackstonians hold “that
the false conviction rate (understood as the proportion of the convicted who
are innocent) must be minimized as much as possible.”200 But Blackstonians
fail to account for the apparent reciprocal effects of the ratio that determines
the false conviction rate as a product of the number of trials by the conviction
rate by the false conviction rate.201 If Blackstonians did, they would see that
194

For a critique, see Koppl, supra note 1.
For a critique, see Findley, supra note 1.
196
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110-72.
197
My analysis of their core argument cuts through or ignores other issues including their
critical analysis of the rate of wrongful convictions in Allen & Laudan, supra note 4,
especially their review of Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 26. The interweaving of
arguments about wrongful conviction rates and the Blackstone ratio made their points about
the Blackstone ratio hard to disentangle and follow. Similarly, Risinger’s reply, Tragic, supra
note 10, at 991-97, also addresses issues related to the incidence of wrongful convictions.
198
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 75.
199
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 75-77, 90-92. Their calculations are similar to those
conducted by FORST, supra note 80, at 57-65; see Part II.C.2, supra.
200
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 77. This assumes that Blackstone took the ratio
seriously, as Bushway asserted, rather than using the number as a way to emphasize the
Blackstone principle. If his starting premise is wrong, then the analytic edifice built by
Laudan and Allen collapses. This is a major premise of my critique and will be reiterated
infra.
201
The product is stated in formulaic terms in Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78; the
characterization of their position is my own and forms a basis of my internal critique. It is not
195
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“[w]ithout accounting for the frequency of convictions and the frequency of
trials, we can infer nothing from the false conviction rate regarding whether
we are convicting too many of the innocent.”202
Allen and Laudan then assert, “neither the Blackstone ratio nor the false
conviction rate approach seems to be a promising vehicle for protecting the
innocent from false conviction[.]”203 I am not sure I understand why this is
so. Nevertheless, they propose to “step[] back to look at the larger context”
because “[w]hat matters is how many innocent persons in the general
population are falsely convicted—the risk that an ordinary citizen has of
being falsely convicted of a serious crime.”204 Notice that this shifts the
focus from measuring errors in trials (where the error rate might be small but
worrisome, say from three to five percent) to dividing those errors by the
total population (where the error rate becomes infinitesimal). I pause to
insert a critical comment. The innocence movement focuses on justice
system problems and seeks to correct them. Trial processes that fail to screen
out erroneous prosecutions constitute a worrisome problem. Making trials
more accurate should reduce the number of wrongful convictions and
perhaps factually erroneous acquittals as well. Innocence reforms are not
aimed at reducing the crime rate or ameliorating society beyond reducing
wrongful convictions.205 Allen and Laudan’s shift makes the problem of
wrongful convictions (at trial) a small one when the number is compared to
the issue of crime in society, because far more serious crimes than wrongful
convictions exist. Yet, I assume they take this path because they believe and
assert that by convicting more defendants at trial (and having prosecutors
dismiss fewer) violent crime will be substantially reduced.206 Because I
believe that Allen and Laudan’s crime-reduction thesis is wrong, I see their
shift from a trial-error rate to a societal-error rate as meretricious.

clear to me if Laudan and Allen view the effects of the Blackstone ratio, or perhaps the
Blackstone principle, as determinate in the manner of the effects of laws of physics or
chemistry. Some language seems to imply this and other language does not.
202
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78.
203
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78.
204
Id. (emphasis added). I found some of the language used on this page cloudy, making
it difficult to extract the gist of their points. For example, their reference to “causal
surrogates” left me puzzled, and “stepping back to look at the larger context” seemed like
advertising language. I present a broader context herein that I believe is relevant.
205
We might hope that by confronting system officials with evidence-based approaches,
innocence reforms will make the system’s culture more transparent, but that is not a necessary
part of the innocence program. For justice system resistance to change, see DAVID HARRIS,
FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE (2012).
206
But see Epps, supra note 2, at 1128. Epps seems to say that extending an antiBlackstonian argument to a crime prevention rationale is mistaken: “The Blackstone principle
can prevent only those harms that are caused by the adjudicative system itself.” Id.
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Next, in theory, an acceptable Blackstone ratio can be achieved by
having very few trials and leaving criminals to run amok, but this is not
acceptable to society.207 Thus, false convictions can be reduced by “either
decreas[ing] the rate of convictions per trial, decreas[ing] the false
conviction rate, or both.”208 This can be done by making it more difficult to
convict guilty people.209 Thus, a “deadly dilemma” arises because “[e]very
failure to convict the guilty means additional crimes undeterred and bad guys
who, when left to their own devices, will almost certainly commit additional
crimes.”210
Why did Allen and Laudan switch focus from the trial-false-convictionerror rate to a societal-false-conviction-error rate? They assert, “[t]he social
contract obliges the state to minimize the aggregate cost innocent citizens
face, which consists of exposure to false conviction as well as criminal
victimization.”211 This formulation of the social contract, in my words,
requires that total costs of becoming a crime victim or a wrongful conviction
victim be minimized. Allen and Laudan state these goals as resulting from
trials: “[t]his thesis implies that the standard of proof and other rules of trial
should be set at that point where the total cost of being victimized or falsely
convicted is minimized.”212 They then calculate the risk of being the victim
of a serious crime in the United States as “significantly more than 300 times
greater than the lifetime risk of being falsely convicted of a serious crime.”213
I do not dispute that the overall risk of becoming a crime victim is much
higher than being wrongfully convicted. It might be off by a bit, as Risinger
noted in his response to Allen and Laudan, but any informed understanding
of the way that crimes are reported and responded to would see this as

207

Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 78. I believe the proper name for this argument is
“straw man” or “red herring,” but that depends on the degree to which one takes the
Blackstone ratio seriously. Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 999, made this point.
208
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79.
209
This can be done by “[r]aising the standard of proof or “making the rules of evidence
more acquittal-prone[.]” Id. at 79. The “upstream” corrections to police and forensic science
investigation methods, which are central to the innocence movement, seem to have no place
in this argument, although Laudan injects a loophole into his argument. See discussion infra
at notes 252-253.
210
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79. Strictly speaking, this sentence encapsulates the
second Laudan argument, which is elaborated in The Law’s Flaws and which I address
separately.
211
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79. This is unobjectionable, as far as it goes, but its
seeming limit (i.e., the social contract consists in nothing other than this) can create real
problems. In this Article, I avoid the intricacies of Laudan and Allen’s reliance on Laplace
for their social contract discussion. Risinger responded to this matter, Tragic, supra note 10,
at 1004-14.
212
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79 (emphasis added).
213
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79–80.
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roughly correct.214 As noted, Bushway came up with a similarly large
ratio.215 My critique does not challenge this imbalance as such (which is
probably empirically correct) but challenges its source and the policy
conclusions drawn by Allen and Laudan. In brief, Laudan and Allen say that
this imbalance results from trial rules that produce too many acquittals and
prosecutors who dismiss too many cases. Some errors of impunity have to
result from this, but the larger impunity results from crimes not detected or
reported, or as I will show in Part IV, by the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion that devalues certain kinds of convictions.216
To expand on my comments regarding Bushway’s Blackstone ratio
calculations,217 the main reasons for the impunity of so many unconvicted
offenders walking free have little to do with false acquittals at trial. The
problems of non-reporting and flawed investigations are major reasons why
serious crimes go unpunished.218 Laudan provides data on the criminal
justice process or “funnel” that is familiar to every criminologist/criminal
justice scholar.219 There were 1.7 million victims of completed violent
crimes in 2008; of these 790,000 were reported to police. Thus, Laudan
really has nothing to say about 910,000 victims who were too afraid,
confused, or nonplussed to report these crimes.220 These are police
problems, and however effective are the courts, they will not be able to bring
justice to those victims. Of the 790,000 victimizations reported to police,
542,000 suspects were arrested and charged, leaving a quarter of a million
214

Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 1016–17.
Supra Part.II.B.1. So did Forst: he noted that 9 million felonies reported to police each
year do not end in conviction and assumes a 1 percent erroneous conviction rate (10,000
defendants), creating a ratio of 900 to 1, FORST, supra note 80, at 45, n. 2.
216
Infra Part IV.B.1.
217
Supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
218
Concern with unreported crime goes back many decades. See Wesley G. Skogan,
Dimensions of the Dark Figure of Unreported Crime, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 41 (1977). The
research has continued. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, The Relationship between Crime
Reporting and Police: Implications for the Use of Uniform Crime Reports, 14 J. QUANT.
CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1998).
219
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 48; Different Strokes, supra note 3.
220
Laudan, Different Strokes,supra note 3, at 13. Perhaps Laudan and Allen believe that
increasing the number of convictions will cut into the number of unreported felonies, but this
is speculative. The figure is derived from national victimization surveys, which are the best
crime data we have, but still is an estimate of the reality of crime and victimization. On the
penultimate page of LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 177, Laudan does assert that the
demands of the social contract requires that “citizens” report more violent crimes that occur
and the police need to arrest a higher proportion of reported crimes. However, he says nothing
about the social reality of these complex matters. For example, crime reporting depends on
whether “citizens” trust the police. I assume that Laudan used “citizen” innocently to mean
“civilian,” but undocumented aliens may not report serious crime or fear of being deported.
See Marjorie S. Zatz & Hilary Smith, Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and
Reality, 8 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 141 (2012).
215
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victims (248,000) without justice. Of the 542,000 violent victimizations
reported, 179,000 had charges dropped by prosecutors, 333,000 pleaded
guilty,221 30,000 were convicted at trial, and 15,000 were tried and acquitted.
When Laudan assess the number of false negatives he looks to the 15,000
who were tried and acquitted and the 179,000 whose charges were dropped
by prosecutors.222
The next important step in Laudan’s program is to assess the possible
number of factually guilty people among the 15,000 who are acquitted at trial
and among prosecutors’ dismissals. A trial exoneration means “legal
innocence” and to Laudan is “vastly different from factual innocence.”223
Citing several studies estimating the incidence of wrongful convictions, he
adopts three percent as an approximate wrongful conviction figure, a number
that “will loom very large in [his] arguments . . .since that percentage is the
lynchpin for numerous interesting inferences.”224 He also argues that the
false positive rate for convictions obtained by plea-bargaining may be much
lower.225 He then attempts to measure false negatives. “Conventional
wisdom has it that most defendants acquitted at trial are probably factually
guilty.”226 Laudan plays with estimates and suggests that an “apparent guilt”
range “from about 70% to 90%” of those acquitted is reasonable, suggesting
that trial evidence did not support convictions. He then muses “that about
half of those 15k acquitted at trial are guilty giving us 7.5k false
negatives[.]”.227 Then, after considering verdicts in Scotland, which include
a “not proven verdict,” and the results of the famous Kalven and Zeisel
study,228 he settles on a false-acquittal-at-trial rate of seventy-five percent or
11,200 of the 15,000 acquittals.229 He concludes this section by alluding to
221

Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3, at 13. Laudan labels these “confessions.” For
a reasoned explanation of why plea bargains differ from confessions, see Brandon L. Garrett,
Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1415 (2016) (discussing
that plea bargains lacks essential facts of case, complicate sentencing, where explicit sentence
not bargained for, do not preclude factual challenges in subsequent proceedings).
222
Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3, at 13. In LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note
3, at 48 the figure of dismissed cases is given as “217k.” Laudan’s reasoning is provided at
greater length in LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 56–66.
223
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 52.
224
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 54.
225
Recent attention to guilty pleas and wrongful conviction suggests that the wrongful
conviction rate is as high for guilty pleas as for trial verdicts, see infra Part IV.B.3.
226
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 57; see Epps, supra note 2, at 1127 (footnote
omitted) (“[G]iven that prosecutors have been known stubbornly to insist on the guilt of
previously convicted defendants despite exonerating DNA evidence, it would be surprising if
prosecutors took jury acquittals as reason to conclude that they had charged the wrong
person.”).
227
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 58.
228
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
229
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 59.
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the Givelber and Farrell study “devoted to trying to make the case that the
factually innocent are abundant among those acquitted at trial” but then
castigates their conclusion that they cannot establish the claim empirically
even though their data are consistent with the possibility.230
Following this section that estimates a trial-acquittal-false-negative
rate, Laudan turns to prosecutorial dismissals which he labels acquittals,
reviews two studies offering some sense of the reasons for dismissals, and
concludes that they point to an estimate “that about 56% of the dismissed
and dropped arrestees were probably factually guilty.”231 He then states his
estimate that seventy-five percent of those acquitted at trial “are probably
truly guilty” and then notes that two-thirds of all who went to trial were
convicted and states that this provides “a plausible rationale for saying that,
among those defendants who had the charges against them dropped for nonevidentiary reasons, approximately two-out-of three (and probably more) are
highly likely to be guilty. Hence we shall assume that about 37% to 38%
(that is two-thirds of the 56% of those whom were booted out of the trial
system for non-evidentiary reasons) are factually guilty (and, if they had
gone to trial, would have been convicted).”232 This translates to 81,000 out
of 217,000 dismissed cases, and when added to 12,000 probably guilty
defendants acquitted at trial, puts 93,000 “guilty” criminals into society.
What to do about these 93,000 unconvicted criminals? At one point
Laudan alludes to the possibility that better police investigation can increase
the proportion of convictions but does not explore that path.233 Allen and
Laudan fear that “the remedies usually proposed for the ‘excessive’ levels of
false conviction involve measures that further increase the already grave risk
of criminal victimization.”234 As a result the main devices proposed for
having prosecutors charge more defendants and for juries to convict more is
to lower the standard of proof and eliminate many of the defendant’s
procedural protections.235
230
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 60. See DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL,
NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED INNOCENT? (2012).
231
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 63–64.
232
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 64 (emphasis in original).
233
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 36–37.
234
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 80.
235
The rules Allen and Laudan might excise include the constitutional prohibition on
double jeopardy, exclusionary rules that favor defendants, the exclusion of evidence from trial
that is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant where a judge rules that the prejudice outweighs
its probative value, privileged testimony of the defendant’s lawyer, doctor, etc., the rule that
a jury will be instructed to not infer guilt from a defendant’s decision to not testify, and more.
My assumption is based on a chapter in THE LAW’S FLAWS that lists rules that Laudan would
change to favor the prosecution. Ronald Allen may or may not agree with the list, but from
Deadly Dilemmas he was probably on board with modifying the standard of proof. See
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 110–37.
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2. Laudan and Allen’s Crime Reduction Thesis
Laudan andAllen claim that higher conviction rates and more
incarceration will reduce violent crime.236 “[T]his book will argue that there
are effective methods for lowering the rate of serious crimes. Basically,
these hinge on convicting and incarcerating a higher proportion of the guilty
than we now convict.”237 Laudan fleshes out this point as follows:
In general, rates of conviction prove to be good predictors of rates
of serious crime (far better than any other, including the severity
of sentences). If, for whatever reasons, a society begins convicting
a smaller and smaller proportion of those charged with committing
serious crimes, more and more people will evidently find the
commission of such crimes worth the risk. Contrariwise, if the
courts raise conviction rates, fewer crimes will be committed. This
general correlation is borne out across the full spectrum of serious
crimes and across a broad range of countries with different legal
systems.238
Laudan’s evidence for this conclusion is found in two graphs showing
inverse relationships between serious felony (Figure 1) or murder (Figure 2)
rates from 1950 to 1998 along one axis and expected punishment measured
in days in prison (for serious crimes) and years in prison (for murders) for
each known crime along the other axis.239 These measures of punitiveness
depend on penalties meted out to convicted criminals (whose total
convictions constitute a small proportion of known crimes) against all crime,
possibly including crimes not reported to police, never leading to
apprehension, and leading to dismissals—a very large number.240 I am not
236

LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 44 (“[I]t is empirically true that incarcerating
more perpetrators of serious crimes reduces the future frequency of those crimes.”). This
claim is worked out most fully in Chapter 2 of THE LAW’S FLAWS, extending the argument in
Deadly Dilemmas. LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 18-45.
237
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis in original).
238
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 37. The hypothetical argument has
something of the straw man quality observed in my review of Epps, supra at note 2, by hinting
that conviction rates could fall to ridiculously low rates. In extreme cases, like police strikes
or major riots and disorder, there can be a quick increase in opportunistic crimes, including
murders. This aside, Laudan does use contemporary crime and justice system data to analyze
the routine operation of the justice system.
239
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 35-36 (Figures 2 and 3). The figures seem
approximately correct but might be a bit impressionistic, as Figure 2 has the murder rate in
1998 as at slightly below 1 per 100,000 which is off by a factor of five. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS: BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 247060, THE NATION’S TWO
MEASURES OF HOMICIDE, (2014) (showing the homicide rate to hover around 6 per 100,000
from about 1998 to around 2008 and declining to slightly above 5 per 100,000 by 2011).
240
One problem with the graphs going back to the 1950s is that the use of victimization
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sure that this is a fair way correlate crime and punishment, but it is not
standard.241 His two graphs also begin counting crime rates from 1950, when
most men in the high-crime-prone groups were World War II veterans or
being shipped off to fight in Korea— experiences that reduced the number
violent crimes in the United States. Also the oldest members of the post-war
baby bulge, who started committing larger number of crimes in the 1960s,
were about three years old in 1950 and most were not yet born. Figure 2
shows the rise and fall of the murder rates against years in prison from 1950
to 1998, a subject studied closely by criminologists.
When criminologists disaggregate crime rates by age and other factors,
much of the crime drop since 1990 has been attributed to the aging of the
population and changes in illicit drug markets.242 The simple correlations
that constitute the results in Figures 1 and 2 cannot be taken at face value as
explaining causal relationships in light of other knowledge about the effects
of punishment on crime and what is left out. Laudan is not entirely
insensitive to the concept that crime might be affected by factors other than
conviction and incarceration. Before presenting Figures 1 and 2 he alludes,
dismissively, to the idea that factors like “poverty or unemployment to
inequitable distribution of wealth or a bad educational system or a
demographic spike in the number of young males in the population”
influence the frequency of crime.243 Thus, he seems aware of some of the
social factors that to criminologists explain much crime. Laudan is clearly
unimpressed by criminological explanations of crime, but he does not seem
to refer to the empirical studies of the “great crime drop” that, I think,
undermine his base argument about the scope of the effect of imprisonment
on crime rates.244
To return to Laudan’s argument, he prefers incapacitation as a rationale
and policy for crime reduction over deterrence because the evidence of
higher conviction rates reducing crime via deterrence is weak: “[a] much
surveys began in the 1970s so that the crime rates in Figures 1 and 2 are presumably taken
from the Uniform Crime Reports.
241
His statement that “[i]n general, rates of conviction prove to be good predictors of
rates of serious crime” does not appear accurate if we were to examine the rising prison rates
after 1990 with dropping crime rates. I think it is wise, however, to withhold judgment on the
idea if it were limited to the kinds of violent crime that is the focus of The Law’s Flaws:
murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault. Less discretion is exercised in either dismissing
or criminalizing such behavior, in comparison to other crimes.
242
Bruce Johnson, Andrew Golub & Eloise Dunlap, The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs,
Drug Markets, and Violence in Inner-City New York, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 164206 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, eds., 2000); James Alan Fox, Demographics and
U.S. Homicide, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 288-317 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman,
eds., 2000).
243
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 29-30.
244
Blumstein & Wallman, supra note 138; ZIMRING, supra note 138.
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surer route to decreasing crime is, I believe, by incarcerating wrong-doers,
especially serial offenders.” He then asserts that the conviction rate can be
increased either by the police identifying and arresting
a larger proportion of those likely to have committed a serious
crime and/or . . . increase[ing] the rate of convictions among those
who are arrested and probably guilty. . . . The second
mechanism . . . depends almost entirely on the efficiency of the
courts in identifying and convicting those truly guilty arrestees
who are actually arrested.
He indicated that “[m]uch of the rest of the book will be focused on the latter
issue” rather than discussing the ability of police to arrest a higher proportion
of offenders. 245
At this point in the book he does not specify what the courts have to do
to identify and convict more arrestees, but later he proposes eliminating
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials and replacing it with a
lower standard (in Chapter 5) and eliminating a number of procedural
safeguards for defendants (in Chapter 6). He calculates the lower standard
of proof from his assumption-based estimates of the costs of false positives
and false negatives as 0.65, or roughly equivalent to the “clear and
convincing” standard, which he proposes to replace the ninety or ninety-five
percent certainty commonly associated with proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.246
Laudan’s crime-fighting argument rests importantly on the known high
recidivism rates of convicted offenders.247 Two large NIJ surveys of 1983
and 1994 cohorts of released offenders showed that rearrest rates were about
two-thirds in both cohorts “although the incarceration rate had roughly
doubled between 1983 and 1994.”248 Because “most serous [sic] felons sent
to prison are serial offenders” “incarcerating sizeable numbers of offenders

245
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 38-39. I suppose that as a philosopher
Laudan is free to label convicted offenders in his own way, but his application of the term
“serial” to repeat violent and and property is what criminologists would label “career”
criminals. For a standard definition of serial criminals see Marvin Zalman & Matthew Larson,
Elephants in the Station House: Serial Crimes, Wrongful Convictions, and Expanding
Wrongful Conviction Analysis to Include Police Investigation, 79 ALB. L. REV. 941, 977-81
(2015).
246
These calculations are found in Chapter 4 of LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3.
247
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 40-45.
248
Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn, eds., The Growth of Incarceration in
the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences 151 (Washington, DC: National
Research Council) [hereinafter, NRC, Growth]; Laudan, Different Strokes, supra note 3.
248
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 40-45.
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lowers the crime rate.”249 Thus, he calculates, for example, that “increasing
the conviction rate for aggravated assault by 15% (from 148,000 to 170,000
per year), one could reduce the frequency of violent crimes by about 17,000
per year.”250 He also bolsters his argument by citing a 1999 article by crime
statistician Daniel Nagin to the effect that incapacitation substantially
contributed to crime reduction.251
For all his boldness in asserting that changing the burden of proof in
the small percentage of cases that go to trial (and in a larger number
dismissed by prosecutors) will reduce crime, Laudan does allow a loophole,
which he mentions in passing:
The moral of the story seems clear: increasing the conviction rate
generally lowers the violent crime rateFalse That is not to say that
the only way of lowering the crime rate is by convicting more of
the guilty. Increasing sentences would doubtless have done
something to lower the homicide and rape rates via longer
incapacitation; so would decreasing the number of murders and
rapists who eluded police detection. It is no part of my brief to
argue that raising conviction rates is the only way to control
serious crime. It is important to my later arguments to show,
however, that it is a way, and an effective way at that, to reduce
the ordinary citizen’s risk of ending up a violent crime victim.252
This loophole implies that any effective critique of Laudan and Allen’s
incapacitation thesis should lead them to rationally modify their extreme
position and to pay more attention to the various ways in which the kinds of
social, economic and justice system inputs that Laudan cavalierly dismisses
ought to be treated with greater respect.253 In any event, my internal critique
249

LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 40 (emphasis in original) (“If delinquents
were not serial offenders, incapacitation would not be a very promising strategy.”).
250
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 43.
251
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 43.
252
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, 36-37 (emphasis in original).
253
Listing some “fashionable hypotheses” of variables related to crime, Laudan tells the
reader to “choose your favorite, according to your political predilections.” I could be over
reading this quip, but Laudan seems to be saying that you are ideological if you disagree with
his evidence, but that he is scientific. My understanding is that every person, however
unlettered, carries an ideology (i.e., a political preference), although even for those of us who
think about these things, we may never be able to entirely fathom what drives our views. It
is also possible to recognize and to mitigate predilections and to observe empirical evidence
as an important guide to action (which, I suppose is also an ideological predisposition, but
any further discourse will lead to infinite regress). Every lawyer should read JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1986) to better grasp the
professional ideology she calls “legalism.” There is also a conventional difference between
understanding one’s political predilections (i.e., “ideologies”) and acting or thinking in rigidly
doctrinaire ways that are labeled “ideological.”
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will challenge their overreliance on incapacitation.254
3. Internal Critique of Laudan and Allen Regarding the
Blackstone Ratio
If I understand Laudan andAllen’s position correctly, they attribute
most—if not all—false negatives and/or false acquittals in trials and “false”
cases dismissed by prosecutors to the rules that flow from the Blackstone
principle, especially proof beyond a reasonable doubt and procedural trial
rules that formally advantage defendants.255 In addition, their writing at
points seems to attribute to the Blackstone ratio an intrinsic power to force a
high rate of false positives. Unlike Forst, whose Blackstone ratio
calculations were an abstract exercise informed by normative concerns,
Laudan and Allen seem to say that all failures to convict guilty defendants
and all “false” prosecutor dismissals result from the effects of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and defense-oriented trial rules. If this means that their
formulas determine the outcomes of trials in the same way that fixed inputs
in a high school physics or chemistry “experiment” designed to show how a
law of nature works, then it seems to me that they are engaging in magical
thinking.
It may be, however, that their formula essentially boils down to a way
of expressing the Blackstone principle. In any event, on the basis of
available data Laudan calculated that the justice system annually produces
93,000 false negatives, 12,000 false acquittals and 81,000 dismissals of cases
against factually guilty defendants. Lowering the standard of proof will
result in more of them being convicted.
How solid are his figures? Although they seem to be in a plausible
range, they are estimates based on several assumptions. The most serious
challenge to his numbers is Givelber and Farrell’s analysis. Laudan
dismisses their work because they honestly note that “[i]n the end, we cannot
establish through empirical research with certainty that many (or indeed
most) of the acquitted are innocent. We can only point out that the data are
entirely consistent with this possibility.”256 Just because Laudan attaches
numbers to his guesses does not make his estimate stronger than theirs. What
lies behind their caveat is a careful analysis of data on judge and jury decision
making in 401 noncapital felony jury cases collected by the National Center
on State Courts (NCSC) that were decided in four municipal courts. Their
book successfully challenges Kalven and Zeisel’s “liberation hypothesis,”
which analyzed judge-jury disagreements over proper verdicts, and held that
jury decisions to acquit where the facts were close were based on “sentiment”
254
255
256

Infra Part III.B.4.
Excepting for the “loophole” references, see discussion supra at notes 252-253.
GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 143.
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rather than evidence.257 As for the relationship between acquittals and
innocence, Givelber and Farrell offer convincing challenges to the
assumptions that support the conventional wisdom that (all) acquitted
defendants are guilty.258 Their close analysis weakens the bases for
conventional wisdom, and should weaken the confidence one has in
Laudan’s assumed rate of false negatives. Moreover, their data analysis
shows that factors consistent with innocence are correlated with acquittals.
Defendants with no criminal records are more likely to be innocent, and
acquittals were twice as great for defendants with no known arrests or
convictions (45.0%) than those with records that the jury learned of or did
not learn of (21.2% and 23.8%, respectfully).259 In a large number of
exoneration cases prisoners consistently maintain their innocence, even at
the cost of forfeiting parole.260 In the NCSC data, acquittal rates were more
than twice as high for defendants who claimed innocence to their lawyers
(45.7%) than for defendants who went to trial because plea-bargaining failed
(18.2%).261 Finally, consistent with the reasonable thesis that innocent
defendants have more information about their case than the prosecutor, the
acquittal rates of defendants increased as they entered progressively more
evidence, from having no defense witnesses testify (16.7%), to the defendant
alone testifying (21.6%), to one defense witness testifying without the
defendant testifying (34.9%), to the defendant and at least one other witness
testifying (41.4%).262 Because researchers can almost never know the
ground truth of verdicts it is incautious to make definitive statements about
innocence or guilt. Givelber and Farrell’s caveat at the conclusion of their
book is the kind of caution one expects from good scholars and scientists.
For all of Givelber and Farrell’s evidence, Laudan may be right about
the false negative rate, but his estimate should not be seen as a sufficiently
strong basis for radical policy changes in the trial process. Before dismissing
acquittals as inherently false we should consider that defendants are brought
to trial by police who typically make decisions about guilt quickly and by
partisan prosecutors. “Juries are typically the first remotely neutral decision
makers to hear the defendants’ stories from the defendants, or, more
257

GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 5, 71-79, 95.
These assumptions are the belief that prosecutors proceed only against the guilty, that
prosecutors are better at evaluating evidence, that the reasonable doubt burden of proof causes
the acquittal of a guilty defendant (data supports the view that judges and juries differed
mainly because of differing interpretations of evidence), that some information is not
available to the prosecution. GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 53-63.
259
GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 58.
260
See, e.g., Maurice Possley, Everton Wagstaffe, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS (June 14, 2017) http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/cased
etail.aspx?caseid=4725.
261
GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 64.
262
GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 65.
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importantly, other witnesses. The simplest explanation for acquittals may be
that it is only at trial that defendants can actually tell their stories.”263
Aside from Givelber and Farrell’s important research suggesting that a
higher proportion of acquittals represent actually innocent defendants than
generally thought of, Laudan and Allen miss another element: that a
wrongful conviction in wrong person cases264 allows a possibly recidivist
criminal to go free, so that repressing false positives at trial enhances crime
control.265 Forst and Huff used Innocence Project (IP) and National Registry
of Exonerations (NRE) databases to estimate “the magnitude of wrongful
conviction in violent crimes” and the implications for victimization caused
by actual perpetrators not brought to justice.266 Among the IP cases, almost
none of which are “no crime cases,” 147 perpetrators were not initially
brought to justice, but when discovered were shown to have committed 146
additional crimes. They then totaled the number of NRE cases for violent
crime (1,125 out of 1,851 exonerations at the time of their analysis).267 They
then estimated that an assumed wrongful conviction rate of 1 percent of
339,093 convictions in 2014 would yield 3,391 false convictions. A 3
263

GIVELBER & FARRELL, supra note 230, at 55.
One third of exonerations reported by the National Registry of Exoneration are “no
crime” cases, including arsons that were accidental fires (David Lee Gavitt); “Shaken Baby
Syndrome” cases where children’s’ symptoms were caused by underlying medical condition
or accidental falls (Julie Baumer); false accusations of child sex abuse, common in divorce
cases (Ronnie Mark Gariepy); corporate malfeasance in charging employees with theft
(Cheryl Adams); the misidentification of substances as drugs (Mariah Simmons); mistaking
a statement intended as a joke as a threat (Thomas Shreve); no conspiracy to bribe a foreign
head of state occurred when undercover agent fabricated story that actions were approved by
the U.S. State Department (Haim Geri); no threat against the President occurred when fellow
jail inmates fabricated charge against defendant to get better deals in their own cases (Daniel
Cvijanovich); no burglary–complainant fabricated “crime” our of anger (Michael Waithe); no
assault occurred– sheriff’s deputy fabricated charge against teen-ager (Jonathan Dominguez);
death accidental and not vehicular homicide when audio statement to police, heard by
appellate court, corrected erroneous transcript (Sierra Rigel); no money laundering by defense
attorney defendant where testimony against him by criminal clients inconsistent, and no proof
of specific intent in advising woman to purchase a home with funds that were drug sale
proceeds (M. Donald Cardwell); no theft–money deposited in bank night drop was stuck in
the vault (Robert Farnsworth). The names in parentheses are examples of the reason for a “no
crime” exoneration and are found in the NRE. On August 4, 2017, the NRE reported 2,074
exonerations and 713 “no crime” cases (34.38%). See also Personal Identity, 10 People Who
Were Wrongly Convicted Of Nonexistent Crimes, (contemporary and historic “no crime”
wrongful convictions), https://listverse.com/2014/07/21/10-people-who-were-wrongly-conv
icted-of-nonexistent-crimes/.(last visited May 20, 2018).
265
Laudan does build the crime-committed-by-the-true-perpetrator into his support for
the Blackstone principle, but his thinking does not extend to the Forst-Huff analysis.
266
BRIAN FORST & C. RONALD HUFF, Preventing Violent Crimes by Reducing Wrongful
Convictions, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION, 2ND ED.
(Vazsoni, Flannery & DeLisi, 2017)
267
These were 742 murders, 287 sexual assaults, and 96 robberies) FORST & HUFF, supra
note 266.
264
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percent wrongful conviction rate “would translate to an estimated 10,173
cases of wrongful conviction in violent crimes in that year.” Thus, allowing
for only one crime by the criminals who were free to commit them because
an innocent person was convicted, would generate 3,000 to 10,000 “excess”
crimes each year. Forst and Huff note that those crimes account for only one
cohort of convictions in one year and “does not include the 57 percent of
DNA exonerations reported by the Innocence Project for which no actual
perpetrators were identified.”268 This conservative estimate is even lower
than Laudan would allow, for if assumptions of recidivism were applied to a
portion of those who escaped justice, the excess crimes resulting from
wrongful convictions for violent crimes would be higher. Thus, at the least,
the crimes prevented by lowering the number of false convictions should be
factored into Laudan and Allen’s crime reduction analysis, which necessarily
increases the number of wrongful convictions.
Of course, requiring a prosecutor to prove a case beyond a reasonable
doubt makes the prosecution more difficult and as a result some factually
guilty defendants will be acquitted. My critique of Laudan and Allen’s
proof-shifting idea, as well as Epps’s position, includes two interrelated
points that pick up on my comments on Bushway’s analysis.269 The first part
of my argument is that a verdict depends on more than the standard of proof,
and that abstracting away from a verdict such factors as the strength of
evidence (which might reflect the quality of police investigation work)
overvalues the effect of proof-standards and rules of trial procedure. The
kind of “Blackstone ratio” found by Bushway and the number of the errors
of impunity that result are more logically the failure upstream processes and
decisions. If these upstream decisions place weak evidence before jurors, as
Givelber and Farrell show, the prosecution is logically more likely to fail.270
What Laudan and Allen’s abstract analysis does not account for, then, is that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and defense-friendly procedures on trial
outcomes are part of a mix of elements that go into a verdict. These elements
include many of the built-in prosecutorial advantages in plea bargaining and
the conduct of trials, the array of evidence collected by the police
investigation and forensic science process, the way in which that evidence is
shaped into usable trial evidence by prosecutors before trial, and the entirety
of defense preparation.271 Once trial preparation is concluded, the outcome
depends on the complex execution of the trial by prosecution and defense;
the guidance, evidentiary decisions, and instructions by the judge; and the
composition and deliberations of the jury. The Blackstone ratio is only one
268
269
270
271

FORST & HUFF, supra note 266.
Supra Part II.C.1.
But see GOULD, CARRANO, LEO, & HAIL-JARES, infra note 373.
Some of this will be discussed in Part IV.
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factor in this mix.
The second part of my argument is the moral hazard that a change in
the burden of proof will likely have effects on actors and decisions
throughout the criminal justice system. In a thought experiment one can hold
everything constant in the justice system except the standard of proof. In
this thought experiment the number of convictions will probably rise and in
accord with Laudan’s calculations result in many true convictions at a cost
of a small increased number of wrongful convictions. But, perhaps, in light
of Givelber and Farrell’s analysis, the shift might not be as strong. Still,
were the burden dropped from reasonable doubt to clear and convincing, it
is highly unlikely that system actors would not react to it. Instead of showing
greater concern for weaknesses in police investigation and forensic science
(as does the innocence movement), Laudan and Allen would make it easier
for a poorly resourced, or lazy, or poorly trained, or even corrupt criminal
justice system personnel to convict defendants they assume are guilty by
making the trial less of a screen and more of a conduit. Lowering the
standard of proof would likely have a dynamic effect on police investigators
and prosecutors by creating a moral hazard of indicting and bringing to trial
weaker cases. Weaker cases produced by an uneven criminal justice system
(see, infra, Part IV) will likely include far more false positives than now get
through police investigatory screens. When these weaker cases are filtered
through a trial process with a less stringent screen (clear and convincing
evidence) a far larger proportion of false positives will pass through, possibly
a far larger number than now result in wrongful convictions. Of course, we
cannot be sure if the proportion of false positives to false negatives will be
much worse for innocent defendants, and not so beneficial to potential crime
victims than Laudan calculates.
Some evidence for this argument is found in Gould et al.’s empirical
study of the causes of wrongful convictions. Perhaps the least explicable
factor that was significantly correlated with wrongful convictions was a
prosecutor’s weak case.272 With the assistance of an expert panel whose
majority included police and prosecution professionals,273 the researchers
concluded that when prosecutors are dealt a weak hand in a case that is later
shown to be a wrongful conviction, this also means that the defense has less
evidence with which to challenge the prosecution. As for the moral hazard
argument,

272
GOULD ET AL., infra note 373, at 491, 494, 501-02 (“Of all the statistically significant
factors that harm an innocent defendant, a weak prosecution case is hardest to explain.
Intuitively, we might expect the opposite-that cases with weaker evidence against the
defendant would be more likely to end in dismissal or acquittal.”). Id. at 501.
273
GOULD ET AL., infra note 373, at 505 n.84.
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Weak facts may also encourage prosecutors to engage in certain
behaviors designed to bolster the case, which our statistics show
help predict an erroneous conviction. In several of our erroneous
convictions, a prosecutor, convinced of the defendant’s guilt
despite a lack of conclusive proof, failed to recognize and turn
over exculpatory evidence or enlisted a snitch or other noneyewitness to provide dubious corroborating testimony. These
types of actions compound, rather than rectify, previous errors or
misconduct in the case.274
The “need” to prevail where prosecutors subjectively believe in defendants’
guilt despite the lack of solid evidence led prosecutors in Gould et al.’s
national sample of wrongful convictions and near misses to rely on weak
evidence. This tendency of prosecutors to win even with weak evidence, a
statistically significant factor, was not spurious according the panel of
experts enlisted to assist Gould et al. to interpret their statistical results. “To
a large extent, the panelists attributed tunnel vision in our cases to a police
and prosecutorial culture in which questioning and independent thinking are
not valued, procedures are not designed to probe already gathered evidence,
and little or no concern is given to learning from past errors.”275
Laudan and Allen’s serious concern for crime victims might have
produced its own form of tunnel vision, leading to exuberant claims that may
overstate the extent of false acquittals, brush the larger criminal justice
system out of their analysis, disvalue counter-research without giving it full
consideration, ignore the strongest research on the causes of wrongful
convictions, and fail to consider the likely effects that their proposed changes
would have on actors in the justice system.276 Their analysis is valuable as
an academic challenge to innocentric thinking, ideally producing a dialectic
to improve how we think about issues of guilt and innocence and the trial
process. However, as a foundation for drastically changing the decision rules
274

GOULD ET AL., infra note 373, at 501.
GOULD ET AL., supra note 373, at 505.
276
For what it’s worth, in my interactions with innocence advocates, including attendance
at annual Innocence Network meetings where exonerees are valorized, I have often noticed
real concern for the well-being of the initial crime victims, and concern for the double
victimization that occurs when a rape victim or the family of a murdered person learns of the
wrongful conviction. Sometimes, these victims react by denying the truth, at whatever
psychic cost. See TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE
CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008). More recently, the innocence movement has
expanded to include an organization founded by Jennifer Thompson who herself underwent
the double trauma of a rape and coming to grips with her innocent misidentification of Ronald
Cotton. Their story is told in JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON, & ERIN
TORNEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009). The
organization, Healing Justice, works to assist crime survivors or the families of murder
victims who have doubly suffered upon learning of the wrongful convictions in their cases.
275
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for something as weighty as verdicts in criminal cases, even in a system as
problematic as the American adversary system, Laudan and Allen’s work
falls short. Perhaps all these weaknesses can be forgiven if implementing
their thinking will sharply reduce crime.
4. Internal Critique of Laudan and Allen’s Crime Reduction
Thesis277
In any event, the central theme running through Laudan and Allen was
labeled as the most serious of the deadly dilemmas: “Every failure to convict
the guilty means additional crimes undeterred and bad guys who, when left
to their own devices, will almost certainly commit additional crimes.”278 It
should be kept in mind that Laudan’s focus is on four violent crimes: murder,
rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.279 Criminologists have come to
recognize the intellectual trap held out by the promise of incapacitation.280
Incapacitation requires no behavioral hypothesis, as does deterrence theory,
and it is beyond doubt that a prison inmate cannot commit four violent crimes
(murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) addressed by Laudan and Allen
outside the prison walls. The best thinking in criminology, however, is that
any broad program of incapacitation has inherent limits. I base my
conclusions on a recent and authoritative volume of the Committee on
Causes and Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration of the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences published in 2014.
I draw specifically from Chapter 5, “The Crime Prevention Effects of
Incarceration.”281 Laudan bolstered his incapacitation argument by
referencing an endorsement of that concept by Daniel Nagin. The first
footnote in Chapter 5 indicates that it “draws substantially” on more recent
work by Nagin and Durlauf.282 That chapter separately evaluates the
research on deterrence, incapacitation, and recidivism for most crimes and
277

The sections follow Part III.B.2, supra.
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at 79.
279
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3; Laudan, supra note 3; Different Strokes, supra
note 3, passim.
280
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 130–31 (“There is of course a plausibility to the
belief that putting many more convicted felons behind bars would reduce crime.” Yet, for the
first two decades of massively increasing incarceration in the United States after 1974, “there
was no clear trend in violent crime rates.”).
281
NRC, Growth, supra note 248. It is referred to in the text as “the NRC report” or “the
NRC Committee” depending on context.
282
The chapter draws on S.N. Durlauf & D.S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both
Be Reduced? 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13 (2011); S.N. DURLAUF & D.S. NAGIN, The
Deterrent Effect of Punishment, in CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 43-94
(P.J. Cook. L. Jens, & J. McCrary, eds., 2011); D.S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the
Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83 (2013); and D.S. Nagin,
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century: A Review of the Evidence, in 42 CRIME & JUSTICE:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 199-262 (M. Tonry, ed., 2013).
278
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treats the research on the effect of incarceration for drug offenses on drug
prices and drug use separately.283 National Academy reports draw on the
most noted scholars in any field, and although possibly subject to groupthink,
the report analyzes published research, has been carefully vetted, and at the
least is not the spurious product of an eccentric scholar.284
The overall conclusion of the NRC chapter highly qualifies Laudan and
Allen’s incapacitation hypothesis. Incapacitation necessarily has a crime
suppressing effect. However, studies, such as those including analyses on
the role played by incarceration in the great crime drop after 1990, have
shown that incarceration played a limited role, despite the significant
increase of imprisonment. The NRC report concludes that “[m]ost studies
estimate the crime-reducing effect of incarceration to be small.”285 Why
should this be so? Focusing only on incapacitation, the NRC committee
reviewed econometric research beginning in the 1970s that found small
decreases in crime rates in response to increases in the imprisonment rate.
As more econometric studies of the relevant elasticity— “the percentage
change in the crime rate in response to a 1 percent increase in the
imprisonment rate”—were conducted, it was found that the results varied
widely, from no reduction in crime to “a reduction of –0.4 or more.”286 As
a result the NRC committee concluded that it “cannot arrive at a precise
estimate, or even a modest range of estimates, of the magnitude of the effect
of incarceration on crime rates.”287 The reasons for this conclusion give
some support to a modified version of Laudan and Allen’s enthusiasm for
incapacitation.288 Among the reasons are that the incapacitation studies may
283

NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at v, vii, 435–44.
The chapter was authorized by the 18-member Committee on Law and Justice of the
National Research Council. The committee included notable criminological researchers,
including Nagin, three economists, and the former director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
and other noted scholars. The volume is also sponsored and vetted by the 20-member
Committee on Causes and Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration. The memberships
of the two committees overlap somewhat. The latter committee included Nagin, two
economists, an epidemiologist and other distinguished scholars. NRC, Growth, supra note
248, at v, vii, 435-44.
285
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 155.
286
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 140.
287
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 141.
284

Many factors contribute to the large differences in estimates of the
crimes averted by incapacitation. These factors include whether the
data used to estimate crime averted pertain to people in prison, people
in jail, or nonincarcerated individuals with criminal histories; the
geographic region from which the data are derived; the types of crimes
included in the accounting of crimes averted; and a host of technical
issues related to the measurement and modeling of key dimensions of
the criminal career.
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include a variety of crime types. As I’ll cautiously suggest below, targeted
incapacitation programs may have greater crime reduction effect.
Even a targeted incapacitation program is limited by two factors related
to criminal career research that have emerged from incapacitation research.
These matters are not mentioned by Laudan and Allen, who treat criminals
and defendants more like colorless physical entities, with unchanging
characteristics, than human beings who vary in behavior, respond to
incentives, and who experience change over time.289 Although the research
base for estimating criminal careers is limited, it has been shown that the
mean annual rate of offending over a criminal career, designated λ, is not
constant and is highly skewed among different populations.290 The two
major limits of general incapacitation programs are that incapacitation has
diminishing returns and that λ diminishes with age.
Recent research has identified “stochastic selectivity” as a factor that
implicates diminishing returns for incapacitation.
Stochastic selectivity formalizes the observation that unless highrate offenders are extremely skillful in avoiding apprehension,
they will be represented in prison disproportionately relative to
their representation in the population of nonincarcerated
offenders. This is the case because they put themselves at risk of
apprehension so much more frequently than lower-rate
offenders.291
Thus, beyond a certain point, incarcerating more offenders is likely to
capture low-rate offenders resulting in diminishing crime-reduction returns
for every person incarcerated and for every year of incarceration. The NRC
Report indicated that self-report surveys of the number of crime committed
per inmate overstate the benefits of increase incarceration “because most of
the high-rate offenders will already have been apprehended and
incarcerated.”292 It seems that Laudan’s analysis in The Law’s Flaws made
the same assumptions of recidivism uniformity as did the earlier
incapacitation studies. After the theoretical exposition on stochastic

NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 141.
289
Although I focus my critique on Chapter 2 in LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, no reference to
the effects of diminished returns or aging out of crime is made in Chapter 8, dealing with bail,
sentences, and probation and parole. LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, at 153-72.
290
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 141-43. A technical implication of skewedness is
that “as a matter of accounting, the estimated size of incapacitation effects will be highly
sensitive to whether the mean, median, or some other statistic is used to summarize the
offending rate distribution.” Id. at 142.
291
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 142–43.
292
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 143.
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selectivity was developed, other analyses have supported it along with an
empirical a study of sentencing in the Netherlands.293
The other factor that limits the effectiveness of general incapacitation
programs is that violent crime is highly age-dependent, with rates peaking in
“the late teenage years for violent offenses, followed by rapid declines.”294
This factor is better known in criminology than stochastic selectivity and it
is a bit surprising that it is not alluded to by Laudan and Allen. The growth
of “geriatric prisons” with tens of thousands of prisoners whose likelihood
of reoffending is very low attests to the willingness of American society to
punish severely without achieving crime-reduction effects.295 In any event,
the research strongly suggests that imprisoning large numbers of offenders
and sentencing them to longer terms dependent on their having substantial
prior criminal histories will have a smaller effect on crime rates because
many such offenders have “aged out” of crime; this would be a form of false
negative incarceration and sentencing.
The NRC Report covers other issues that are germane to Laudan and
Allen’s analysis. Regarding recidivism, it concludes that research shows no
deterrent or rehabilitative effects of imprisonment alone, but that recent
research indicates that some rehabilitative programming is shown to reduce
reoffending.296 On the question of whether prison is a school for crime,
research shows “either no effect or a criminogenic effect.”297 Given their
preoccupation with trade-offs, in my estimation Laudan and Allen’s view of
the social contract that does not take into account the harms of prison on
offenders, their families, their home communities, and the kinds of
employment that prison work provides in economically devastated rural
towns is a cramped view. In our society prison is strong but necessary
“medicine,” but unlike responsible medical regimens (or penal policies in
other democratic countries), prison is “prescribed” in reckless doses that do
harm to the “patient.”
My critique admits that incapacitation has a place. “Policies that
effectively target the incarceration of highly dangerous and frequent
offenders can have large prevention benefitsFalse”298 But Laudan and
Allen’s blunderbuss approach is the opposite of a targeted program, which
can, in terms of the NRC report, “. . . have a small prevention effect or, even
293

NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 143.
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 143.
295
See TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUST., IT’S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS, INCREASING
COSTS, AND GERIATRIC RELEASE (2010) https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/dow
nloads/Publications/its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatric-release/leg
acy_downloads/Its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatric-release.pdf.
296
See infra Part IV.B.2.
297
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 150.
298
NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 155.
294
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worse, increase crime in the long run if [their policies] have the effect of
increasing postrelease criminality.”299 It should also be noted that a good
deal of research on selective incapacitation, greeted with enthusiasm in the
1970s, cooled off when the ability to identify high-risk offenders with
precision was found to be limited.300 Laudan and Allen would create a
permanent, wide-scale, and indiscriminate incapacitation program, with
limited if not counterproductive effects, if their proposal to lower the
standard of proof were ever taken seriously.
I’ll end with a note about targeted programming aimed at high-risk
offenders that seems to have had real effect. The program known as
“Operation Ceasefire,” which began with the Boston Gun Project in 1996,
targets young, high-risk gang members, threatens them with prosecution and
severe sentencing if they reoffend, and then offers job, educational and other
services to reorient their lives.301 A cautious, methodological review of what
police researchers call “lever-pulling” operations provides some support for
the effectiveness of the program.302 Again, this approach, which combines
the threat of legal force with a generous and humane provision of services,
represents the kind of social contract that makes sense to me, although I
understand that in our polarized society many people hold radically differing
views about state-civil-society-individual relations including crime and
punishment.303
▪
This is an appropriate place to add a postscript to my review of Laudan
and Allen, or better, my review of Laudan, as we transition from the work of
a philosopher, self-taught in slices of law, evidence, and proof, to the analysis
of two writings by Paul Cassell, a conservative legal warrior. Laudan had
already staked out most of the positions made in Laudan and Allen in a wellreceived book, which includes an engaging short Preface on how he was
intellectually drawn to issues of legal theory, a new field for him.304 His
299

NRC, Growth, supra note 248, at 155.
Shawn Bushway, Incapacitation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 2447 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd, eds., 2014).
301
DAVID M. KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: THE
BOSTON GUN PROJECT’S OPERATION CEASEFIRE, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING OPERATION
CEASEFIRE (2001); ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., MEASURING THE IMPACT OF OPERATION
CEASEFIRE (2001); DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP,
AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011).
302
See Cody W. Telep & David Weisburd, What is Known About the Effectiveness of
Police Practices in Reducing Crime and Disorder?15 POLICE Q. 331, 338-39 (2012).
303
See Jaweed Kaleem & Kurtis Lee, Atty. Gen. Jeff Sessions Wants to Get Tough on
Crime. These People Think He’s Got It All Wrong, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-doj-crime-district-attorneys-20170623-htmlstory.html.
304
LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY xi-xiii (2006). For an acute review, see Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen
300
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plunge into the study of law brought him into contact with scholars of
superior intellect and acquainted him with aspects of the continental/
inquisitorial system. A complete analysis of Laudan’s work should probably
parse any shifts from his 2006 volume to Laudan and Allen’s writings, but
as my focus is on Laudan in the context of other anti-Blackstonians, I might
be doing injustice to his ideas. Yet, the notion that Laudan has never been,
or has never given any consideration to what it might be like to be a
practicing lawyer, representing clients (whether individual, corporate, or the
state), grubbing a living from the law, gives rise to something that has
bothered me in my review of the anti-Blackstonians. I note at several points
in this article that the anti-Blackstonians abstract too much from the
empirical reality of criminal justice and the court process. Without denying
the value of different levels of abstract thought, at some point the analysis of
law needs to connect to the empirical world.305 A quick skim presents Truth,
Error, and Criminal Law as a work of jurisprudence that analyzes legal
concepts, judicial opinions, and the writings of other scholars and with a
selective connection to “real world” issues.306 Though fair enough, the
strengths of abstract thought in the law need to be balanced with
considerations of the possible effects and unintended consequences of
turning the products of jurisprudence into practical law.
Some of my concern is seen in Pardo’s generally favorable review of
Truth, Error, and Criminal Law.307 Pardo’s main points of his critique of
Laudan’s error reduction analysis are that error reduction rules should not
simply distribute error, should be shown to reduce error in the long run, and
should show that the rules are not justified on nonepistemic grounds.308 By
raising nonepistemic grounds, Pardo betrays his roots as a person trained in
Stones and Criminal Law’s Epistemology, 86 TEX. L. REV. 347, 347-84 (2007) (book review).
305
That, at least, is my view. A standard survey of “western legal theory” closely tracks
political theory and is related to changing notions and realities of the state, implicating ways
that the rule of law is understood. See Kelly, supra note 26. Thus, even at the highly abstract
level of legal theory, links to material and ideational changes in the nature of governance
cannot be avoided. I fail to understand how theorizing about criminal law cannot at some
point link to policy preferences. A tired analogy to the relationship of mathematics and
physics to engineering comes to mind; there is a place for jurisprudence but at some point law
is more a practical endeavor like engineering (some might say plumbing).
306
Laudan, Truth, supra note 304, at 2, notes that “whatever else it is, a criminal trial is
first and foremost an epistemic engine, a tool for ferreting out the truth from what will often
initially be a confusing array of clues and indicators.” This is an appropriate starting place
for a book on legal epistemology. Yet, when it comes to recommending changes to legal trial
rules, like the standard of proof, attention must be paid to “whatever else it is.” I argue, infra
Part IV, that the narrow focus on trial rules is a misplaced effort in comparison to the work of
scholars who explore ways to realign the American adversary process in ways that are more
“inquisitorial.”
307
Pardo, supra note 304.
308
Pardo, supra note 304, at 371.
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a law school and who practiced or entertained the idea of practicing law.
Even as a legal scholar, his mind travels to thoughts about the law’s wider
field of interests that if tickled would probably draw on empirical and
historical evidence. Such “external” evidence does cloud the reductionist
tendency of the kind of jurisprudential field that Laudan traverses.
Nevertheless, at the point of making changes to law and policy based on
theoretical analysis, empirical effects must be considered. It seems that the
major externality that animates Laudan and Allen is crime victimization,
offset by wrongful convictions, and all their analysis and calculations go to
that trade-off. Yet Pardo seriously complicates this focus. “As an analytic
matter, there is no reason why the benefit of the doubt must be isolated in
the standard of proof rather than divided between the standard and one or
more other prodefendant rules.”309 Laudan does not do this and his,
[R]eason for locating [the proper ratio of false positives to false
negatives] solely within the standard of proof is that it will be
easier to calibrate. This is most likely true, and it makes for a
simpler and more elegant theory of the epistemology of legal
proof. While it may be easier to calibrate, however, it will still be
an incredibly difficult task.310
This critique can be applied to Laudan’s The Law’s Flaws, where his model
is based on issues of standards of proof, but his challenge to procedural rules
are dealt with seriatim.311 The messiness of the entire mix of values and
processes that go into the adjudication process (to say nothing of the criminal
justice system) may be beyond the ability of a simple model to describe, and
may instead require a mix of legal, empirical, historical, and analytic
scholarship to fathom, all of which wise judges and legislators need to
consider.312 As Pardo notes, referring to understanding jurors’ beliefs in
relation to evidence in cases, “[e]ven if we knew what ratio we were looking
for, developing a standard that would produce roughly this ratio across all
categories of criminal cases may be virtually impossible.”313 If this is so in
the case of juror decision-making, I think it applies even more to a macroanalysis of the adjudicatory or the criminal justice system. Admittedly, one’s
belief in this conclusion might depend on one’s affinity for reductionist or

309

Pardo, supra note 304, at 372.
Pardo, supra note 304, at 373.
311
LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, 110-37.
312
See, for example, the variations that have been played on Packer’s two models, Hadar
Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model, 36 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 237 (2011).
313
Pardo, supra note 304, at 373.
310
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contextualist analyses of social phenomena.314
Judges tend to think contextually.315 I’ll pluck out one more feather
from Truth, Error, and Criminal Law. In a chapter on “dubious motives for
flawed rules,” Laudan joins the conservative judicial critique of Miranda on
the ground that exclusion of evidence against a guilty person in order to
discipline the police weighs “a known and serious cost against an uncertain
and probably modest gain.” To him, joining Justice Rehnquist’s preDickerson view of the Miranda rule “should be an easy call.”316
In a little noticed aside in the key paragraph in Weeks v. United
States,317 the case that found an exclusionary rule necessary to the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment,318 Justice Day commented that:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.319
“Enforced confessions”? This sloppy writing, injecting a due process or
Fifth Amendment matter into a Fourth Amendment case,320 would never
occur after first drafts of opinions came to be written by justices’ clerks. The
truth is that by 1914 the use of “third degree” police methods was well

314

See Forst’s comments on economists’ reductionist approaches to criminology, supra
note 80, at 126, quoted supra at footnote 126.
315
Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1275, 1276 (1999) (“[T]he particular decisions courts make are neither inevitable nor
mechanically made. These decisions are influenced, explicitly and implicitly, by factors that
are political, social, psychological, and cultural. There are many such factors that lead courts
to mask or discount systemic harm.”).
316
Laudan, Truth, supra note 304, at 275. Laudan relies on the reasoning of Justice
Rehnquist in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), back in the day when as an Associate
Justice he was pedaling the “Miranda is a prophylactic device” theory and before his
realpolitik about face, as Chief Justice of the United States, in Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000).
317
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
318
See William C. Heffernan, Foreword: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as
a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L. J. 799 (2000).
319
232 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added).
320
Although the Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) concept of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments “running into one another” was still alive, it only seemed to apply in cases
involving writings, like the lottery tickets in Weeks.
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known,321 and the fact that torture was practiced routinely by police
throughout the United States, and not only in the Jim Crow South,322 was a
national scandal. Perhaps the movement to constitutionalize rules of
criminal procedure in order to protect defendants’ rights was a romantic fling
by liberal justices responding to nonepistemic grounds.323 Perhaps not. A
page and a half description of the kind of treatment doled out by Cleveland
police to Tony Colletti in 1930 over 26 hours has none of the elegance of a
formal proof,324 but this kind of raw empirical and historical evidence is
factored into calculations of judicial intervention. Of course, police torture
is no longer routine. Still, routine and egregious torture went on for more
than a decade from the 1970s to the 1980s in a Chicago station house, applied
against more than 100 suspects, all African American.325 In Chicago, the
courts were aware of these abuses and by the context of Chicago-style
judging, enabled the torture regime to continue through their rulings.326
In significant ways, the innocence movement’s empiricism, based in
part on psychological science327 and other empirically grounded legal
research,328 has exposed the limits of procedural legal liberalism and thus
provided some support to the conservative critique of “nonepistemic”
rulings, like Miranda. We now know that false confessions in proven
321
RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 68 (2008) (discussing
third degree subject of U.S. Senate hearings in 1910).
322
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see Michael J. Klarman, The Racial
Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000).
323
Proponents prefer to view the incorporation movement as a process of perfecting of
American constitutionalism, and incorporation has been finally accepted by conservative
justices. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
324
Colletti was “questioned nonstop, lied to, threatened, screamed and cursed at, deprived
of food and water, and made to stand for hours. He was slugged with bare fists, stripped naked,
and beaten with a rubber hose. . . . [Detectives] slapped him whenever he appeared to fall
asleep. . . . They jolted him whenever his knees sagged or he sought support from the wall.
Detective Welch repeatedly punched him just below the ribs on both sides and slapped him
in the back of the head, causing Colletti’s face to strike the wall.” He confessed. LEO, supra
note 321, at 41-43.
325
Methods included “suffocating the suspect, placing a revolver in the suspect’s mouth,
squeezing the suspect’s testicles, and playing Russian roulette,” —methods which leave no
bodily marks. Other methods included electroshocks with a cattle prod and being forced
against a hot radiator. Bandes, supra note 315, at 1290, 1294. See Juleyka LantiguaWilliams, A Digital Archive Documents Two Decades of Torture by Chicago Police, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/10000files-on-chicago-police-torture-decades-now-online/504233/.
326
Bandes, supra note 315.
327
The error reduction reforms regarding lineups come mainly from the work of cognitive
psychologists. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT:
ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014).
328
Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585 (2005); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 288-89 (2011).
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wrongful convictions are almost always generated by police feeding
incriminating information to suspects, which occurs in and seems to be a
byproduct of the psychological pressure methods that describe contemporary
American police interrogation.329 And if video recording and more
enlightened police administration makes the revival of police torture unlikely
in 2016, a constitutionalist with a sense of history should consider that
anything is possible after 2017. If, thanks to innocence reforms, the criminal
justice system can reduce wrongful convictions without increasing impunity,
it would be potentially tragic to lose sight of the nonepistemological factors
that continue to raise concerns for defendants’ rights. Pardo gets this: “It
would be a step in the right direction to try to reduce errors, not only by
revising current truth-thwarting practices but by developing new ones that
improve the accuracy of outcomes—such as better forensic-science
techniques, more reliable (and visible) interrogation practices, more reliable
lineup procedures, and more open and available discovery.”330 Simply
abolishing Miranda, although it is on life-support, does nothing to improve
the accuracy of interrogation-induced confessions.
C. Cassell on Criminal Justice
Paul Cassell’s historic role in innocence scholarship was set off by
Bedau and Radelet’s1987 Stanford Law Review article identifying 350
capital miscarriages of justice and claiming that 22 resulted in wrongful
executions.331 His response with Stephen Markman challenged Bedau and
Radelet’s somewhat subjective method of assessing a wrongful conviction
by carefully reviewing case facts.332 Markman, then an Assistant Attorney
General under Edwin Meese in the Reagan Administration, and Cassell, a
former Department of Justice Associate Deputy Attorney General, aimed to
squelch death penalty challenges, which they defended as a deterrent to
homicide. This high-visibility exchange occurred on the eve of the first
DNA exonerations. Although DNA exclusions forcefully placed the fact of
wrongful convictions beyond challenge, the widely read exchange alerted
innocence advocates that assertions of actual innocence were subject to close
observation and criticism by crime control advocates if there was any doubt
about the innocence claim. As a result, the innocence movement has
become, in Richard Leo’s words, an exoneration movement.333 Michael
329

Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stanf. L. Rev. 1051(2010);
Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395 (2015).
330
Pardo, supra note 304, at 372 (footnote omitted).
331
Hugo Adam Bedau, & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L, REV. 21 (1987).
332
Markman & Cassell, supra note 21.
333
Richard A. Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement?
The Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
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Radelet acknowledged the role played by Cassell and Markman in forcing
innocence advocates to be more parsimonious in defining wrongful
convictions.334
Cassell moved from academe to the federal bench and back to
academe.335 Professor Cassell’s 2011/12 article and 2017 chapter include
several recommendations for better getting to the truth in criminal cases that
are drawn from a coherent approach to criminal procedure that is grounded
in reversing most Warren Court decisions. These include abolishing the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, overruling Miranda and requiring
videotaping of custodial interrogation, and barring habeas corpus petitions
except on colorable claims of factual innocence. This “conservative”
approach returns readers to the great clash in constitutional criminal
procedure that played out over the decades since 1961, as a more or less
conservative Supreme Court after 1970 whittled down defendant’s
procedural rights established in the 1960s.336 It reminds us that conservatives
viewed Warren Court rulings, including expanded access to federal habeas
corpus by state prisoners, as truth-thwarting protections for the guilty.337 The
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 57-83 (Daniel S. Medwed ed.,
2017). The concern with defining wrongful convictions parsimoniously can be seen in the
National Registry of Exonerations’ definition of an exoneration, Glossary, THE NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossar
y.aspx (last visited May 15, 2018).
334
Michael L. Radelet, How DNA Has Changed Contemporary Death Penalty Debates,
in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING
THE INNOCENT 138, 141 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). Since the concept of trade-offs is
central to the Blackstonian debate, note that the more parsimonious the definition of a false
conviction, the fewer errors of justice will be acknowledged. Leo, supra note 321 (discussing
definitions of exonerations that are even more parsimonious than the National Registry of
Exonerations’ conservative definition).
335
As a law professor, he promoted the cause of abolishing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) on the grounds that the decision increased crime by reducing the number of
confessions. Cassell engaged in a series of academic debates on the subject. See, e.g., Paul
G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV.1055 (1998); Richard A. Leo &
Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth
About False Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 293 (2001). The
debate continues: Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review
of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97
B. U. L. REV. 685 (2017).
336
Any contemporary law school criminal procedure casebook traces this monumental
history. E.g., YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (14th ed. 2015). As
explained below, Herbert Packer’s “crime control” and “due process” models are preferable
statements of ideological predilections on crime subjects than “conservative” and “liberal.”
See PACKER, LIMITS, supra note 61; infra text at footnote 560; Marvin Zalman, A Brief Reply
to Professor Cassell, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1493 (2018).
337
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 (1970).
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“innocence factor,” that was mobilized by criminal procedure conservatives
in opposition to expanded procedural protections is highlighted by a series
of eight essays labeled “Truth in Criminal Justice” that were internally
published by the Justice Department in 1986.338 These well researched legal
briefs were drawn up under Stephen Markman’s direction. In a preface to
the reports he wrote that little of the voluminous legal writing on criminal
procedure “concerns increasing the system’s effectiveness in bringing
criminals to justice, or doing justice for the actual and potential victims of
crime.”339
The conservative crime agenda, of which limiting constitutional rights
was only a part, and which was later supported by President Clinton,
succeeded in pushing incarceration rates to unprecedented heights.340
Labeled mass incarceration, this policy is now disfavored even by
conservatives and is undergoing partial revision.341 It seems in retrospect
that the conservative crime agenda of advancing capital punishment, harsh
punishment, and prison building, despite its rhetoric about factual accuracy,
338
The reports were later re-published in volume 22, numbers 3 & 4 of the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Spring & Summer 1989. See generally Preface, 22 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 393 (1989). The reports discuss the law of pretrial interrogation, search
and seizure exclusionary rules, Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases regarding
interrogation, admission of criminal histories at trial, judiciary’s supervisory power, double
jeopardy, habeas corpus review of state judgments, and drawing adverse inferences for
silence. Each report was a brief for overruling pro-defendant Warren Court rulings and
expanding prosecutorial power. See generally id.
339
Stephen J. Markman, Foreword: The ‘Truth in Criminal Justice’ Series, 22 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 425 (1989). In fairness, it should be noted that as a Justice of Michigan’s
Supreme Court, Markman has voted to grant new trials in post-conviction cases that led to
exonerations. See e.g., People v. Moldowan, 643 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. 2002); People v. Swain
878 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. 2016).
340
ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW, supra note 157; OLIVER, supra note 50; TRAVIS C.
PRATT, ADDICTED TO INCARCERATION (2009); ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011).
341
A leading voice for a conservative turn toward liberal penal ideas (up to a point) has
been the think tank Right on Crime, which may be the oldest such organization. See RIGHT
ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/ (last visited May 15, 2018). It is, according to its web
site, a “project of the Texas Public Policy Foundation, in partnership with the American
Conservative Union Foundation and Prison Fellowship.” See id. The Texas Public Policy
Foundation is a think tank that supports and is supported by the “establishment” or monied
sector of the conservative movement.
See TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION,
https://www.texaspolicy.com/ (last visited May 15, 2018). See AVIRAM, supra note 47;
DAGAN & TELES, supra note 47. This conservative shift to more measured criminal justice
and sentencing policies has not been uniformly adopted by all lawmakers and under Attorney
General Sessions the federal government seeks to revert to the tough on crime and drug
policies that generated mass incarceration in the first place. Editorial, The Right Way to Fix
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/20/opinion/trumpprison-reform.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module
=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-re
gion
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was not much concerned with actual innocence. Wrongful conviction was
not recognized as a problem by leading conservative jurists and did not
become a major policy issue until the innocence movement and DNA
exonerations put it on the public policy agenda.342 This background places
Cassell’s proposals in context.
1. Overview of Cassell’s Perspectives on Innocence Reforms
Cassell’s 2011/12 article appeared in a symposium addressing trial
procedures and wrongful conviction, a topic that had been ignored in the first
wave of innocence scholarship.343 In Part I of his article, Cassell challenged
Tim Bakken’s proposal for a novel trial process that would allow a defendant
to plead “innocent.”344 As noted above, Bakken’s article and four other
thought experiments suggested modifying trial procedures to improve
verdict accuracy.345 Given their novelty, such proposals call out for review
and Cassell’s critique of Bakken is the most valuable part of his article. The
merits of those articles and Cassell’s thoughtful critique are not germane to
the present article. My focus is on Part II of Cassell’s article, which proposed
changes to reduce wrongful convictions and increase justice system
accuracy. His arguments are reiterated in a shorter chapter which adds an
appreciation of Allen and Laudan’s “Deadly Dilemmas.”346
Cassell’s list of accuracy-increasing criminal justice reform proposals
is embedded in his proto-anti-Blackstonian vision: “the goal of innocence
protection must proceed against a backdrop of a few needles—innocents
wrongfully convicted—in a comparatively big hay stack—the vast pool of
guilty defendants. Reform proposals designed without an awareness of these
trade-offs can end up presenting far more problems than they would
solve.”347 As with my assessment of Laudan and Allen’s writings, this
342

Marvin Zalman & Nancy E. Marion, The Public Policy Process and Innocence
Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 11-38
(M. Zalman & J. Carrano, eds., 2014).
343
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5; Tim Bakken & Lewis M. Steel, Exonerating the
Innocent: Pretrial Innocence Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 825-1096 (2011-12).
344
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1065-80.
345
See discussion supra at notes 73-74. The articles reviewed in Zalman and Grunewald,
supra note 73 , are: Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons:
Beyond the Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547 (2008); Keith A. Findley,
Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911
(2011-12); Gross, Pretrial Incentives, supra note 187; D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts:
The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1281 (2004); Christopher Slobogin, Lessons From Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL.
L. REV. 699 (2014).
346
“Rather than try to reinvent the wheel here on quantitative assessments of the tradeoff, I want to simply take the Allen and Laudan calculation as accurate.” Cassell, Protect,
supra note 5, at 266.
347
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1080.
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generalization is not wrong but is overstated. How the trade-offs are
assessed by researchers and managed by decision makers, however, can
expose ideologies and political calculations that can muddy any rational
choice.348 Getting public policy right is an arduous and continuous task.
Cassell’s article seems to include a sleight-of-hand. I’d assume that an
author would list his or her most potent argument first. In Part II Cassell lists
and analyzes eight accuracy-enhancing proposals, but buries the most
powerful point in position four only to dismiss it.
[T]he root cause of wrongful convictions is probably lack of
resources devoted to the criminal justice system. Whatever
individual causes might be pinpointed in particular cases, more
resources would often have enabled defense counsel (or police and
prosecuting agencies) to locate persuasive evidence of innocence.
If this diagnosis is correct, then the true solution to the wrongful
conviction problem is devoting additional resources to the
criminal justice system.
Given the fiscal realities of the world we live in, however, it would
truly be an academic proposal to call for significant new funding
for defense attorneys, for example. At a macro level, the funds
devoted to the criminal justice system are probably roughly fixed
and not much is likely to change in the near term. What is needed,
then, is to prioritize innocence over other criminal justice
expenditures. Fortunately, for those who truly believe
innocentrism, there are ways to do this.349

348

For example, relatively minimal government expenditure under the Obama
administration established the Attorney General’s National Commission on Forensic Science
(NCFS) in 2013 as a joint effort of the Department of Justice and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. National Commission on Forensic Science, JUSTICE.GOV
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs (last visited May 15, 2018). Attorney General
Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III in the Trump administration allowed the NCFS charter to
expire on April 23, 2017, a decision generally met with dismay. See, e.g., Erin Murphy,
Sessions Is Wrong to Take Science Out of Forensic Science, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/opinion/sessions-is-wrong-to-take-science-out-of-for
ensic-science.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=
opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-c-col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right
-region&_r=0. Given the critical assessment of the forensic sciences, the NCFS was an
appropriate vehicle to improve services that are vital to accuracy in criminal investigation and
prosecution. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009). Sessions’ call for a new evaluation of forensic
science will either “reinvent the NCFS wheel” (while losing momentum) or hinder the
advance of a more accurate criminal justice system. It is possible that Sessions’ decision was
political, animated in part by a visceral antipathy to any policy that originated under President
Barak Hussein Obama.
349
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1086 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
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Cassell’s stark realism can’t be wished away. His observation, however,
could, and depending on one’s values or interests, should raise questions
about the capacity of the criminal justice system to create efficiencies with
current resources.350 A deep flaw in his overall argument on this point is
exposed when at one part of his article he takes Bakken to task for proposing
a right to demand police investigation by defendants claiming innocence,
which Cassell claims is beyond the capacity of police.351 Later in his article,
he would require all defense attorneys to “truly attempt to learn whether their
clients are guilty or innocent.” Forgetting his observation that the criminal
justice system is strapped for cash, he asserts that defense attorneys will
“adequately investigate the claim” because, as he blithely remarks,
“[p]resumably adequate defense investigation happens in most cases,
regardless of whether a defendant claims to be innocent or guilty.”352
Overlooking this glaring internal inconsistency, Cassell’s other “low cost”
proposals that “prioritize innocence over other criminal justice expenditures”
are admittedly second-best solutions.
First on Cassell’s list is “more research on the frequency and causes of
wrongful convictions.”353 He acknowledges considerable prior research but
urges more research to pinpoint the number of factually erroneous
convictions, a figure that most experts acknowledge is an estimate and
cannot be known with mathematical precision. Researchers should take a
random sample of filed felony cases and “track them through the system to
see what happens.” As I will indicate in my critique, an empirical project
completed after Cassell’s article was published that focused on the causes of
wrongful convictions and not on the difficult and arguably impossible task
of assessing the precise proportion of wrongful convictions outside of death
penalty cases.

350
To that end see Geoffrey T. Burkhart, How to Leverage Public Defense Workload
Studies, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 403 (2017); Andrew Lucas Blaise Davies & Alissa Pollitz
Worden, Local Governance and Redistributive Policy: Explaining Local Funding for Public
Defense, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 313 (2017).
351
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1075 (arguing that Bakken’s proposal does not assess
the adequacy of police investigation and would “divert[] both police and judicial resources
into many wild-goose chases.”).
352
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1093-94. I am not aware of social scientific studies
that assess whether “adequate defense investigation happens in most cases” so Cassell’s
assertion may be correct; however, legal scholarship on the resources available to indigent
defense has been decrying the lack of resources for decades, and in that light this casual
assertion by Cassell should not be accepted at face value as accurate. See Stephen B. Bright,
Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice, 75 MO. L. REV.
684 (2010); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L J. 1031 (2006).
353
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1080-83 (italics and capitalization deleted).
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Next on Cassell’s list, he approved of Samuel Gross’s proposal that
defendants’ relinquish trial rights in return for innocence procedures.354
With Ralph Grunewald, I commented on these experimental trial processes
and do not address them herein. I would add that Laudan and Allen and
Cassell allude to inquisitorial approaches to adjudication but do not expand
on many of the features of continental justice systems or inquisitorial tweaks
to our adversary system that would offer other ideas for improving system
accuracy.
Cassell urged implementing the prosecutor’s Brady requirement of
disclosing exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.355 He described a
case before him as a federal judge involving inadvertently withheld
exculpatory evidence where he ordered a new trial based on doubts about the
defendant’s guilt. He proposed information-sharing technologies as a
possible solution. He also supported a reciprocal discovery proposal in the
same symposium issue by Michael and Lesley Risinger.356 This is one area
where Cassell’s ideas seem to be in sync with those of the innocence
movement and might be more appealing to defense attorneys than to
prosecutors.
Cassell next turns to proposals, based on the conservative criminal
procedure agenda, which would free up attorney time and resources that
could be invested in trying cases: abolishing the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule and replacing it with civil damage remedies; replacing “the
Miranda regime” with videotaped custodial interrogation; and barring
prisoners from filing for habeas relief without a colorable claim of actual
innocence. The Fourth Amendment argument rests on analysis by William
Stuntz that “a system with limited resources that emphasizes procedure over
substance will give short shrift to factual claims of innocence.”357 The same
argument applies to interrogation and the Miranda issue. Viewing Miranda
as a “triumph of formalism,” he would shift the limited resources of “defense
attorney time and attention away from claims of innocence” and divert
judicial attention away from the reliability of confessions—positions
354
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1083-84; see Gross, Pretrial Incentives, supra note
187 (one of the five articles proposing innovative trial procedures analyzed in Zalman and
Grunewald, supra note 7376, at 203-206, passim). Gross’s proposal is part of a carefully
calibrated set of trade-offs that would replace the traditional adversary trial with an
inquisitorial-like process; to be clear Gross did not suggest that defendants give up existing
constitutional rights in the present adversary process.
355
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
356
See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking
Innocence into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 88690 (2011-12).
357
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1087 (citing William Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 37-40
(1997)).
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supported by both liberal and conservative academicians.358 The argument
for restricting habeas corpus, which I will not evaluate, rests on commentary
going back to the 1960s,359 and is a current debate among leading habeas
scholars.360
Cassell’s last proposal would require defense attorneys to directly ask
their clients if they are actually innocent.361 I have already alluded to
Cassell’s internally contradictory notion that resource-strapped defense
attorneys have the resources to carefully investigate all cases (while police
do not have the resources to investigate all the permutations of a suspect’s
leads). To Cassel, this requirement would give defense attorneys a role to
play in preventing wrongful convictions. If a client convinces an attorney
that he or she is innocent, Cassell’s advice amounts to this: “Within [the]
traditional structure [of a criminal trial], defense attorneys have many tools
that they can employ in the defense of innocent clients.”362
Cassell’s 2017 chapter adopts Allen and Laudan’s position and adds
other interesting points. He raises concerns about the comparative moral
worth of some exonerees depending on their prior criminal status and pleabargaining behavior, given that the innocence literature seems to show that
“many of those wrongfully convicted were convicted because they had
committed other crimes.”363 Reflecting on a case in which he served as an
expert witness for law enforcement officers defending a civil suit resulting
from a wrongful conviction, Cassell asserts that where factually innocent
defendants plead guilty without entering an Alford plea, they make “a
decision to mislead the Court and enter a guilty plea [which] produces a
wrongful conviction that is, at least to some extent, the result of illegal
choices on their part and presumably entitled to somewhat less weight in a
social harm calculus.”364 He also suggests that eyewitness identification and
false confession reforms can increase the number of criminals who escape
justice. This has a kernel of truth but avoids countervailing arguments.365
358
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1089 (citing Welsh S. White, False Confessions and
the Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
105, 156 (1997) and JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 206-16 (1993)).
359
Friendly, supra note 337.
360
Compare Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (2009) with John H. Blume et al., In Defense of
Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435 (2011).
361
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1092-95; Cassell Protect, supra note 5, at 277-80.
362
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1094; Cassell Protect, supra note 5, at 279-80
(similar quote).
363
Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 268.
364
Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 270.
365
The conservative view was that the Warren Court criminal procedure reforms were
truth-defeating. See footnotes and accompanying text at 337-339. The liberal view is that the
failure to adhere to the constitutional procedural dictates as shaped by the Warren Court’s
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Cassell also proposes to study exonerees’ prior criminal histories on the
supposition that a prior conviction may be a source of wrongful convictions.
2. Critique of Cassell’s Innocence Reforms
i. Research the Frequency and Causes of Wrongful
Convictions.366
There appears to be nothing objectionable to calling for “more
research.” Cassell seems fixated on the number of wrongful convictions and
suggests taking a random sample of cases from one jurisdiction and
following them up.367 It should be noted, however, that scientific research is
subject to the same issues of limited resources and trade-offs that confront
all enterprises. Poorly conceived research creates lost opportunity costs for
better research and may set analysts off on unproductive research paths.368
That is why funded scientific research is subjected to close scrutiny by peer
reviewers before scarce research dollars are allocated.369 What we know
about the incidence of wrongful convictions we know from a small number
of empirical studies that offer precise estimates, other empirical studies with
less precise estimates, and a smattering of works that try to make sense of
this inherently challenging issue.370 Aside from issues of costs, the time
needed to follow cases through appeals, and the confounding problem of
knowing the ground truth, Cassel’s proposed sketch of a research project
misses Risinger’s important observation about the substructure of wrongful
convictions.371 This suggests, among other things, that wrongful conviction
reforms increase the number of false convictions, see Forst, supra note 80, at 13-18. A
narrower scientific debate has arisen over whether error-reducing innocentric reforms may
fail to identify the guilty, see discussion infra at notes 424-426.
366
Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 271; Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1080-83.
367
Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing the
Conventional Wisdom About the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions (unpublished
manuscript).
368
As the late John Stulson, a Nobel-winning geneticist noted, “There is no point in
wasting good thoughts on bad data.” Gina Kolata, Obituaries John E. Sulston, 75, Dies,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/obituaries/john-e-sulston75-dies-found-clues-to-genes-in-a-worm.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftoday
s-new-york-times&action=click&contentCollection=todayspaper&region=rank&module=p
ackage&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection
369
See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FUNDING, https://www.nsf.gov/funding/
(last visited May 15, 2018).
370
Some of the research is discussed in Marvin Zalman, Measuring Wrongful
Convictions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (G. Bruinsma & D.
Weisburd eds., 2014); see also Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O’Brien, Chen Hu, & Edward H.
Kennedy, Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants who are Sentenced to Death, 11
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20 (2014).
371
Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 26, at 783. Cassell may have understood
what can be called a subjective sense of substructuring of wrongful conviction, because he
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rates can (and likely do) vary considerably from one jurisdiction to another,
but the methods and metrics for assessing such variation is at the present time
underdeveloped or even non-existent. Until the field of wrongful conviction
develops techniques parallel to those of geologists who can make costeffective guesses of where to dig, Cassell’s proposal could produce a dry
well.
Given his (and Laudan and Allen’s) concern with cost-effectiveness, a
decision to fund a proposed study about the proportion of wrongful
convictions would have to evaluate its likely success and the lost opportunity
costs of other kinds of research. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is at
present wisely putting its money into sentinel event initiative research and
programming, a concept that arose from James Doyle’s thinking about
wrongful convictions and that has promise for correcting errors throughout
the criminal justice system.372 For lawyers unfamiliar with this area,
consideration might be given to the NIJ funding of the Gould-Carrano-Leo
study on wrongful convictions causes that has generated useful information
and should be more widely disseminated.373 In passing, note that the general
field of wrongful conviction scholarship is packed with empirical or
experimental studies in psychology journals, law reviews, and forensic
science journals. The diverse nature of the field does make it challenging to
keep up, and several recent anthologies are valuable resources.374

stated that he did not detect one wrongful conviction among a sample of 173 filed criminal
cases in a study he conducted. Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1082. It would be wise to
consider Gross’s point that “False convictions are not merely unobserved, but in most cases
are also unobservable.” Gross, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 71, at 175. Given the
great challenges involved in assessing involved in post-conviction, Cassell’s confidence in
not finding any wrongful convictions may be correct but should be taken with caution.
Risinger, Tragic, supra note 10, at 1014 (observing that Allen and Laudan also “failed to
account for the substructuring of risks generally” by relying on general statistics).
372
James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010); James M. Doyle, An Etiology of Wrongful Convictions: Error,
Safety, and Forward-Looking Accountability in Criminal Justice, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 56–72 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano eds.,
2014). See NIJ’s Sentinel Events Initiative, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/j
ustice-system/Pages/sentinel-events.aspx (last visited May 15, 2018).
373
JON B. GOULD, JULIA CARRANO, RICHARD LEO & JOSEPH YOUNG. PREDICTING
ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE
(2012) The results have been published in at least two places: Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano,
Richard A. Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471
(2014); Jon Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Innocent Defendants:
Divergent Case Outcomes and What They Teach Us, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 73-89 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano eds., 2014).
374
CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (B. L.
Cutler ed., 2012); FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM: PROTECTING THE INNOCENT (W. J. Koen & C.
M. Bowers eds., 2017); WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT (Daniel Medwed ed., 2017).
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ii. Implement Existing Rules on Disclosing Exculpatory
Evidence375
The greater disclosure of evidence in prosecutors’ hands to defense
attorneys is high on the list innocence movement reforms.376 While Cassell
is to be commended for advocating the issue, his tone differs from innocence
advocates who were heartened by Judge Kozinski’s claim that “Brady
violations have reached epidemic proportions in recent years.”377 Cassell
characterizes the quantum of Brady violations as having occurred “in a few
cases” and wrongful convictions resulting from failures to discharge Brady
obligations “in some smaller subset of these cases.”378 He might be right.
The generally held view is that most prosecutors act professionally. Yet, the
bulk of legal academic writings raise concerns about the Brady materiality
standard and other critiques report on Brady violations including the famous
exoneration of Senator Ted Stevens, compare American disclosure practice
to that in England, discuss weak internal administrative practices, and the
like.379 A recent article commissioned by California prosecutors challenged
Judge Kozinski’s conclusion; it carefully reviewed the 29 Brady-violation
cases Kozinski cited and concluded that some cases were negligent, although
more than half were intentional or reckless.380 As is the case with most
375

Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1084-86.
Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 969 (2011-12).
377
United States v. Olson, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc, Kozinski, C.J.
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO.
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, viii-ix (2015) (challenging 10 accepted ideas about criminal
law, including “prosecutors play fair”).
378
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1084.
379
Griffin, supra note 376; Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379
(2000); Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33
(2004); Robert Cary, Not Guilty: The Unlawful Prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens (
2014); Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois
Disclosure, 68 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695 (2007); DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX:
AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 35-51 (2012).
376

[T]he statistical presence of these categories of manner of suppression
among the total population can be discerned as follows: thirteen cases
(45%) comprise intentional suppression, which occurs where the
prosecution was aware of exculpatory or impeaching evidence, yet
willfully withheld it from the defense. Four cases (14%) can be fairly
characterized as reckless, where the trial prosecutor was not personally
aware of the favorable evidence, but willfully ignored his duty to
search out such evidence in the files of his own office or partner
investigative agencies. Another four cases (14%) were simply too
unclear to make a definitive conclusion as to manner of suppression.
Seven cases (24%) represent mere negligent suppression, meaning the
prosecution was unaware of the favorable evidence, which was either
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important criminal justice and court practices, the data are very hard to come
by. I conducted a “back of the Internet” analysis that suggests that 6.5% of
all NRE exonerations were infected with Brady violations, but I wouldn’t bet
the farm on that figure.381 Given this lack of data it is difficult to make
overarching conclusions about the way in which prosecutors operate. Good
scholarship, like that of Angela Davis, identifies numerous problems while
not demonizing prosecutors as a group.382 A recent assessment by
experienced scholars on these issues suggests that the clamor about Brady
violations and other misconduct is beginning to make a dent in practice.383
iii. Replace Miranda with a System of Videotaping Custodial
Interrogation.384
Ridding the world of the Miranda decision has been Cassell’s lifelong
quest. Hoping to kill off the ruling, he had a hand in maneuvering the
Supreme Court case that decided in 2000 that Miranda was good law,
although hobbled in many ways.385 Without buying into Cassell’s
contentious theory that the Miranda decision reduced confessions and
increased crime, after a half century of endless writing and research it is wise
to rethink some of the police processes addressed by Warren Court decisions.
Cassell cites criminal procedure scholars who think that Miranda and other
Warren Court rulings have directed criminal lawyers to argue procedural
actively withheld from it by a law enforcement partner or the evidence
was hidden in a totally-unrelated investigation. Finally, one of the
Kozinski 29 cases (3%) was reversed on appeal after Judge Kozinski
noted it in his Olsen dissent (the final court to rule on the matter found
no suppression by the prosecution, i.e., no Brady violation).
Jerry P. Coleman & Jordan Lockey, Brady “Epidemic” Misdiagnosis: Claims of
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Sanctions to Deter It, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 199, 207-08 (2016)
(footnotes omitted) (twenty-nine cases cited at U.S. v. Olson, supra note 377, at 631-33).
381
On July 29, 2017, the NRE listed 2,069 exonerations. Of those 1,070 indicated OM
(official misconduct) under the “Contributing Factors Display.” Using the NRE filter, only
four narratives included the term ‘Brady violation’ in the narratives, and only 12 included
‘Brady.’ I searched for ‘withheld exculpatory evidence’ and found 55 cases, and 134 with
the term ‘withheld evidence.’ The larger number, 134, is 6.48% of 2,069 exonerations.
382
ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
(2007).
383
Griffin, supra note 376; Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961 (2010).
384
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1088-90; Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 275-77.
385
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see Roger Parloff, Miranda on the
Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1999) http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/26/magazine/mira
nda-on-the-hot-seat.html (describing Cassell as “an indefatigable, ideologically driven young
law professor at the University of Utah” and reprising his “seven -year crusade” to bring a
case before the Supreme Court that would test the constitutionality of a 1968 law that
purportedly “overruled” the Miranda decision.
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issues rather than the facts of cases, an argument that clearly has merit,
although like Epps’s arguments, are empirically untested.386 What we seem
to be learning from innocence movement fallout is that some of the Warren
Court’s goals in cases involving interrogation and identification procedures
may be better achieved through changes in police management of
interrogations, lineups, and other critical investigative procedures. Without
overruling Miranda, I observe that procedures like video recording and
shifting from the psychologically coercive Reid technique to investigative
interviewing can be instituted.
Cassell is to be commended for having supported the video recording
of confessions from an early date. It demonstrates a desire to effectively
curb abusive police practices while promoting accuracy in the justice
process. Given the large number of guilty interrogated suspects, video or
audio recording will more often help police solve a case rather than free an
innocent suspect, a point that innocence advocates accept without any
qualms.387 However, as video recording policy is spreading it is becoming
apparent that recording is not a panacea to end psychologically abusive
interrogation; something more is needed. When video recording was
proposed in 1992 by the Police Executive Research Forum, the goals were
to improve police administration and public relations. Video recording came
to be seen as a way to reduce the number of false confessions only after
innocence movement activity raised consciousness that false confessions
occur in significant numbers. Cases exist where entire interrogations that
produced false confessions were video recorded, and yet were nevertheless
deemed true confessions by prosecutors, judges, and juries who later
observed the videos.388 The limits of video recording are apparent when
386

STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 328.
Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, Recent Developments: The Consequences of
Law Enforcement Officials’ Failure to Record Custodial Interviews as Required by Law, 99
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215 (2009).
388
In some cases, downstream observers have watched or heard confessions, later proven
false, that were taken to be true by prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and jurors. See,
e.g., Michael Scott, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3622 (last visited May 15, 2018); Robert
Springsteen, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoner
ation/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3658 (last visited May 15, 2018); see also BEVERLY
LOWRY, WHO KILLED THESE GIRLS? COLD CASE: THE YOGURT SHOP MURDERS (2016). The
practice of audio or video recording only a confession after a lengthy and possibly
psychologically coercive interrogation is inherently biasing and was a target of cognitive
psychologists and innocence reformers. See Saul Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010) (APLS Approved White
Paper). The preferred practice of recording the entire interrogation is designed to discourage
abusive practices and to providing an accurate record. See Saul Kassin et al., Police Reports
of Mock Suspect Interrogations: A Test of Accuracy and Perception, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
230 (2017) (transcripts or audio recordings of interrogation capture more police tactics than
police reports written soon after interrogation). A valuable Netflix documentary, “The
387
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compared to a new method known as the investigative interview, which
replaces the psychologically coercive methods of interrogation allowed
under American law with non-coercive, fact-based questioning. The
investigative interview has become the preferred, sanctioned method of
pretrial examination of suspects in England and a number of other nations,
where police officials partnered with psychologists to develop more effective
and more human ways of questioning suspects. Research has shown that the
method, under the PEACE acronym,389generates the same number of
admissions by suspects and is far less likely to pressure a weak suspect into
a false confession. The replacement of the more abusive Reid method with
investigative interviewing methods by some training companies presages not
simply a technological fix, but a shift in the culture of policing that values
case facts and evidence-based methods for questioning rather than the kinds
of bluffing and bullying that is now supported by law.390
iv. Abolish the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule and
Replace it with Civil Remedies391
Cassell does not observe that the exclusionary rule has been rendered
less than mandatory by the Supreme Court.392 But that aside, search and
seizure has not concerned innocence advocates. Perhaps it should, because
the kind of police impunity that was unleashed by the Supreme Court’s
virtual “drug exception” to the Fourth Amendment,393 which has enabled
Confession Tapes” “presents six cases of possible false confessions leading to
murder convictions of the featured people. In each case, the documentary presents alternate
views of how the crime could have taken place and features experts on false confessions,
criminal law, miscarriages of justice and psychology.” The Confession Tapes, WIKIPEDIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Confession_Tapes (last visited May 15, 2018).
389
PEACE stands for ‘Preparation and Planning’; ‘Engage and Explain’; ‘Account,
Clarify and Challenge’; ‘Closure’; and ‘Evaluation.’ See Dave Walsh & Ray Bull, What
Really is Effective in Interviews with Suspects? A Study Comparing Interviewing Skills
Against Interviewing Outcomes, 15 LEG. & CRIM. PSYCH. 305 (2010) (finding interviewers
who attain the PEACE standard significantly more likely to to obtain full comprehensive
account or confession). A comprehensive anthology of suspect questioning methods around
the globe indicates that thee prevalent methods are torture, psychological interrogation (e.g.,
the Reid method common in the United States) and investigative interviewing. See David
Walsh et al., INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PRACTICES IN INVESTIGATIVE
INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION: VOL. 2: SUSPECTS (2016).
390
See Marvin Zalman, Laura Rubino & Brad Smith, Beyond Police Compliance with
Electronic Recording of Interrogation Legislation: Toward Error Reduction, CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. (2017); JAMES L. TRAINUM, HOW THE POLICE GENERATE FALSE CONFESSIONS: AN
INSIDE LOOK AT THE INTERROGATION ROOM (2016).
391
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1087-88; Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 274-75.
392
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
393
Steven Wisotsky, Essay: Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L. REV. 889 (1987); Juan R. Torruella, Deja Vu: A Federal Judge
Revisits the War on Drugs, or Life in a Balloon, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167 (2011); Paul
Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL.
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America’s war on drugs and its consequential racialized mass
incarceration,394 may have indirectly led to thousands of false convictions.
As Ralph Grunewald and I wrote:
As a matter of logic, eliminating the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule cannot lead to wrongful convictions, because
possession of contraband signals guilt and the exclusionary rule
itself allows the guilty to escape justice. Is this so in practice?
Some legal scholarship has linked defendants’ rights to inaccurate
verdicts and to that end the Burger Court created a hierarchy of
constitutional rights related to factual truth, “with those rights that
are trial related at the top, the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege in
the middle and the [F]ourth [A]mendment right with its unpopular
remedy of exclusion at the bottom.” One consequence of the
exclusionary rule is widespread police perjury covering illegal
searches, but even then one may argue that the police are using the
evidence against “bad guys”—or so it seems from applying the
abstract logic of single cases to mass action. Extravagant fears of
crime and drugs have led to a four-decade massive increase in
prisoners generated by harsh sentencing laws, police incentives,
bipartisan political support, a runaway prison-building program,
and an enabling role by a conservative Supreme Court that
shredded Fourth Amendment protections. It is no longer possible
to fall back on brittle logic to support believing that every
convicted drug possessor was factually guilty. In too many cases,
the war on drugs has corrupted or overwhelmed American police
departments, leading to a rise of police corruption and wrongful
convictions both in pleaded-to drug convictions and tried
homicide convictions.395
As it turns out, there is useful empirical support for the proposition that
corrupted drug law enforcement has led to a large number of false
convictions. The National Registry of Exonerations (NRE) has collected
data on what it calls “group exonerations,” or exonerations “of innocent
defendants who were falsely convicted as a result of large scale patterns of
police perjury and corruption,”396 a phenomenon first identified in Gross’s

L. REV. 1389 (1993); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s
Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35 (1998).
394
ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROWN, supra note 157.
395
Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 76, at 252-253 (footnotes omitted) (typographical
error corrected).
396
SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012 (2012), https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf
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pioneering exoneration study in the early 2000s.397 Gross and associates
located three group exonerations (previously labeled “mass exonerations”)
by 2005: the well-attested Rampart scandal in Los Angeles,398 the Tulia,
Texas debacle,399 and the Dallas sheetrock cases. Since that time the NRE
has uncovered more group exonerations, up to 12 in 2012.400 “Those group
exonerations included at least 1100 additional exonerated criminal
defendants who are not listed in the Registry itself.”401 Given the widespread
use of militarized policing to enforce drug laws in rural areas, the quasiprivate association of some law enforcement drug task forces, and the large
sums of money involved, the NRE’s 12 group exonerations may be the tip
of a corruption iceberg.402
These corrupt and blatant Fourth Amendment violations were
undeterred by the exclusionary rule, providing an occasion to rethink the
control of illicit police behavior with methods that go beyond the rule. Police
shooting of civilians in the news today and the seeming failure of criminal
prosecution in blatant cases of abuse suggests that controlling police
misbehavior is an intractable issue.403 At the least, Cassell and other
innocence skeptics might consider rethinking some assumptions about the
relationship of police search and seizure activity and errors of due process.404
397
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533-35 (2005).
398
Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1133 (2013).
399
NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN
(2005).
400
GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 396, at 80-90.
401
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, Update: 2012 1 (2013), http://www.law.um
ich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE2012UPDATE4_1_13_FINAL.pdf.
402
See MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES
OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE (Peter B. Kraska ed., (2001); BLAKESLEE, supra note
399, at 201-13; Rush v. City of Mansfield, 771 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ohio 2011); Jennifer
Gonnerman, How One Woman’s Fight to Save Her Family Helped Lead to a Mass
Exoneration, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2018) (describing first Chicago mass exoneration of 32
people falsely convicted because of corrupt Chicago P.D. officer planting drugs)
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/28/how-one-womans-fight-to-save-herfamily-helped-lead-to-a-mass-exoneration.
403
See, e.g., Justin Nix et al., A Bird’s Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015, 16
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 309 (2017) (reviewing 990 fatal police shootings compiled by
the Washington Post and calling for federal data on subject); Roger Dunham & Nick Peterson,
Making Black Lives Matter: Evidence-Based Policies for Reducing Police Bias in the Use of
Deadly Force, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 341 (2017); Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here’s
How Many Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year For On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions
_us_5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da (based on data from Assoc. Prof. Philip Stinson at Bowling
Green University, no police convicted in 2015 and only 13 convictions of 18 charged from
2005 to 2013).
404
Even impressive efforts by leading legal scholars to re-think issues related to policing
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Hauling out jurists’ well-intentioned but ideologically-driven proposals from
the 1980s to control police misconduct that have had little traction is not an
adequate approach. Legal scholars seeking genuine attempts to curb police
excesses through civil and administrative measures need to engage more
with criminological and criminal justice policy research.405 Any such
overtures are welcome at a time when the nation’s chief magistrate has
publicly encouraged police to be “rough.”406
v. Require All Defense Attorneys to Ask Clients if They
Committed the Alleged Crime and Aggressively
Investigate Claims of Actual Innocence407
This proposal envisions a radical change to the adversary model of
adjudication. Whether a defense attorney should know or be concerned
about a client’s guilt is a perennial ethical issue, but one which, given long
adversary system traditions, resolves by allowing attorney indifference to
factual guilt or innocence. The attorney’s role is to put the prosecution to its
proof so as to insure prosecutorial integrity. Cassell justifies a radical threat
to the adversary system by asserting that “[i]nnocent persons ensnared in the
criminal justice system have a stronger claim to our attention than do the
guilty.”408 Leaving aside the difficulty of assessing whether a client is
guilty,409 this position might be arguably correct from an ethical position and
may indeed be felt, psychologically, by attorneys who are representing a
palpably innocent client,410 but it is not a correct statement of my
understanding of the law. The adversary system, as an objective and imperial
(and even imperious) entity, is concerned with procedural integrity and
counts on proper procedure to get the substance right.411
proceed almost entirely within the world of law reviews, talking only to other legal scholars
and not engaging with police researchers. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts:
Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016);
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016).
405
See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2005).
406
Philip Bump, Trump’s Speech Encouraging Police to be ‘Rough,’ Annotated, WASH.
POST (July 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/28/tr
umps-speech-encouraging-police-to-be-rough-annotated/?utm_term=.1427973f2bcb.
407
Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 1092-95; Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 277-80.
408
Cassell, Protect, supra note 5, at 278.
409
Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence,
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2010).
410
This is stated plaintively by attorney Patrick McGuinness on the night before trial in
the documentary film MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING (Direct Cinema 2001).
411
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 27-49 (describing development of this ethic
and rule among the Church Fathers who were confronted with the need to judge, and thus to
draw blood, as power to govern shifted from the Roman Empire to the Church). “The history
of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.” McNabb v.
United States, 319 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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Debating the merits of the adversary system is fair game and is a wellestablished tradition of legal scholarship.412 Were Cassell to flesh out his
argument, as have other scholars, with some thought given to his proposal’s
possible negatives and better detailing the operation of such a novel
approach,413 I would respect the product as an interesting innocentric trial
procedure innovation. However, given his inconsistency between the limited
resources in criminal justice and an assertion that defense attorneys have the
capacity to fully investigate cases, and the total lack of any “innocentric”
procedures as a tradeoff for an attorney’s obligation to inquire into
innocence,414 I have to view this proposal as a provocation. The proposal
could become a talking point for prosecutors opposed to innocence reforms.
Were such a proposal to be enacted, with no other changes to the adversary
model, and without erecting some of the accuracy-enhancing elements in
modern, European, inquisitorial systems, 415 its effect would be to make
defendants’ lawyers structurally subservient to prosecutors, at least by
limiting the scope of defense cross-examination of witnesses.
vi. Arguments Raised in “Can We Protect the Innocent Without
Freeing the Guilty?”
As noted above, Cassell added a few points in his Chapter in Medwed’s
anthology. He raises an interesting criminological point about the number
of exonerees (and by proxy the proportion of the wrongfully convicted) with
prior criminal records. Innocence movement legal scholarship is not
concerned with the question but at least two valuable criminological studies
have explored pre- and post-exoneration offending. Gould et al.’s study of
what factors cause erroneous prosecutions to become wrongful convictions
identifies a prior criminal record as a statistically significant variable.416 A
study of post-conviction offending found a correlation between high
monetary exoneree awards and lower levels of offending, suggesting that
412

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, SECOND EDITION (Craig M Bradley ed.,
2007); articles abound, see e.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide
to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should
We Care?, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 542 (1990); James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The
Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 119 (2009).
413
This is a point Cassell makes in his somewhat positive appraisal of Gross’s
“investigative trial.” Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5, at 56.
414
“Within [the] traditional structure [of a criminal trial], defense attorneys have many
tools that they can employ in the defense of innocent clients.” Cassell, Freeing, supra note 5,
at 1094.
415
In the part of our article that focused on German trial procedures, my colleague Ralph
Grunewald specified the ways that German criminal procedure protects defendants rights,
“often much more broadly than in the United States.” Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 7376,
at 226.
416
Jon Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 498-99
(2014).
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crimes by exonerees are driven by economic factors.417 These factors are
relevant to certain kinds of innocence policies, including exoneree
compensation, but should not be relevant to adjudication under existing
adversary system theory. However, one of the eight proposals that came out
of the Justice Department’s Reagan-era “truth in criminal justice” series
advocated that defendants’ criminal histories be admitted at trial.418 A
defendant’s full background is made available to judges and jurors in French
criminal trials, but a French defendant is entitled to request extensive police
reinvestigation of facts (as was proposed by Bakken), and another significant
material trade-off is that criminal penalties are far less draconian in France
and Europe generally.419 Cassell’s intellectual career suggests that his
proposals derive from a conservative, crime control model420 vision of
criminal justice that would depart from the present adversary system with no
countervailing civil liberty protections.
Nevertheless, police investigators are not wrong to question people
with certain prior criminal histories as possible suspects (as they are not
wrong to question family members in suspicious deaths). The danger,
however, arises when investigators stupidly turn a probabilistic factor into a
categorical one.421 Cassell pokes holes in the rectitude of some or many
exonerees by raising the reality that some have been involved in criminal
activity. A balanced inquiry about the criminal conduct of those involved in
wrongful conviction cases would also examine the degree to which wrongful
convictions are caused by the criminal misconduct of police, forensic
examiners and prosecutors, and not only among the group exonerations
identified by the NRE.422 The bulk of wrongful conviction scholarship
examines justice system errors, and although many exoneration narratives
expose criminal wrongdoing, very few scholars have systematically studied
criminality by system actors as a source of wrongful conviction.423
417

Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 353 (2014).
418
Office of Legal Policy, A Report to the Attorney General on the Admission of Criminal
Histories at Trial [1986], 22 J. L. REFORM 707 (1989).
419
See Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527
(1997); Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE
171(Richard Vogler & Barbara Huber eds., 2008).
420
As described by PACKER, LIMITS, supra note 61.
421
See, e.g., CALVIN C. JOHNSON, JR. WITH GREG HAMPIKIAN, EXIT TO FREEDOM (2003).
422
See e.g., BLAKESLEE, supra note 399. GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD
MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 230-33 (2012)
(discussing the impunity murder of prisoner Samuel Shepherd and shooting of prisoner Walter
Irvin by Sheriff Willis McCall); THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT, VICTIMS OF JUSTICE:
REVISITED (2005) (discussing prosecutors tried and acquitted for acts in the prosecution of
Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez).
423
See MICHAEL NAUGHTON, THE INNOCENT AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 15-69 (2013) (adopting the term
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Exploration of this topic by Prof. Cassell, with his finely tuned sensibility
for injustice, would be welcomed.
Cassell raised a concern that eyewitness identification reforms might
allow guilty criminals to escape prosecution, but does not flesh out the issue.
He follows the empirical challenge to eyewitness reforms by Steven Clark
and others demonstrating in laboratory studies that reducing the selection of
innocent perpetrators increases the number of guilty perpetrators not
identified.424 Clark’s work is in contrast to the kind of global antiBlackstonianism reviewed in this article, and his challenge to every
eyewitness reform was answered by Wells, Steblay and Dysart.425 Further
analysis of this more precise debate is beyond the scope of this article. It is
worth noting, however, that National Research Council (NRC) of the
National Academy of Sciences has reviewed the debate, and has supported
most eyewitness reforms generated by the work of psychological scientists,
which should go far to reduce identification errors without “deadly dilemma”
tradeoffs. The reforms supported by the NRC include instructing
participants that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup, blind
administration, fair procedures for filler-selection so that the suspect does
not stand out, immediately taking the witness’s confidence estimate if an
identification is made, video recording the lineup, and insuring that only one
suspect is included in a lineup.426 The procedure neither supported nor
dismissed by the NRC is the sequential lineup procedure. Although
substantial research shows greater accuracy with sequential lineups,427 the
concern that they result in fewer overall picks, which in turn reduces the
number of guilty suspects being picked and ultimately convicted, has not
been resolved. As a result of methodological and substantive concerns, the
NRC did not recommend that police departments adopt sequential lineups at
this time.428

“abortions of justice” for wrongful convictions generated by police illegality).
424
Clark, supra note 37.
425
Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Reforms: Are Suggestiveness-Induced
Hits and Guesses True Hits?, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 264 (2012).
426
See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reform, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615
(2006).
427
Nancy K., Steblay et al., Seventy-Two Tests of the Sequential Lineup Superiority
Effect: A Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y AND L. 99-139 (2011).
428
National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness
Identification, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. (2014).
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AN EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE AND ARGUMENT FOR THE
BLACKSTONE PRINCIPLE―THE REAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM

Part III presented “internal” critiques of the anti-Blackstonians. The
“external” critique in this Part does not propound a systematic theory of
adjudication or the criminal justice process. Its empirical sketches of
criminal justice show several things. “The Prosecutor as a Source of
Impunity” shows that prosecutorial practices can allow serious crime to go
unpunished and unjustly distribute public safety. “Recidivism and
Rehabilitation” offers research findings that weaken Laudan’s insinuation
that once convicted a person is a continuous, inveterate recidivator who can
be stopped from committing crime at every turn only by perpetual
imprisonment. “Plea Bargaining” provides evidence to undermine the idea
that convictions obtained by plea must be more factually accurate than
convictions obtained by trial. “How Courts Operate” draws on an
ethnography which shows one of the busiest criminal courts in the country
to operate in ways that are poles apart from the idealized vision held by many
and weakens one’s confidence that all criminal courts can routinely deliver
accurate verdicts or pleas. “Murder, Race, and the State” argues that the
source of high black-on-black serious crime rates is the withdrawal of state
protection in poor minority communities that has existed at least since the
mid-nineteenth century. The anti-Blackstonians’ programs appear oblivious
to this and would only continue or exacerbate this sorry state of affairs.
Many more sketches could be offered, but together they display an uneven
justice process in which crime control relies on more than convictions and
prison. They imply that an anti-Blackstonian agenda would possibly
increase the number of wrongful convictions, perhaps substantially, without
offering greater protection against crime victimization, a consideration that
offsets crime increases hypothesized by anti-Blackstonians as a result of
innocence reforms.
A. Introduction
Epps and Laudan and Allen’s jurisprudential analyses are applied to
rules of criminal procedure, justice system statistics, Supreme Court
decisions, and evidence theories. These approaches, by abstracting too much
from the quotidian reality of adjudication and criminal justice, undermine or
at least weaken their conclusions. Criminological insights and a gritty
picture of contemporary practices drawn from legal scholarship and
investigative journalism depict a justice system favoring the prosecution, and
in which, oddly, errors of impunity are sometimes generated by prosecutors
and not only by the criminal defense. Cassell’s approach is more empirical
and grounded in a coherent conservative approach to criminal procedure that
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grew out of a backlash to Warren Court rulings.429
Before offering an exposé, I need to state a belief that most system
actors act professionally and usually get correct results.430 This belief is
based on readings, research, and interactions with system actors. American
criminal justice is no longer the “third degree” system of a century ago,431
and for all the real problems of racial friction, is not the kind of “old” Jim
Crow era system that was a thriving reality in my lifetime.432 Academic
writings describe positive changes in policing, forensic science, prosecution,
defense lawyering, and the education of judges about forensic science,
although all justice institutions fall short of achieving attainable ideals.433
Innocence movement leaders never claimed that the American criminal
justice system is so thoroughly corrupt that it is irredeemable.434 Indeed, the
systemic innocentric reforms proposed reflect a paradox: while a nontrivial
number of wrongful convictions occur because of serious justice system
problems, reform is possible because of systemic improvements and a high

429
Most legal criminal procedure scholarship is “liberal,” fueled in part by a realization
that the Supreme Court’s decisions enabled the “war on crime and drugs,” which imposed
enormous burdens on society. See ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW, supra note 157; FORMAN,
supra note 157. Recently, the conservative position on crime policy, silently accepting the
liberal critique, has moved away from the “war on crime/drugs” trope (although the Trump
administration has revived the tough on crime position for federal prosecutors). See DAGAN
& TELES, supra note 162; AVIRAM, supra note 162; PFAFF, supra note 147. Whether
conservative Supreme Court justices will align their constitutional criminal procedure
decisions to accommodate a new position remains to be seen. A sign of internecine
conservative conflict is the conflicting positions taken by Justice Clarence Thomas and
Attorney General Sessions on asset forfeiture. See Damon Root, Clarence Thomas vs. Jeff
Sessions on Asset Forfeiture, REASON (July 20, 2017) http://reason.com/blog/2017/07/20/clar
ence-thomas-vs-jeff-sessions-on-civi.
430
We need to pay attention to genres. I observed in a chapter about detective work that
the kind of narrative writing that extols the acuity and success of police investigators (the true
crime genre) leads readers to be in awe of the ability of detectives. On the other end of the
spectrum, articles and books about wrongful convictions (some of which falls into the true
crime genre) almost uniformly paint a picture of police incompetence, tunnel vision, or
malfeasance. Between these factually accurate but incomplete genres, social science research
about police investigation depicts a less glamorous and less “noir” world of deadlines, heavy
caseloads, resource limitations and bounded rationality. See Marvin Zalman, The Detective
and Wrongful Conviction, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM:
MAKING JUSTICE 147-63 (M. Zalman & J. Carrano eds., 2014).
431
ERNEST JEROME HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE: A STUDY OF THE UNLAWFUL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW (1931).
432
S. JONATHAN BASS, HE CALLS ME BY LIGHTENING: THE LIFE OF CALIPH WASHINGTON
AND THE FORGOTTEN SAGA OF JIM CROW, SOUTHERN JUSTICE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY
(2017); KING, supra note 422.
433
See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity
and Change: Into the Twenty-First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55 (2010).
434
This characterization of the innocence movement is implied in Hoffman, supra note
53.
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level of professionalism and self-awareness among today’s criminal justice
leaders compared to the past.435
The anti-Blackstonians’ “crime and punishment” perspective fastens
analysis on substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, trials, evidence law
and imprisonment. Except for the hangman and transports to Australia, this
was the institutional context of the debate about justice system trade-offs
between Rev. William Paley and Samuel Romilly around 1800. An
empirical criminological focus on how the justice system operates today
draws on a wider slice of reality. The burden in this Part is to provide
empirical evidence that the system is stacked against defendants, that justice
systems errors arise from a variety of sources that have little or nothing to do
with standards of proof and criminal procedure, that anti-Blackstonian
reforms would do little to diminish most errors of impunity, and would likely
increase wrongful convictions with little crime-reduction effect. The
intuition that the deck is normally stacked against the defendant, requiring
non-symmetrical pro-defendant procedures, is prominent in common law
countries but less so in liberal democracies with so-called inquisitorial
justice systems.436 As it seems impossible to finely calculate the state’s
advantage,437 the Blackstone principle and asymmetric rules like reasonable
doubt seem to be intuitive attempts to even the scales that has been noticed
in many justice systems.438
435

I’ve made a case for this proposition in Marvin Zalman, Edwin Borchard and the
Limits of Innocence Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS & MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE:
CAUSES AND REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 32955 (C. R. Huff & M. Killias eds., 2013).
436
The notion that wrongful convictions occur very rarely in inquisitorial countries is
beginning to change. See UNDERSTANDING WRONGFUL CONVICTION: THE PROTECTION OF THE
INNOCENT ACROSS EUROPE AND AMERICA (Luca Lupária ed., 2015).
437
FORST, supra note 80, at 45-56.
438
The Talmudists understood this. Rabbis were granted power to regulate Jews’ daily
lives under the Romans and their successors after the Temple was destroyed and the Jewish
commonwealth crushed in 70 CE. They asserted the need for effective criminal justice. In
Pirke Avot, the “ethics of the fathers,” a fundamental collection of basic Talmudic principles,
“Rabbi Chanina, the Deputy High Priest, says: Pray for the welfare of the government, for
were it not of the fear of it, people would swallow each other alive” REUVEN P. BULKA,
CHAPTERS OF THE SAGES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON PIRKEY AVOTH 93 (Jason
Aronson, 1993) (Pirke Avot [PA] chapter & verse 3:2). Yet, the Rabbis knew that their
governing overlords were essentially despotic. “Be cautious with the ruling authorities, for
they befriend a person only for their own needs. They appear as friends when it is to their
advantage, but they do not stand by the individual at the time of that person’s distress” (PA
2:3) Id. at 57. Nevertheless, when they had the ability, the Rabbinical authorities were
enjoined to conduct trials aimed at achieving the truth. “Rabban Shimon, the son of Gamliel
says: The world is preserved through three things: truth, justice, and peace, as it is said:
‘Administer truth and the justice of peace in your gates’ (Zechariah 8:16)” (PA 1:18) Id. at
47.
With these injunctions in mind, the Talmudists created decidedly “Blackstonian”
criminal procedure rules. While a civil tribunal consists of 3 judges, a criminal tribunal was
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B. Sketches
1. The Prosecutor as a Source of Impunity — Amy Bach,
Ordinary Injustice439
Under a district attorney for four Mississippi counties, the conviction
rate in one county dropped from about 90 percent to only 15 percent over a
period of years. The District Attorney was not corrupt but exercised his
discretion to focus on what he saw as major cases. Amy Bach listed 16
proper factors that a prosecutor could use to decide whether to not prosecute
a case, from doubt about guilt to the mental status of the accused.
Admittedly, factors like restitution or undue hardship to the accused will play
little or no role in the serious crimes addressed by Laudan (homicide, rape,
robbery, aggravated assault), but the Mississippi prosecutor’s pattern of
decisions led to systematic impunity that withdrew legal protection from
victims of serious domestic abuse (many of whom were seriously assaulted),
storeowners subject to theft and embezzlement, children victimized by
statutory rape, and people assaulted by those with severe mental problems.
The D.A. even refused to prosecute a large-scale illicit drug manufacturing
operation. One reason for the lack of effective prosecution in the county was
underfunded and inadequate policing.
It is not clear whether Bach’s in-depth investigation in one locality is
representative of other rural prosecutors. It may be an outlier, but we cannot
know how far from the norm without better county-level criminal justice data
comprised of 23. In a civil case the opening argument can favor or oppose the defendant; in
a capital case the opening statement must favor the defendant. A civil case can be decided by
a simple majority as can a capital acquittal. But no execution can be had on a unanimous vote
as it is presumed corrupt, but only by a super-majority. A civil verdict may be reversed
whether the defendant was held liable or absolved, but in capital cases an acquittal may not
be later reversed. In a capital cases, some must argue for the defendant, while in a civil case
all judges could argue against a defendant. A person who argued for acquittal in a capital
case cannot thereafter change his position. Civil cases are discussed in daylight and may be
decided during the nighttime, but in capital cases the merits are argued in daytime, and the
verdict must be reached in the daytime, either an acquittal on the same day, but a guilty verdict
must be decided on the following day. In civil cases the senior judges are polled first, but in
capital cases the junior judges are polled first, so as not to be swayed by seniority. A capital
verdict of guilt is based only on direct evidence and not on hearsay. Witnesses in capital cases
are admonished that they will be cross-examined severely. A witness who saw the defendant
committing a murder had to warn him that his act was sinful and unlawful. The testimony of
witnesses who contradict one another becomes invalid. Composition is not allowed in capital
cases as it is in civil cases. Capital guilt is followed by execution, normally by stoning. The
site of execution must be far from court (the judges must remain in the courthouse) to give
time for a convicting judge to change his mind (officers at the court and with the execution
procession remain in eye contact). If the rules of procedure disallowed the execution (e.g., if
a witness did not warn the perpetrator to desist) but there were witnesses to intentional murder,
provisions for life imprisonment existed. HYMAN E. GOLDIN, HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE, MISHNAH: SANHEDRIN—MAKKOT 106-26 (1952).
439
AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 130-90 (2009).
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and analysis, the kind that Measures for Justice made public for the first time
in 2017.440 It is reasonable to assume that poorly funded rural county justice
systems operate below par, leading to injustices of impunity that ought to
drive anti-Blackstonians to distraction and focusing their attention on
improving and strengthening prosecutorial professionalism. This sketch
does not alone undercut an anti-Blackstonian message, but suggests that
before seeking to weaken defendant’s rights, analysis should explore
whether prosecutors contribute to errors of impunity.
2. Recidivism and Rehabilitation— Cullen and Jonson:
Change is Possible441
Offenders’ high persistent recidivism rates were used by Laudan as
support for reducing the standard of proof. Recidivism rates are problematic
and need to be factored into sound crime reduction policies. The surveys
Laudan relied on were taken during America’s mass incarceration binge
when rehabilitation programs were at low ebb.442 While no criminologist
claims that rehabilitation can eliminate recidivism, evidence-based
rehabilitation programs do reduce recidivism. It would be negligent for
policy officials (or criminal law scholars) to consider diminishing legal or
constitutional rights of defendants as a way to (ultimately) reduce crime
without considering recent scientific evidence on rehabilitation. Francis
Cullen, a leading criminologist, and Cheryl Jonson thoroughly review more
than 200 research articles tracing the trajectory of rehabilitation studies.
Until about 1970 rehabilitation was the reigning criminological theory
of punishment, included in the Model Penal Code as a valid punishment
rationale.443 Reviews of recidivism research around 1970s showed that many
programs were not effective. A famous article by researcher Robert
Martinson declared that “nothing works.” That anti-government mantra was
picked up both by left-leaning academics wary of discretion used by justice
440

Bach diagnosed lack of county level data as a source of errors of justice in her book
and has worked to rectify this with an organization that is providing usable data. MEASURES
FOR JUSTICE, https://measuresforjustice.org/ (last visited .May 17, 2018); see discussion supra
in note 154 .
441
Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs, in
CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 293-330 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011).
442
I do not mean to imply that the timing of those surveys alone means that the reported
recidivism rates were necessarily higher than at other times, although it is a hypothesis worth
testing. To the degree that imprisonment is a criminogenic factor, avoiding the unnecessary
use of imprisonment for less serious felonies is a factor in reducing the number of recidivists
even if rates are uniformly high.
443
The Model Penal Code takes a utilitarian approach and includes rehabilitation along
with deterrence as a general purpose for sentencing and treatment of offenders. MODEL PENAL
CODE, § 1.102 (2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2016). This section also advances use of scientific
knowledge as a desideratum aimed at future implementation by legislatures.
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system actors to control offenders, and by right-leaning policy makers who
saw rehabilitation as coddling inmates. Rehabilitation rapidly declined as a
reigning punishment philosophy, followed quickly by the elimination of
many rehabilitation programs as prisons became overly crowded and
community corrections became bloated.444 This change was consistent with
America’s turn from a New Deal consensus and the denigration of
government service by high ranking politicians who valorized business and
the private sector, a process abetted by “wars” on drugs and crime that led to
mass incarceration.445 Some criminologists supportive of weak state
ideologies (anarchists on the left, libertarians on the right) favored “radical
non-intervention” for many offenders. A more prescient political theoretic
analysis holds that unlike Switzerland, where prison is modeled as a place to
make democratic citizens, in America’s “virtual” and “potential” democracy
in which not more than half the electorate participates in elections, prison is
relatively invisible. As a result prison inmates and probationers and parolees
have been turned over to criminological specialists who are “not concerned
with issues of citizenship and democracy.”446
Correctional programming did not disappear, but was held in low
esteem by many criminologists. A shift toward methods of multi-program
analysis from narrative approaches to meta-analysis in the 1980s allowed for
more robust studies of the average effect size of rehabilitation treatment,
defined as “a planned correctional intervention that targets for change
internal and/or social criminogenic factors with the goal of reducing
recidivism and, where possible, of improving other aspects of an offender’s
life.”447 Despite some limitations of meta-analysis, studies of heterogeneous
programs showed decreases in recidivism of from ten to up to forty
percent.448 Education and work programs were found to have positive
effects, although measurement was limited by participant selection bias;
more refined analysis suggested that treatment effect was modified by
prisoner’s prior level of education and that to be effective a minimum
exposure was required. As for drug treatment, residential therapeutic
444
JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 (1993); JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A
REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA (2014).
445
SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 157.
446
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Invisibility of the Prison in Democratic Theory: A Problem
of “Virtual Democracy”, 23 GOOD SOC’Y 6, 14 (2014).
447
Cullen & Jonson, supra note 441, at 295 (italics in original deleted).
448
Cullen & Jonson, supra note 441, at 303. The authors cited a 2007 review of eight
meta-analyic studies of correctional interventions on recidivism, stated that “they showed
that treatment programs were consistently associated withreductiuons in offending. In fact,
they discovered that none of the meta-analyses ‘found less than a 10 percent reduction in
recidivism,’ and that ‘most of their mean effect sizes represent recidivism reductions in the
20 percent range, varying upward to nearly 40 percent” (internal citations omitted). Id.

ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

1408

8/10/2018 10:03 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1319

community programs were effective in reducing recidivism but group
counseling and boot-camps had no effect.449
States could put this scientific evidence about rehabilitation to use by
investing in programs designed to partially reduce recidivism rates. The way
forward toward a more enlightened, evidence-based correctional policy is
not entirely clear. Since about 2010 conservative groups have supported
milder criminal justice policies, the Obama administration took steps to
reverse mass incarceration, and the Senate almost passed bi-partisan
legislation to ease harsh federal sentences. But the legislation stalled, overall
prison rates have not fallen by much, and the present administration has
ordered a reinvigoration of the war on drugs.450 In the states, the rhetorical
move toward “smart on crime” policies continue, and both prosecutors and
public opinion registers favorable opinions of rehabilitation.451 If an
unwillingness to move beyond the low hanging fruit of releasing first time
drug offenders becomes the norm,452 it is unlikely that a sustained program
of rehabilitation will reach its potential effects. In such a case placing lowrisk offenders into unnecessary rehabilitation programs might “increase the
likelihood of future criminal justice involvement.”453 To the degree that antiBlackstonians focus on trial procedures as the main driver of crime attitudes
or as the prime factor in crime reduction, studied ignorance of correctional
programming and the prospects of rehabilitation (as a mitigator of
recidivism, at least) is misguided.

449

Cullen & Jonson, supra note 441, at 312. See also, David Weisburd et al., What Works
in Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation: An Assessment of Systematic Reviews, 16
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 415, 419 (2017) (“It is time to abandon the nothing works idea.”).
450
Matt Ford, Jeff Sessions Reinvigorates the Drug War, ATLANTIC (May 12, 2017, 11:37
AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessions-sentencing-memo/526
029/.
451
Fred Patrick & Meg Reiss, Criminal Justice Reform Starts with the Prosecutor, HILL
(Aug. 10, 2017, 5:40PM) http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/346103criminal-justice-reform-starts-with-the-prosecutor (noting a diverse group of prosecutors
agree that rehabilitation is a key determinant of public safety); Timothy Williams, Trump
Wants to Get Tough on Crime. Victims Don’t Agree., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/crime-victims-poll-trump-agenda.html?&moduleD
etail=section-news-2&action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&region=Footer&module=Mor
eInSection&version=WhatsNext&contentID=WhatsNext&pgtype=article&_r=0.
452
PFAFF, supra note 147.
453
Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration To Mass Control, and Back Again: How
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead To a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 125,139 (2017).
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3. Plea Bargaining—Any Errors Are False Positives
Allen and Laudan were forced to abandon the myth that innocents
almost never plead guilty, but they maintained that pleaded false negatives
were rare.454 Alas, in the year they published the pilot episode of their deadly
errors series,455 Josh Bowers shook up the world of plea-bargaining
scholarship by asserting that false guilty pleas are frequent and a good
thing.456 A decade later Laudan applied a three percent false negative rate to

454

“Risinger makes the striking claim that the rates of error in plea-bargained cases could
be as high as errors at trial. Such an unsubstantiated and highly improbable proposition stands
in stark contrast to the commendably empirical cast to his article.” Allen & Laudan, supra
note 4, at 69 (footnotes omitted). After more analysis, they write: “In short, extrapolating
from error rates of trials to error rates in bargains involves a serious category mistake. There
may be cases of false positives involving pleas, but there is no reason to think they are
relatively plentiful.” Id. at 71 (footnote omitted). To determine the rate of plea-bargained
false negative, they drew on data from Garrett and from Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra
note 26, conducted numerology on their data, and produced a plea bargained error rate of
0.84%. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COL. L. REV. 55 (2008). Curiously,
that rate is close to the error rate ascertained by Hoffman, supra note 53, and is greater that
the lower qualitative estimate of wrongful convictions in my study, see Marvin Zalman,
Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221
(2012). In my simple calculation, an error rate of .0084 in all plea-bargained cases (assuming
one million felony convictions a year) produces 7,896 innocent people who plead guilty each
year. If 3 percent of the 95% of one million convicted who plead are innocent, the number
rises to 28,500.
455
Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, inaugurated a deadly dilemmas series: Larry Laudan &
Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI. KENT L. REV. 23 (2010); Larry
Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other
Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493 (2011); Ronald
J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention,
101 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2011).
456
Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008). The
utilitarian/libertarian argument in favor of innocent guilty pleas is made succinctly by Albert
Alschuler:
It is better to be an innocent person on probation than an innocent
person in prison. When an innocent defendant has been offered a
beneficial deal, he should be permitted to take it. . . . Convicting the
innocent is not wrongful when the innocent want it to happen. [Odds
bargaining distributes aggregate punishment differently]. If ten
innocent defendants were to stand trial, one might be wrongly
convicted and sentenced to ten years. With odds bargaining, all ten may
be convicted, but each may serve only one year. The number of
wrongful convictions will increase, but not the number of years of
wrongful imprisonment. Moreover, with costs bargaining added to the
picture, the total quantum of punishment inflicted on the innocent may
diminish.
Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L. REV.
919 (2015).
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serious felony convictions whether convicted by trial or plea.457
The innocence movement caused legal scholars and social scientists to
look more closely at plea-bargaining. Albert Alschuler summarizes this
research in an article that advertised plea-bargaining as a “nearly perfect
system for convicting the innocent.” In brief, the innocent plead guilty
because both “odds bargaining” and “cost bargaining” overbalances the
defendant’s chance of acquittal.458 Alschuler critiques five arguments
claiming to limit guilty pleas by innocence defendants. First, although there
are reasons why the innocent will plead guilty at lower rates than the guilty,
psychological studies and economic reasoning support the idea that
substantial numbers of innocent do plead guilty. The enormous difficulty of
obtaining exonerations from plea-bargained wrongful convictions explains
why very few such cases show up in exoneration databases.459 Second, the
obligation of courts to establish a factual basis for pleas does not mean that
courts in fact carefully review the record or put the defendant to the ordeal
of explaining what happened in his or her own words.460 Third, the
desideratum that a prosecutor must be personally convinced of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt before accepting a plea is not a requirement, and evidence
of prosecutorial opinion and behavior weakens that assertion.461 Fourth,
evidence does not show that most defense attorneys would block a client who
was believed to be innocent from pleading; in this condition some attorneys
pressure innocent clients to plead guilty or withdraw to allow other counsel
to represent such clients.462 Finally, Alschuler revisits the economic model
undergirding guilty pleas (the prosecutor’s offer overbalances the
defendant’s chance of acquittal) and proposes that the economic conflict of
457

LAUDAN, LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 3, passim.
Prosecutors bargain “both to ensure conviction in doubtful cases and to save the costs
of a trial.” Alschuler, supra note 456, at 919-20. He bolsters his argument by drawing on his
prior observational studies of plea bargaining and by an empirical survey of prosecutors
conducted by Shawn Bushway, Alison Redlich and Robert Norris. See Shawn D. Bushway
et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial”, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723
(2014).
459
Alschuler, supra note 456, at 928-33.
460
Alschuler, supra note 4566, at 933-34. “A defendant’s one-word answer to the
question whether he engaged in the conduct described in the indictment establishes a
sufficient basis.” Id. at 934 (footnote omitted). See the example by Gonzalez Van Cleve,
infra note 479. This factor is the point on which reform proposals could have the greatest
impact. See Gross, Pretrial Incentives, supra note 187; Christopher Slobogin, Plea
Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution
and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1505 (2016) (arguing that a coherent plea bargaining scheme should be procedurally
inquisitorial and substantively aimed at rehabilitation); Garrett, Why Plea Bargains, supra
note 220.
461
Alschuler, supra note 4566, at 934-35.
462
Alschuler, supra note 4466, at 935-37. Defense attorney behavior is also considered
in the section on courtroom behavior, infra Part IV.B.4.
458
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interest among private defense lawyers and the organizational pressures of
the courtroom workgroup lead many lawyers to pressure clients to plead with
little concern of innocence or guilt because “[a]dvising a guilty plea is nearly
always the safe, secure, comfortable, and profitable course.”463
Part of my argument contra-Laudan is that even if the the number of
false negatives in criminal cases that go to trial are reduced, such a correction
cannot influence the many crimes that are not reported to police, that do not
lead to arrest, or that are dismissed by prosecutors.464 In addition, false
negatives/wrongful acquittals simply cannot occur when defendants plead
guilty, supporting Alschuler’s reasoning, which suggests that guilty plea
false positives could be as high if not higher than trial verdicts.465
Is change possible? An empirically-based recent article by two leading
criminal procedure scholars reports from the front lines of the judicial
process that judicial involvement in plea bargaining is growing. This may
in turn be creating an invisible managerial revolution, which, ideally, may
by squeezing efficiencies out of the medieval institution that is the court
allow for more careful consideration of criminal cases.466 Nancy King and
Ronald Wright interviewed 100 judges and lawyers in ten states describing
how judges routinely engaged in settling criminal cases, much like the civil
justice norm. These programs are not haphazard but are allowed by law, rely
on case management information technology representing cost-conscience
docket management, and emphasize transparency. This shift in judicial
attitudes and practice might be achieving the substantive and procedural
justice goals called for by plea bargaining reform advocates. The
respondents report that judicial involvement is producing better and not just
faster pleas. First, judges provide information and a reality check on cases
where advocates have unrealistic views of their cases, and can focus
discussion on important substantive issues: “how best to rehabilitate the
defendant, how do we protect the public, what should we do to accommodate
the particular defendant.”467 Second, although not all prosecutors were in
favor, a number of prosecutor respondents agreed that judicial involvement
helped moderate overzealous line prosecutors and that in sensitive cases
463

Alschuler, supra note 4566, at 939, see 937-39.
Supra note 456.
465
This idea is bolstered by the growing number and increasing rate of plea-bargained
exonerations reported by the National Registry of Exonerations. On November 10, 2017, the
NRE reported 391/2120 or 18 percent guilty plea exonerations, a far higher rate than reported
among DNA exonerations and earlier exoneration reports. Given the fortuitous nature of the
exoneration experience, it is a mistake to take these shifting figures as a clear reflection of the
largely uncharted reality of conviction ground-truth integrity.
466
Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325 (2016).
467
King & Wright, supra note 466, at 368, generally, at 366–68.
464
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judges were willing to “take the heat” for unpopular pleas and sentencing
decisions, or gave an assistant prosecutor a reason to buck an overly rigid
office policy.468 Third, judicial involvement almost always produced more
lenient sentences, making fans of defense lawyers.469 Fourth, defendants
craved sentencing certainty, and “judicial input in . . . jurisdictions [with
restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion] was valued for the certainty it
provided about those aspects of punishment that the law left to the judge’s
discretion. And where the judge’s approval offered a way around sentencing
restrictions or postsentence review, judicial participation became even more
attractive.”470 Fifth, respondents indicated that judges are receiving plentiful
information about the cases from the parties and from evidence-based risk
reports with which to make informed decisions. Judges’ requests for victim
information pushed prosecutors to make efforts to obtain it. The absence of
presentence reports is largely seen as as a matter of less concern, as resources
for report preparation is declining and the other sources of information,
including prior history data, are routinely available. This paints a
considerably different picture from the view that defendants bargain in the
absence of information and are at the mercy of prosecutors, which takes us
to the next point.471 Sixth, judicial involvement increases discovery for the
defense. Although some lawyers in two states demurred, other respondents
reported that judicial involvement “may actually prompt prosecutors to
reveal more to defense counsel, and to reveal it earlier.”472 Also, settlement
conferences served as discovery devices. Seventh, judicial involvement
helped defense attorneys with stubborn clients, where judges talked to
defendants, to convince them that the plea offers were reasonable and that
the sentence recommendations were real. Respondents discounted the
concern that judge involvement with defendants was coercive. Defense
attorneys said that judge involvement made an already coercive situation less
so, and judges did not become involved until after defendants decided to
plead guilty. Judges talked to defendants in only five states.473 In sum, these
reports about judicial involvement in plea bargaining commonly noted that
“judicial settlement conferences provided better options for defendants, not
worse.”474

468

King & Wright, supra note 466, at 368-71.
King & Wright, supra note 466, at 371-72.
470
King & Wright, supra note 466, at 376, generally, at 373-76.
471
Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial
Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 798 (2014).
472
King & Wright, supra note 466, at 380, generally, at 380-81.
473
King & Wright, supra note 466, at 381-87.
474
King & Wright, supra note 466, at 387 (emphasis in original).
469
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The King and Wright study raises questions about generalizability.
They note that “[l]ike the other self-serving claims about defendant
perceptions we report here, our interviewees’ assertions deserve testing that
this study cannot provide.”475 Still, the “consistency with which participants
held [positive] view[s] was striking.”476 Judicial involvement may very well
be a great corrective to the pressures and imbalance that led Judge Jed Rakoff
to explain to a wide public “why innocent people plead guilty.”477 After
repeating the various reasons to believe that the innocent plead guilty,478 he
was “driven, in the end, to advocate what a few jurisdictions, notably
Connecticut and Florida, have begun experimenting with: involving judges
in the plea-bargaining process,” which was forbidden to federal judges. He
envisioned a process in which prosecutors would have to provide case
evidence and both parties would meet with a magistrate. The ten-state
survey is encouraging news and may provide a key to reducing a source of
procedural injustice and wrongful convictions. King and Wright did not
include the issue of false plea bargained decision in their report. Additional
empirical research to tease out information about possible pressures that
generate false pleas in judge-involved plea-bargaining is called for.
4. How Courts Operate—Racialized Justice in “Crook
County”
A startling omission in the anti-Blackstonians’ analyses is race. In their
highly abstract world not only are human actors like unchanging monads but
they are colorless.
Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve’s ethnography of prosecutors and defense
lawyers in the Cook County criminal court presents strong evidence that the
adjudication process in America’s largest criminal court is indelibly infused
with racism, even as openly espoused racist views are no longer permissible
in a nominally post-racial society.479 Actual innocence is not a main theme
of Crook County, but Gonzalez Van Cleve’s description of attorney behavior
shows that a sloppy and hyper-efficient justice system creates an
environment in which wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals can
flourish. As a caution, most of her observations concern drug cases; to the
extent that Laudan and the other anti-Blackstonians focus on more serious,

475

King & Wright, supra note 466, at 383.
King & Wright, supra note 466, at 383.
477
Rakoff, supra note 188. For a detailed popular account of the problems of the guilty
plea regime, see Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC MAG. (Sept. 2017), at 66.
478
The process is one-sided and the results dictated by prosecutors, who apply “inordinate
pressures to enter plea bargains.” Id.
479
NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S
LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016).
476
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violent crimes, her observations might be discounted.480
Gonzalez Van Cleve asserts that Cook County’s court culture thrives
on racism to function efficiently. Details to support the thesis exposes an
adjudication process rife with pressure tactics that silences witnesses and
defendants, creating an environment that should produce more error than
would be expected if due process norms were operative. This court culture
“exists as its own ecosystem, far from the oversight and accountability of the
legal bar and the city at large.”481 Her book is infused with tales of racialized
and class-based degradation ceremonies (e.g., a judge ranting at an African
American woman being sentenced for the killing of her abusive husband)
that undermine the motion-picture ideal of wise and sober judges.482
Observed crude behavior by professionals both in public and private,483
toward witnesses and defendants indicate a cultural norm that is not attuned
to search strenuously for the truth. Indeed, the message was made explicit
in an overheard conversation:
Given . . . the view that the paper pushing of plea-bargaining was
not “real” legal work, fundamental due process protections are
regarded as mere formalities, at best a type of ceremony without
substance. This allows professionals to achieve a lowest common
denominator of due process.
Socialization was central to the institutional continuity of this
belief system and practice. Experienced prosecutors and even
judges taught new attorneys how to streamline processes to the
bare minimum of legality or laughed at attorneys who were so wet
behind the ears that they cited case law. For instance, two senior
first- and second-chair prosecutors in one courtroom coached as
their third-chair novice how to avoid doing plea bargains that
“long way.” The third chair would naively read a detailed account
of the facts of the case that the defendant was pleading guilty to
when asked to do so by the judge. The attorneys told her that this
detail was a complete “waste of time.” The first chair explained to
the third chair that she should put fewer facts on the record.
First Chair: All I say is “on such and such a date,” he was found
480
Still, if I have solid evidence that the culture in a hospital was negligent and biased in
regard to minor ailments, I’d have my doubts about the quality of work in major surgeries.
481
GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 12.
482
GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 51-54. Whites perceived as lower class are
similarly degraded as “hicks” or “rednecks.” Id. at 68.
483
GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 39-41 (discussing the sociological
examination of “front-stage” and “back-stage” behavior in social settings and in the Cook
County Court).
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stealing. So stipulated? OK. Let’s move on.
Third Chair: They [formal management] said I wasn’t putting
enough facts.
Second Chair: Mary, you can never put too little.484
Errors of justice in Cook County’s “don’t rock the boat” environment
could be errors of impunity. In a telling episode, when Gonzalez Van Cleve
was a prosecutorial intern she was tasked with organizing the next day’s
cases, which she misinterpreted as meaning she had to read the files and
absorb their content. She became fascinated with a case of a twenty year old
man who severely beat his grandmother “with a bat over the head” when she
refused to give him money for drugs. The file included gruesome
photographs and the grandmother’s victim statement asking for a severe
sentence. Gonzalez Van Cleve “made the rookie mistake of studying the
legal facts of the case while I managed the bureaucratic organization.” At a
pretrial conference the next day, the public defender (PD) counted on the
“prosecutor’s lack of legal engagement in the case or, even worse, the lack
of concern for another black victim, an elderly grandmother.” The PD
almost got away with downplaying the injuries and bluffed that the
grandmother might not want to pursue the case to the fullest (the PD did so
without positively stating an untruth). The prosecutor was about to buy the
PD’s suggested seven year sentence when Gonzalez Van Cleve violated her
dual role as in intern and as an ethnographer by stepping out of the shadows
to note that the victim was severely injured and asked for full prosecution.485
I violated several norms: I spoke. I negotiated. I advocated for a
black victim. I caught the public defender in a lie. I exposed my
supervisors’ apathy and perhaps their negligence. The resulting
silence hung in the room.486
When the participants recovered their balance, the defendant was given a
fourteen-year sentence. Gonzalez Van Cleve understood that she had
“muddied the cultural waters.” “[M]y arrogance cost a man a decade more
of his life.” The prosecutors “came ‘prepared’ with simplistic moral rubrics
ready to pursue the mope rather than legal evidence to pursue the case.” She
noted that the judge appeared animated, possibly because he was
“actually . . . discussing the law rather than simply engaging in the common
484
485
486

GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 74.
GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 123-24.
GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 479, at 124.
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name-calling and banter that defined most plea bargains.” Yet, what
Gonzalez Van Cleve identified as “discussing the law” amounted to the
judge noting the existence of permanent physical injury and calculating that
eighty-five percent of a seventeen-year sentence would amount to “14 years,
5 months and 12 days” of imprisonment.
As impunity includes not only false negatives but less than optimal
sentences, Gonzalez Van Cleve’s anecdote suggests that errors of impunity
may be as common as errors of due process. The adoption of Laudan’s
lowered standard of proof would perturb a plea bargaining ecosystem that is
far from pristine. In any event, the glimmers of racialized, lax, oppressive,
and a production-oriented court system offer support for Alschuler’s analysis
and weaken Lauadan’s implicit picture of a well-functioining pleabargaining process.
5. Murder, Race, and the State
Allen and Laudan properly express concern for serious crime victims,
but their color-blind and ahistoric approach is unlikely to remedy the deeplyrooted unconcern for black lives.487
Historical criminology has contributed to the grand observation that
state formation is associated with declines in interpersonal violence.488
Steven Pinker’s thesis on the decline of violence brings much of this
scholarship together, displaying a steady decline in European homicide rates
in different regions from the high Middle Ages to the twentieth century as
feudal principalities grew into consolidated nation states.489 The process
continued in a steady fashion in Europe where the post-Enlightenment
bureaucratic state applied many controls and the inducements of civilization
led to sharp declines of violence among upper class men.490 These data are
consistent with anthropological studies of warfare death rates in three kinds
of non-state societies and in states, with average death rates far higher in
non-state societies than in pre-modern and modern states.491 Pinker’s closein analysis of violence in the United States observes the much higher
American homicide rate (fluctuating from 5 to 10 per 100,000 in the
twentieth century) compared to England (steady at about 1 per 100,000 but
487

Allen & Laudan, supra note 4, at Part III.B.1&3.
See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS AND STATE
FORMATION AND CIVILIZATION 450-51 (1994).
489
STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED
63 (2011). Pinker summarizes Elias’s theory. See id. at 64-81 (“While Europe was becoming
less murderous overall . . .”).
490
PINKER, supra note 489, at 81-82.
491
PINKER, supra note 489, at 49, Figure 2-2 (displaying data on 21 prehistoric
archaeological sites, 8 hunter-gatherer societies, 10 hunter-horticulturalists & other tribal
groups, and 8 pre-modern (Ancient Mexico, before 1500 CE) and modern states).
488
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rising gently since 1970), and traces generally downward trends from
colonial times to the present.492
But the trends that most draw our attention are the different homicide
rates between whites and blacks. Somewhat surprising, from 1800 to the
mid-nineteenth century homicide rates among black and whites were quite
similar in New York City and Philadelphia but “the second half of the 19th
century also saw a fateful change, . . . [when] a gap opened up, and it
widened even further in the 20th century, when homicides among African
Americans skyrocketed, going from three times the white rate in New York
in the 1850s to almost thirteen times the white rate a century later.”493 Aside
from economic and social factors, Pinker observes, “communities of lowerincome African Americans were effectively stateless, relying on a culture of
honor (sometimes called “the code of the streets”) to defend their interests
rather than calling in the law.”494 I’ll return to Pinker’s “statelessness” thesis
after discussing the role of racism.
Police officers who patrol lower-income black communities tend to
comment on the high rates of violence they encounter in moralistic ways,
according to their apparent levels of education and comprehension, but their
expressions of frustration are understandable given that they often confront
violence and disorder more or less on their own.495 I assume that they, and
the mass of middle-class suburbanites who are entertained with accounts of
inner-city violence on the 11:00 o’clock news, might be surprised by
Pinker’s “statelessness” thesis.
The unnerving implication is that
continuously broadcasting the raw data of black crime fuels deep currents of
American racism. The findings of modern genetics indicates that the “vast
proportion of genetic diversity (85 to 90 percent) occurs within so-called
races (i.e., within Asians or Africans) and only a minor proportion (7
percent) between racial groups.”496 As Siddhartha Mukherjee puts it, “the
genome is strictly a one-way street.” A person’s ancestry can be assessed
492

PINKER, supra note 489, at 91-97.
PINKER, supra note 489, at 97.
494
PINKER, supra note 489, at 97-98 (emphasis added). Id. at 85 (“Not surprisingly,
lower-status people tend not to avail themselves of the law and may be antagonistic to it,
preferring the age-old alternative of self-help justice and a code of honor.”). Pinker notes that
police observe and comment on this. Id. Pinker describes the violent basis of the honor
societies of Homeric Greece, the Hebrew Bible, the Roman Empire and early Christendom,
and the chivalrous era of medieval knights. Id. at 40-41. See also JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE:
A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 11 (2015).
495
See Peter Nickeas, What Cops Know: You Can Learn A Lot About a City by Seeing it
Through the Eyes of Police Officers Who Patrol It, CHI. MAG. (June 26, 2017)
http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/July-2017/What-Cops-Know/; see also
David Couper, Behind the Badge: What Cops Think, IMPROVING POLICE (Jan. 12, 2017)
https://improvingpolice.wordpress.com/2017/01/12/behind-the-badge-what-cops-think/.
496
SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 341-42 (2016).
493
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with genomic tools, but knowing that yields very little knowledge about the
person’s characteristics. “The geneticist goes home happy; the racist returns
empty-handed.”497 Unfortunately for social observers, however, even as raw
racism is fading,498 “[t]here is copious evidence that individuals of all races
have implicit racial biases linking blacks with criminality.”499
Several observations about black-on-black homicide are worth noting
in light of Laudan and Allen’s expressed concern for “colorless” crime
victims and their claim that more and longer prison sentences will reduce
crime. Jill Leovy, drawing on available research in Ghettocide, notes that
many liberals in polite society are skittish about confronting the issue and
being labeled as racists, leaving this critical issue oddly under-researched.
“By the early twenty-first century, popular consensus held that any emphasis
on high rates of black criminality risked invoking the stigma of white racism.
So people were careful about how they spoke of it.”500 Nevertheless:
Homicide had ravaged the country’s black population for a
century or more. But it was at best a curiosity to the mainstream.
The raw agony it visited on thousands of ordinary people was
mostly invisible. The consequences were only superficially
discussed, the costs seldom tallied.
Society’s efforts to combat this mostly black-on-black murder
epidemic were inept, fragmented, underfunded, contorted by a
variety of ideological, political, and racial sensitivities. When
homicide did get attention, the focus seemed to be on spectacles—
mass shootings, celebrity murders—a step removed from the
people who were doing most of the dying: black men.

497

Id. at 342.
LEOVY, supra note 494, at 11 (“One of the enduring tropes of racist lore had been the
‘black beast,’ the inferior black man who could not control his impulses and was prone to
violence,”). I won’t even try to assay the degree to which an ‘alt-right’ ideology brought in
the current administration and its relation to “raw racism”—the picture is complex.
499
L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom,
126 YALE L. J. 862, n.82 (2017) (Book Review). In addition to the edgy topic of black-onblack homicide, a recent data-based report makes the stunning finding that in 400,000
homicides between 1980 and 2014, the killing was deemed justified in 2 percent of cases
overall but in 17 percent of cases where a white person killed an African American. Daniel
Lathrop & Anna Flagg, Killings of Blacks by Whites Are Far More Likely to Be Ruled
‘Justifiable’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/upshot/killi
ngs-of-blacks-by-whites-are-far-more-likely-to-be-ruled-justifiable.html?rref=collection%2
Fsectioncollection%2Fus&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=stream&module=str
eam_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=sectionfront.
500
LEOVY, supra note 494, at 11 (“Researchers describe skirting the subject for fear of
being labeled racist. Activists have sought to minimize it.”). According to James Forman, Jr.,
“progressives tend to avoid or change the subject” Id.
498
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They were the nation’s number one crime victims. They were the
people hurt most badly and most often, just 6 percent of the
country’s population but nearly 40 percent of those murdered.501
Leovy, consistent with Pinker, notes that historians traced the high rates of
black-on-black homicide to the late nineteenth century and observed that the
trend continued in contemporary Los Angeles, with its relatively low African
American population, even in mixed black and Hispanic neighborhoods.
“[I]t was, as one young man put it, as if black men had bull’s-eyes on their
backs.”502 Moreover, she also locates the root cause of high black violentcrime rates on statelessness, but a kind of stateless that must be seen clearly.
As she puts it, “Few experts examined what was evident every day in
[detective] John Skagg’s working life: that the state’s inability to catch and
punish even a bare majority of murderers in black enclaves such as Watts
was itself a root cause of the violence, and that this was a terrible problem—
perhaps the most terrible thing in contemporary American life.”503
High black violence rates reflecting injury to other African Americans
is certainly a terrible thing, but “the most terrible”? Perhaps Leovy is getting
too close to her subject. Or, perhaps not. The statelessness of poor African
Americans is not like the the formal statelessness of Jewish refugees fleeing
Nazi Germany on the Hamburg-Amerika Line’s ship the St. Louis in May
1939, who were refused entry to Havana and passed the shores of Miami on
their return to Europe.504 The “statelessness” of African Americans is more
precisely seen as the withdrawal of the normal benefits of citizenship. To
locate the place of weak police protection in this kind of statelessness,
consider Richard Rothstein’s thesis that housing discrimination, which has
done as much to separate the races as anything, has been a “consistent
government policy that was employed in the mid-twentieth century.”505
Housing segregation was enforced throughout the United States by explicit
rules and laws at all levels of government that excluded African Americans
from or relegated them to segregated enclaves in emergency housing built
during World War II and in public housing, by racial zoning, by excluding

501

LEOVY, supra note 494, at 6.
LEOVY, supra note 494, at 10.
503
LEOVY, supra note 494, at 7-8.
504
Feelings against allowing more Jewish refugees to enter Cuba was fueled by the
concern that they would compete for jobs against the native population. A few were allowed
entry but 908 others were returned to Germany, despite organized efforts to aid them, passing
close to Miami on the return voyage. Some of the 908 held German citizenship, for what it
was worth, and others were formally stateless. Voyage of the St. Louis, HOLOCAUST
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005267.
505
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
502
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African Americans from federally subsidized mortgages, by allowing mass
home building projects like Levittown to exclude blacks, by permitting
private agreements of white home-owners associations to exclude African
Americans, and by “the willingness of the Internal Revenue service (IRS) to
grant tax exempt status to churches, hospitals, universities, neighborhood
associations, and other groups that promoted residential segregation.”506 A
variety of local initiatives like raising sewer fees, condemning land for parks,
or “slum removal” to built interstate highways disrupted plans for proposed
interracial housing or simply disrupted established African American
neighborhoods.507 A result of this massive effort to segregate America was
to suppress the job prospects and incomes of black Americans.508 And,
always and everywhere these laws were backed up with the unwillingness of
law enforcement to prevent “move in violence, what Rothstein called state
sanctioned violence.509
Few would deny the significant gains among African Americans in
education, employment, and participation in American life in recent decades.
And yet, despite the gains due in large measure to the reversal of legal
segregation with the passage of civil rights laws in the 1950s and 1960s, and
despite the growth of a significant black middle class and even elite class,
the enduring legacy of segregation has left a seemingly unbridgeable gap. A
disproportionate number of African Americans live in poverty. Middle class
blacks lag in wealth even if incomes are comparable to whites.510 Schools
have become resegregated because of divided housing patterns and for the
most part poorly serve black students. Many African Americans were not
able to advance economically as the great economic shifts of globalization,
automation, job-loss, and wage stagnation created the “new urban poor,”511
a condition that has now claimed many white victims. White backlash to
affirmative action programs and the ominous advance of voter suppression
have sought to maintain white advantage if not supremacy.512 A central
factor in preserving a divided polity has been the war on drugs and mass
506

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 505, at 101.
See also THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND
INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (2014).
508
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 505, at 153-71.
509
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 505, at 139-51. Move-in violence continues to be a problem.
See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS AND HATE CRIME
(2002).
510
EUGENE ROBINSON, DISINTEGRATION: THE SPLINTERING OF BLACK AMERICA (2010);
see A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 291-94 (Gerald David Jaynes &
Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds. 1989).
511
See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR (1996).
512
Carroll Rhodes, Federal Appellate Courts Push Back Against States’ Voter
Suppression Laws, 85. MISS. L. J. 1227 (2016).
507
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incarceration, i.e., the “new Jim Crow.”513
The toleration of black crime, then, is not another problem but an
essential part of the deep fabric of anti-black racism that has stained
American and holds on with a tenacious grip. Leovy sketched its essential
form in the old Jim Crow era, combining the heavy criminalization of
African Americans for petty crimes as a gateway to peonage,514 while
completely ignoring black-on-black violence, which according to Jim-Crow
era anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker, “‘places the Negro outside the
law.’”515 In the post-civil rights era, blindness to the needs of poor black
communities, combined with fear of crime and drugs among African
Americans mixed with conventional crime and punishment tropes, played
out in a different way. James Forman convincingly shows that while African
American leaders and communities helped to initiate mass incarceration by
supporting tough on crime measures; their more complete political desires
encompassed “root cause solutions” to drug use that included better
education and job training.516 As a newly emergent dominant political class
in Washington, D. C. in the 1970s but not entirely in control of budgets,
blacks sought better police protection and the kinds of social services that
would make for more viable communities. They only got the former: harsh
drug enforcement and penalties instead of effective drug treatment,517 strict
gun control while the national gun market saturated inner cities;518 and
African American police who did not refrain from violence against
suspects.519 While black police “executives joined many of America’s other
black leaders in calling for root-cause solutions to crime, including
socioeconomic reform and a health care overhaul, . . . they also demanded a
“nationwide war on drugs” and—yes—”minimum mandatory
sentencing.”520
It is instructive that once African Americans gained a degree of political
agency and control, although they sought to obtain needed social and
economic benefits for their communities, in the political competition for
resources they drew on a deep well of conventional thinking about crime that
turned out to be a trap (although it was not so perceived at the time) but that
fit with broader retributive tropes in America,521 and the growing reliance on
513

ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW, supra note 157.
See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).
515
LEOVY, supra note 494, at 9.
516
FORMAN, supra note 157, at 29-30.
517
FORMAN, supra note 157, at 17-46.
518
FORMAN, supra note 157, at 47-77.
519
FORMAN, supra note 157, at 78-115.
520
FORMAN, supra note 157, at 115.
521
WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 168.
514
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“law and order as a source of political legitimacy.522 They failed, however,
to obtain an array of services and benefits from the state that were not in the
narrow interests of controlling political elites. This pattern fits Lisa Miller’s
analysis and conclusion that “[p]olicies widely supported by local officials
and citizen alliances are sometimes thwarted by legislators representing
much larger constituencies with little or no connection to local problems and
much less connection to serious crime.”523 The crime problems faced by
poor communities are embedded in a complex web of disadvantage that
requires complex solutions. The organizations that speak for such
communities are more diffuse and less potent that the kinds of single issue
lobbies, whether the NRA or the ACLU, that are better able to achieve
legislative successes. She argues “that state and national governments . . .
operate under structural constraints that can sometimes promote a much
narrower range of problem definitions and policy solutions than are apparent
in cities.”524 As a result, problems that are intertwined at the community
level, like transportation, jobs, blight, crime, health care and public services,
get short-shrift. The ultimate irony is that community requests for more
police are rooted in dissatisfactions with the quality of life and are nuanced
requests for reducing crime and disorder and improving communities, while
among those who hold the purse strings of government, these pleas are
turned into a “good cop, bad cop frame that polarizes much public
discourse.”525 The decision makers advance policies that fluctuate between
community-friendly policing incentives and “a blank check for aggressive
policing styles that are largely distrusted in low-income, particularly black
communities.”526
Still, this kind of liberal mewling, even if backed up by solid policy
analysis, does not get to the personal responsibility of the person committing
the criminal act. But when it comes to black-on-black violent crime and
murder, what the government fails to provide gets closer to the placing part
of the responsibility on the state. It’s not just better schools and midnight
basketball that are missing, but, to repeat, “the state’s inability to catch and
punish even a bare majority of murderers in black enclaves such as Watts.”
Leovy claims that her thesis is simple: “where the criminal justice system
522

SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 157.
LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS OF
CRIME CONTROL 4 (2008).
524
MILLER, supra note 523, at 7.
525
MILLER, supra note 523, at 163.
526
MILLER, supra note 523, at 164. This tension played out in the monumental story of
the rise and fall of zero-tolerance and stop, question and frisk policing in New York City. See
Michael D. White et al., Federal Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural
Experiment Exploring the Effects of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New
York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9 (2016).
523

ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

8/10/2018 10:03 AM

THE ANTI-BLACKSTONIANS

1423

fails to respond vigorously to violent injury and death, homicide becomes
endemic.”527 Well, perhaps this is just a fact of life and limited ability of
human institutions that must be endured, like the lack of adequate defense
resources accepted as a reality by Cassell. But Leovy digs deeper. In Los
Angeles law enforcement is reasonably well resourced. What the LAPD did,
perhaps by default, was to marginalize homicide investigation, and doubly
marginalize it in poor areas “south of I-10.” Unlike the stereotype and
perhaps the reality in other police departments that place homicide detectives
at the top of the department’s pecking order, in Los Angeles, patrol work
was valorized, reflecting the culture of aggressive control instilled in the
department by Chiefs William Parker and William Gates that culminated in
the Rodney King beating.528 Working south of I-10 for any length of time
hurt an officer’s chances for promotion. Plum assignments were sought in
the Robbery-Homicide division located at LAPD headquarters where an
officer might investigate an unusually complex or celebrity case that would
help make his or her reputation.529 Murders south of I-10 did not make the
news and in the high-crime era of the 1980s detectives were often
overwhelmed with cases. “According to the old unwritten code of the Los
Angeles Police Department” the kinds of murders that went unsolved were
“nothing murder[s]. ‘NHI—No Human Involved,” the cops used to say.”530
This narrative account cannot prove with scientific precision that the
state has withdrawn from places like south-central Los Angeles to a degree
that renders its inhabitants “stateless.” But a polity and a police department
that in 1993 accepted a homicide rate of 368 per 100,000 for black men in
their twenties without expending extraordinary resources to reduce it, as did
Los Angeles County, should in any moral universe bear some of the
responsibility for the killings. As violent crime and homicide rates have
generally declined in America in recent decades, the persistently high rates
of murder in poor pockets of cities like Baltimore, Chicago and Detroit, point
to problems that require serious action by the state.
The anti-Blackstonians propose the simplest of solutions to the
complex problem of chilling rates of intraracial violence in poor black
communities. Their laser-like focus on the Blackstone ratio or Blackstone
principle and trial verdicts can be seen as academic myopia, or more
cynically, as a smokescreen that diverts thought among academicians from
considering more potent solutions to a real crime problem. Nothing they
propose would raise the money and change the attitudes that would get the
527
528

LEOVY, supra note 494, at 8.
JOE DOMANICK, BLUE: THE LAPD AND THE BATTLE TO REDEEM AMERICAN POLICING

(2015).
529
530

LEOVY, supra note 494, at 24-29, 38-39.
LEOVY, supra note 494, at 6.
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police (responding to already committed crimes) and the state services
(water, education, transportation, jobs, etc. that would lessen the
environment for violence) to address the upstream process. And nothing
they propose would funnel more money and change attitudes about the dayto-day working reality of indigent defense and the political climate within
which resources are sought for an ill-funded fundamental right.531
V.

CONCLUSION

The authors identified as anti-Blackstonians and challenged in this
Article write from different analytic perspectives and with differing aims.
What connects them is a mood that challenges Blackstonian legal orthodoxy
of the the adversary criminal process and their disconnect from relevant
empirical criminological knowledge. Each author’s proposals claims to
make contemporary criminal procedure law and the attendant judicial
process more rational; each posits that their proposal would on average result
in more accurate verdicts. My critique challenges their assertions. Although
each proposal has reasonable kernel, I have shown that each rests on limited
or flawed premises; the proposals would likely increase the number of
wrongful convictions without increasing public safety, thereby producing
less accurate verdicts.
Epps’s thought experiment seeks to hermetically seal the Blackstone
principle from its attendant rules (e.g., proof beyond a reasonable doubt) to
show that a theoretically even playing field would better distribute
punishments. I have shown that the empirical basis for his argument that the
Blackstone principle is dynamic and results in lesser benefits to defendants
is close to nonexistent. Epps draws on a grab bag of logical ideas that do not
reflect the empirical reality of the contemporary criminal justice and
adversary systems. Beyond the world of legal academics where a sort of
economic rationality divorced from thick description is valued, I am
concerned that Epps’s naïve foray would be used as ammunition by policy
makers (including elected prosecutors who hold significant political power
in their localities) who wish to preserve a harsh and punitive crime-controlmodel ideology at a time when many across the political spectrum are calling
for a more temperate justice system.532
531
Indigent defense is funded at the county level and competes with other demands;
however, there may be ways to make indigent defense efficient and effective. See Burkhart,
supra note 350; Davies and Worden, supra note 350; Janet Moore & Andrew L. B. Davies,
Knowing Defense, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 345 (2017).
532
It is worth keeping in mind that in America’s fragmented political system, a great deal
of criminal justice policy making occurs at the county level, where the prosecutor and the
sheriff are likely to hold far greater sway over their nominal supervisors on the county
commission. When gathered together in politically engaged pressure groups, these officials
have the potential to qualify if not erode constitutional rights. See Walt Bogdanich & Grace
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Epps is the only writer among the anti-Blackstonians who formally
eschews the Blackstone principle. Laudan and Allen formally support their
own estimate of the Blackstone ratio developed by formal reasoning and
buttressed with mathematics to attack virtually every rule of criminal
procedure that is associated with the Blackstone principle. I have challenged
two of their arguments. First, their analysis that purports to show that the
current system frees “too many” guilty violent criminals is flawed in
attributing outcomes resulting from “upstream” criminal justice (i.e., mostly
police investigation) to downstream prosecutorial decision-making and trial
verdicts. Their analysis overly discounts the strong possibility that many
acquitted at trial are factually innocent and undervalues the likelihood of a
substantial number of innocent felony defendants pleading guilty. Second,
they make assertions about the effects of incapacitation resulting from higher
rates of prosecutors’ charges and guilty verdicts that would not hold up in a
first-year graduate seminar in criminology. If taken seriously, their proposals
would expand prison populations with very little crime suppression effect
and possibly increase serious crime in the long run.
Cassell, who supports the Blackstone principle, writes in a different and
somewhat less abstract register than the other authors, and more directly
addresses issues raised by the innocence movement. With the Blackstone
principle as a starting point, each author necessarily writes in the shadow of
the new understanding that a nontrivial number of innocent felony
defendants are convicted every year. Nevertheless, Epps’s essay is
unconnected to concerns raised by innocence movement writings. As for
Laudan and Allen, one author was present at the birth of the innocence
movement and apparently did not like what he saw.533 Thus, while
Laudanand Allen can be seen in part as a reaction to an innocence movement
agenda, the writings proceed along abstract planes that are in the tradition of
philosophic inquiries into evidence law.
Cassell’s essay and chapter, however, respond directly to innocence
movement concerns. What is intriguing is that he proposes a mix of
Blackstone principle (e.g., robust discovery) and anti-Blackstone principle
(e.g., eliminate several constitutional protections) proposals that he claims
will produce more accurate verdicts. Despite some formal areas of
agreement,534 on the whole my evaluation of Cassell’s proposals are that they
Ashford, An Alabama Sheriff, a Mystery Check and a Blogger Who Cried Foul, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/us/ana-franklin-alabama-sheriff.htm
l?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fus&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=
rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=sectionfront.
533
Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 4, at 85-86 (expressing reservations
about the Northwestern University conference on the death penalty in 1998).
534
A point of possible agreement with Cassell is that cases like Wade and Miranda, which
expressed the desiderata of liberal Supreme Court justices, advanced ultimately ineffective
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make unsupportable claims or are stalking horses for maintaining and
strengthening a conventionally conservative approach to criminal procedure
that was part of the conservative counterrevolution to Warren Court
doctrines. The Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have in large measure
succeeded in advancing a more or less conservative doctrinal agenda in
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law. This jurisprudence has enabled the mass
incarceration that is plaguing in American criminal justice and society.535
The connection between conservative constitutional criminal procedure and
wrongful conviction is not clear, although it may have played a marginal role
in increasing wrongful convictions.536 Beyond this, it is hard for me to see
what beneficial practical effect overruling Mapp and Miranda would have.
Cassell’s derivative thesis that defense attorneys freed from the potential
need of filing boilerplate constitutional challenges would find the time and
resources to mount vigorous, investigator-supported, time-consuming and
fact-intensive investigations that, say, are conducted by innocence
organizations or police investigating major crime, seems fanciful. It is
supported by no empirical evidence.
Empirically grounded adversary process critiques could help to move
the mountain of the legal system’s entrenched culture.537 My concern is that
anti-Blackstonian ideas, if adopted, would generate unintended
consequences that could destabilize American adjudication in ways
dangerous to the routine civil liberty that we too often take for granted; like
the reality that for all their material and reputational advantages, American
prosecutors in court are just another set of lawyers who have to prove their
methods for improving the diagnosticity of police-conducted lineups and interrogations. The
innocence movement has advanced techniques devised by psychological scientists that have
been shown to produce more accurate lineups and less abusive interrogation methods while
generating accurate incriminating statements that tend to reduce the incidence of false
confessions.
535
See DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS, supra note 340.
536
Laqueur et al., Wrongful Conviction, supra note 142.
537
The anti-Blackstonians could draw on inquisitorial justice systems research. The
substantial comparative legal literature offers many ideas that should attract antiBlackstonians. Beginning at least with MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND
STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986), a challenge
to the adversary system can consider alternatives. In a few places Laudan cherry-picks
references to German procedure but that hardly makes for a consistent argument. Epps and
Laudan could have alluded to other ways of conducting trials before plunging into their antiBlackstonian models. Concerns raised by STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 328; Brown, supra
note 328 and WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999) about hyper-proceduralism,
noted by the anti-Blackstonians, is worth following up. Cassell does pay attention to this
critique. However, he uses it not to envision an efficient and rights-supportive inquisitorial
model as now exists in Germany. Rather he is aimed at keeping the present system minus
some procedural protections based on an unproven empirical hypothesis that eliminating a
few constitutional rights would magically free up time and reorient defense lawyers attentions
to finding cases of actual innocence.
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cases.538
So, I remain a wary Blackstonian in spite of agreeing with James Q.
Whitman’s criticism of reasonable doubt. Whitman’s deeply researched
intellectual history of two millennia of judging serious crimes in the Western
world argues that reasonable doubt developed as a rule of moral comfort to
ease the anxieties of judges and jurors faced with the obligation of ordering
executions.539 This sense has been lost in the modern world. “Instead we treat
reasonable doubt as a fact-finding principle, as a heuristic formula that can
help guide the individual juror in the effort to achieve sufficient certainty
about uncertain facts.540 But the rule, “a fossil, a misconstrued fragment of
the Christian past,”541 does not work well to guide factual decisions. While
jurors in earlier times had less doubt about case facts, they had reasons to not
decide, including fear of reprisals. “Unlike their ancestors, modern jurors
routinely decide cases in which there is authentic uncertainty about the
facts.”542 The project of turning the old moral comfort rule into “a modern
factual proof procedure” is “hopeless.”543 To make matters worse,
exclusionary rules embedded in American law denies evidence to fact finders
that may be critical to resolving the factual case accurately,544 and becomes
“a form of systematic protection for the accused.”545 This should be music to
the ears of anti-Blackstonians. However, they should read on.
Whitman attributes false convictions to the adversary system with its
reliance on reasonable doubt and exclusionary rules, but also raises a factor
from “the old theology”—the theology of punishment.546 In earlier times

538

It is instructive that Italy’s curious decision to inject adversarial criminal procedures
into their inquisitorial system was motivated in part by a desire to symbolically rid the country
of a code drafted under the Fascist regime and to inject democratic principles into the law.
Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 412, at 303. This suggests that for major legal
changes to ocur, as opposed to small, routine technical fixes, may need “external” crises may
be necessary. The “discovery” of actual innocence has provided just such a shock to the
adversary system, forcing needed reforms.
539
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185. The reasonable doubt scholarship is deep and
extensive. See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in
the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1165, 1168-69, n.5 & n.7 (2003).
540
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 202.
541
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 203.
542
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 207.
543
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 205.
544
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 207 (“Thus the law of evidence and the law of
criminal procedure give rise to trials in which American jurors (unlike French or German
ones) often receive a strangely fragmentary selection of the pertinent facts in a given case.”).
545
Whitman’s focus on reasonable doubt does not address the pro-prosecution bias of the
adversary system sketched in Part IV, supra.
546
WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 208-09. See also WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE,
supra note 168.

ZALMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

1428

8/10/2018 10:03 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1319

a morally justifiable system must protect both the innocent and
the guilty. Our conception of criminal justice has no obvious place
for protection of the guilty at all.. . . Our morality demands that
we do everything possible to prevent innocent persons from being
caught up in the toils of the criminal justice system. But it leaves
the guilty to whatever fate the punishment system may hold for
them, . . . while tolerating no doubts about ourselves as judges.”547
Whitman’s concern for punishment may seem orthogonal to trial procedure
issues. Jurors are supposed to decide facts and render verdicts with no care
about the sentence, although in the real world residues of human concern
dribble through. Since the 1970s our penal system abandoned a concern for
balanced justice that had a place for humane treatment of prisoners and
instead embarked on harsh policies of world-historic proportions. Current
prison practices will surely be seen by future generations with the same
horror now reserved for chattel slavery.548 Whitman’s radical solution for our
weird trial system—to abandon it for “straightforward procedures for
determining the truth” along continental lines—is either a non-starter or a
very long-range project.549 Like Epps, he aims at getting us to think
differently. The “tragic error” is to “refuse to recognize the harshness of our
nonblood punishments, and the correspondingly high moral stakes in
inflicting them. . . .[and] that judging and punishing are morally fearsome
acts.”550
Whitman’s ethics might simply be confusing to utilitarians, and may
not fit into Laudan and Allen’s and Cassell’s Manichean concern for the
welfare of potential crime victims and the wrongfully convicted to the
exclusion of concern for those who have been correctly convicted of
crimes.551 Scientists’ needs to abstract from reality to accomplish a coherent
research strategy may be necessary in the natural sciences where reductionist
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WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 209 (emphasis in original).
See CRAIG HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF
IMPRISONMENT (2006); WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 168; SIMON, MASS
INCARCERATION, supra note 444; Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
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WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 210. The same could be said for Laudan’s
proposal to make the prosecutor’s burden of proof dependent on a defendant’s record.
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WHITMAN, ORIGINS, supra note 185, at 211.
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Restorative justice does not seem to be for them although it could fit into Whitman’s
moral universe. See ROSS LONDON, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: FROM
THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM (2011). Although I am not an adherent of the original sin
doctrine, it seems that those who are might be inclined to look on the non-convicted as
including many who have not (yet) been apprehended for their criminal delicts. See Samantha
Cooney, Here Are All the Public Figures Who’ve Been Accused of Sexual Misconduct
After Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), http://time.com/5015204/harvey-wein
stein-scandal/.
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methodologies can produce findings not otherwise obtainable.552 In some
social science research, and in policy analysis and programming,
contextualist rather than reductionist strategies require that care be taken in
deciding what to include as relevant. There is a place for studying reasonable
doubt or trial procedures in the abstract, but Whitman reminds us that
abstracting away consequences like the possible effects of our penal system
might produce both deadly dilemmas and tragic consequences. As my
critique of Laudan and Allen suggests, their idea of expanding punishment—
in the absence of a better understanding of the effects of incapacitation—
could impose unnecessary harm on prisoners, their families and
communities, while doing very little to make potential victims safer.
My opposition to system changes that could impose greater hardship to
defendants with perhaps no crime reduction payoff is a partial reason for
wanting to keep a Blackstonian adjudication system until something better,
perhaps along the lines of the German criminal process,553 is established. To
offer a more positive reason for supporting a Blackstonian system, one that
might accept the costs of weaker crime control, I claim no originality but
piggyback my thinking onto a point made by Risinger.
[I]f you think that the state is more responsible for a wrongful
conviction than for a crime that might result from a criminal’s
freewill-based choice, influenced by a wrongful acquittal, to
commit a crime (Laplace’s emboldened wretches), then you will
reject [Allen and Laudan’s] analysis or at least its most extreme
implications. That does not mean that you would not be cognizant
that wrongful acquittals are indeed undesirable and involve costs
that must be taken into account in some calculus that tries to
resolve the dilemma that Allen and Laudan have identified. But
it does mean that there would be space for special treatment of the
problem of convicting the innocent.
Is such a position tenable? Viewing the state as having more
responsibility for harm done directly to the immediate subjects of
its acts than for harm done indirectly by its failures to act, or by
its choices to act one way rather than another, has a long tradition,
especially in situations where the latter harm is done by the
subsequent choice of an independent human agent.554
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Risinger’s observations followed a political-theoretic exchange in which he
linked his special concern for wrongful convictions to value choices between
Risinger’s
liberal/Romillist or conservative /Payleyite styles.555
observations may be of no concern to a Payleyite who is unconcerned with
the source of false acquittals (i.e., the government) and who registers only
the fact that false acquittals are (supposedly) imposing deadly dilemmas on
civilians requiring greater toughness, which might produce a few more
wrongful convictions. This narrow focus, however, discounts the risk that
an unconstrained criminal apparatus is the primary tool of tyranny,556 an
observation that weighed on the minds of the Constitution’s framers.557
This train of thought leads to an admission that my pro-Blackstonian
criminal procedure tilt arises not simply from an evaluation that the justice
process is stacked against the defendant,558 that innocence reforms can
improve system-diagnosticity, 559 or that crime victims are far better
protected by upstream criminal justice processes than from tinkering with
the standard of proof, which are weaknesses in the anti-Blackstonian view
of the adversary system’s error-reduction capacity. It arises from a selfappreciation of my ideological predilections. In Packer’s two models, crime
control ideology favored a speedy and even cursory approach to
investigating and prosecuting crimes on the assumption that innocent cases
would be accurately weeded out and that errors were excused because of the
crime control model’s major concern with factual guilt and protecting
civilians from the violation of their civil right to live peaceably. The due
process ideology is fixated on legal guilt and is willing to tolerate some level
of crime and disorder in order to retain a legal system that has the capacity
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In democratic countries the political significance of criminal law had almost been forgotten
when the impact of twentieth century dictatorship, with its unvaried immediate seizure of the
punitive legal apparatus, revived a startled realization of the dependence of civil liberty on
criminal law. By a sure and unconscionable instinct, the forces of repression cut straight to
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The treason clause was designed to prevent a popular President, or perhaps even an
unpopular President with his hands on the police apparatus, from expanding the definition of
treason, as did Henry VIII, to label political opponents as “enemies of the state” and crush
them with treason convictions. I wrote about this early in my academic career, arguing that
the overt use of treason in this way was archaic, but that in times of highly polarized political
passions, political actors seek to tarnish opponents in ways that are redolent of traitors. See
Marvin Zalman, The Federal Anti-Riot Act and Political Crime: The Need for Criminal Law
Theory, 20 VILLANOVA L. REV. 897 (1975).
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For example, that the innocence model is a Reliability Model. Findley, New
Paradigm, supra note 10.
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to slow advances toward executive autocracy and legislatively directed
repression of civil liberties.560 The ironic result, after a quarter-century of
innocence movement policy-thinking, has been to expose real weaknesses in
crime control model assumptions about factual guilt; the case is now strong
that due-process-model legal procedures (both at trial and post-conviction)
are really important for testing the factual guilt of individual cases. In light
of the exposure of criminal justice system weaknesses, the kind of intense
factual re-examination of specific convictions, exemplified by the forensic
methodology of Markman and Cassell’s “reprosecution” of James Adams,561
must be available to defendants and to prisoners in the post-conviction
process if a major goal of crime-control ideology (i.e., factual guilt) is to be
achieved.
Thus I support the Blackstone principle for epistemic and nonepistemic
reasons, the latter out of my concerns about state power and the instruments
through which it exercises its supposed monopoly of legitimate force. These
nonepistemic grounds may be orthogonal to the concerns of antiBlackstonians. Indeed, Epps “intuited” that support for the Blackstone
principle may be ideologically linked:
Finally, one’s intuitions here will also depend on underlying views
about the relationship between the state and its citizens. Those
that reject the view that the state has a strong obligation to protect
its citizens from crime may remain convinced of the moral harm
argument. Thoroughgoing libertarians, who prefer a minimal role
for the state in all domains, are particularly unlikely to be
persuaded. For the many people who reject those premises,
however, and who accept the post-New Deal understanding of the
government’s positive obligations, the Blackstone principle is
difficult to justify on deontological grounds.562
Many conservatives and most liberals,563 however, especially those with a
sense of history, are concerned about excessive state police power.
Conservatives seek to downsize government’s social welfare role as a way
of limiting state power but are comfortable with more expansive
prosecutorial power.564 In my view, the complex needs of a modern,
560
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Epps, supra note 2, at 1138. The moral harm argument is a deontological ground for
the Blackstone principle based on moral constraints on punishment.
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These terms are used in conventional, contemporary ways, to identify one’s political
valence.
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Despite professions of the downsizing goal, state size and power has remained
substantial over the last half century at times when more or less conservative Republican
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technological, high population, post-industrial society facing unprecedented
challenges, implies the necessity of a robust state apparatus in a mixed
capitalist—social welfare state, i.e., the so-called administrative state. I also
value an effective criminal justice (police and prosecution) apparatus to meet
many challenges posed by crime, whether individual or organizational,
conventional or novel (e.g., cyber). Appreciating the civil liberties risks
flowing from unchecked justice agency power, especially at the behest of
excessive executive branch power,565 leads me to support an overlapping
array of limiting institutions both within and without the justice process.
External checks include legislative and executive oversight, free press and
alternative media investigative reporting, civil society inquiry through nonprofit organizations, individual citizen checks (from video recording police
encounters to civil rights lawsuits), and the like. Internal checks are inherent
in the adversary system and begin with a robust and fearless defense bar,
constitutional criminal procedure limitations exemplified by the specifics
and the ethic underlying Warren Court rulings, and an alert and fair
judiciary.566 Within this mix, I value rules of procedure that slow down the
prosecution, but this is simply a way of stating a preference for Packer’s due
process model, when elements supporting that model, like reasonable doubt,
are challenged.567 If I thought that Laudan’s crime reduction hypothesis held
water, my decision would be harder, but I would still adhere to it for these
reasons. Although, my values lead me to fear abuses of state power more
than criminal harms (both are bad!), actual decisions about radically

party-headed administrations were in power and attempts to seriously check the role of the
state have failed. See Max Ehrenfreund, Kansas’s Conservative Experiment May Have Gone
Worse Than People Thought, WASH. POST (June 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/15/kansas-conservative-experiment-may-have-gone-worse-thanpeople-thought/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e4e0fa60ec1b.
Whether the current
administration’s attempt to radically downsize the “administrative state” will succeed remains
to be seen. Also, the conservative “small government” ideology supports the Enlightment’s
valorizing individual freedom over communal controls, a value shared by liberals and
conservatives albeit in different and not always consistent ways.
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The FBI’s role under J. Edgar Hoover during the cold war stands as a paradigmatic
example. See RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER, THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER
(1987). For a comprehensive view of the ways that the potential negatives of state power
might be constrained, see Daryl J. Levinson, Incapacitating the State, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 181, 192-206 (2014).
566
Luban makes the point forcefully: “The political argument for zealous criminal
defense does not claim that the adversary system is the best way of obtaining justice. It claims
just the opposite, that this process is the best way of impeding justice in the name of more
fundamental political ends, namely keeping the government’s hands off people.” DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 63 (1988). For other nonconsequentialist
justifications of the adversary system, see id. at 81-92.
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Substantive criminal law, if bounded by principle, should also play a role in
constraining the state. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 555, at 27-69 (discussing
the principle of legality).
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expanding or curtailing prosecutorial power should be subject to empirical
knowledge and testing, to the lessons of history, and to careful, contextual
thinking to the greatest degree possible.

